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Emmanuel Levinas sees Plato not as a philosopher of the other, but as a phi-
losopher of freedom: “This primacy of the same was Socrates’ teaching,” Levi-
nas says: “to receive nothing of the Other but what was in me, as though from 
all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from the outside—to re-
ceive nothing, or to be free” (TI 43/13–14).1 In what follows, I contest the idea 
that Plato is a philosopher of freedom for whom thought is a return to the 
self. Instead, Plato, like Levinas, is a philosopher of the other. More broadly, I 
maintain that Plato and Levinas are more similar than Levinas thinks because 
neither of them accepts the idea, often associated with early modernity, that 
human beings are fundamentally self-sufficient but instead thinks human be-
ings are essentially vulnerable and essentially in relation to others.
The point of the book, however, is not simply to critique Levinas, but 
also to resituate his work and see what is most unique about it by carefully 
delineating how he and Plato are different. They are different because they 
conceive our essential vulnerabilities and forms of responsiveness differently. 
For Plato, when we are knocked out by beautiful others, we are knocked 
out by the beauty of what is, that is, by the vision of eternal form. We then 
respond to the beauty and form we have seen by acting in its light, and we 
relate to others by sharing that vision with them and by acting in the light 
of that vision in our relations to them. For Levinas, we are disrupted by the 
newness, foreignness, or singularity of the other. The other, for him, is new, 
not eternal. The other is foreign. The other is unknowable singularity. For 
Plato, what makes nonaggressive relations to the other possible is sharing in a 
common third through mutual beholding of what is. For Levinas, to the con-
trary, cognition is a source of violence because of its selectivity and inability 
to comprehend singularity. Whether contemplative or calculative, knowledge 
for Levinas cannot comprehend the new, the foreign, the singular.
Especially in his earlier writings, Levinas exposes his work by contrast to 
Plato. Some contrasts he draws are striking and helpful such as the one, just 
discussed, between beholding what is and respecting singularity, or the one 
between the eternal and the new. On the other hand, his view that Plato is 
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a philosopher of freedom who thinks we receive nothing of the other but 
what is already in us involves, I maintain, an important misunderstanding 
of Plato’s view of cognition or knowledge. The misunderstanding leads to a 
misleading contrast between their views that keeps us from seeing what is 
most unique in Levinas’s own work. Plato does not think that “cognition is 
freedom.” Instead, like Levinas, Plato thinks responsiveness is prior to free-
dom—but Plato construes knowledge itself as responsive while it is crucial 
that for Levinas knowledge is not responsive but active.
The book is divided into two parts referring to Levinas’s two major works, 
Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise Than Being (1974). Each chap-
ter in the Totality and Infinity part includes an interpretation in some detail 
of one or more Platonic dialogues coupled with interpretation of relevant 
parts of Totality and Infinity. The first chapter, “Violence,” proceeds by way of 
interpreting the theme of violence in the drama and argument of the first 
part of Plato’s Phaedrus. In the chapter, I argue that both Plato and Levinas 
think we are essentially vulnerable and responsive, but they differ about what 
the vulnerability and responsiveness are like. For Plato, like the helmsman 
of the soul imagined as a chariot, when we human beings are knocked out 
by the beauty of an other, we are knocked out by the beauty of what is, that 
is, by the shining forth of eternal form. As a result of being knocked out, 
we cannot remain in ourselves. Instead, we act in the light of the beauty and 
form we have seen, and we relate to others not aggressively or selfishly but 
by sharing that vision with them and by acting in the light of that vision of 
beauty or goodness in our relations to them. For Levinas, in our everyday going 
on being, we are mastered, ruptured, and broken open by an other. The rup- 
ture results from the fact that the other is singular—not the individuation of a 
concept—and utterly new—absolute upsurge or absolute commencement—
and therefore not assimilable to my self. In addition, though the rupture is 
disturbing or unsettling, it is peaceful: the mastery teaches us something, 
and the breaking open opens for us a new dimension. Moreover, because the 
other is singular and new, my relation to him or her is not need, since need 
according to Levinas fulfills a retrospective lack, but desire, since for him 
desire is accomplished in hospitality, directness, openness, and other forms 
of relation to what is singular. For Plato, then, we are knocked out by beauty 
and, as a result, endeavor to share it, while for Levinas, we are peacefully 
broken open by the singular other who is new and, as a result, experience 
desire for him or her and accomplish that desire in openness, directness, or 
hospitality. For Plato, nonviolent relations are accomplished through shar-
ing a common third while for Levinas they are accomplished through types 
of relation to what can never be common. The topic of violence opens up 
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one way of delineating the different types of responsive relatedness found in 
Plato and Levinas: one type takes place through mutual beholding of what 
is while the other is accomplished by bracketing all cognition and relating to 
the other as singular.
In chapter 2, “Freedom,” I give a detailed interpretation of the drama and 
argument of Plato’s Meno, arguing from it that Plato is not a philosopher of 
freedom but in fact a critic of the emphasis on freedom in Greek cultural 
life. I then go on to show, through detailed interpretation of the Republic, 
that Plato nonetheless has a concept of freedom—an unusual concept of 
freedom through response. Then, through analysis of Totality and Infinity, I 
show that Levinas also discusses two levels of freedom, including one he cri-
tiques, freedom as spontaneity or the ability to determine the other, and one 
he accepts, freedom as responsibility. Each, then, believes we are essentially in 
relation to an other, so in that sense not free, and that we are free only in an 
unusual sense of freedom as response to what is outside us. At the same time, 
I argue, the type of response they espouse is different, with Plato focusing on 
responsive knowledge of form including the form or idea of the good and 
Levinas focusing on noncognitive response to the singular other. The former 
frees us from being thwarted in all our activity while the latter frees us from 
the enchainment to self.
The third chapter, “Creation,” delineates a distinction between the eter-
nal and the new. Starting out with the fact that Socrates in the Symposium 
thinks love (erōs) is desire and desire a type of need, while Levinas, in Total-
ity and Infinity, argues that desire is not a type of need, I argue that the two 
thinkers are closer together in their understanding of love and desire than it 
seems since Plato introduces need for the same reason that Levinas rejects it, 
namely, to highlight essential human vulnerability. I then go on to delineate 
how their views of love are nonetheless different since for Plato’s Socrates 
essential human vulnerability is to the eternal while for Levinas it is to the 
new. The chapter includes detailed interpretation of the drama and argument 
of the Symposium and related parts of Totality and Infinity. It also includes 
discussion of the good beyond being in Plato supported by interpretations of 
the Republic and a new and detailed interpretation of Plato’s dialogue on the 
beautiful, the Hippias Major, in which I argue that beauty, for Plato, is the 
appearance of form.
Chapter 4, “Knowledge,” interpreting accounts of recollection found in 
the Meno and the Phaedrus and related images in the Theaetetus, again argues 
against a strong distinction Levinas draws, this time between Platonic maieu-
tics and knowledge, on the one hand, and Levinas’s teaching and revelation, 
on the other, and claims that they are more similar than Levinas thinks since 
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each involves the learner’s responsiveness or receptivity to what is outside 
herself. Nonetheless, the chapter argues that the two are significantly different 
since in maieutics and recollection I direct myself to something both tran-
scendent and immanent, namely, form, but when I am taught by an other, in a 
Levinasian sense, I direct myself to what can never be immanent or compre-
hended, namely, the other who, as other, is absolutely foreign. The distinction 
between recollection in Plato and teaching for Levinas is between disclosure 
of what is hidden but indicated and revelation of what is absolutely foreign.
The Otherwise Than Being section of the book describes how Levinas, in 
his second major work, treats distinctions similar to those treated in Totality 
and Infinity but without reference to differences between Plato and Levinas. 
Chapter 5, “Time and the Self,” begins by showing that something like the 
Plato/Levinas distinction recurs in Otherwise Than Being but as a metaphysi-
cal distinction between synchrony and diachrony rather than an intertextual 
distinction between Plato and Levinas and that the central metaphysical idea 
of Totality and Infinity also recurs in Otherwise Than Being, namely, that the 
self is essentially in relation while at the same time absolving itself of rela-
tion. In addition, I argue that for Levinas this metaphysical idea shows up in 
ethics, epistemology, religion, and, most centrally, the treatment of the self. 
The argument is accomplished through a discussion of the idea of sensibility 
(in both of Levinas’s major works) including an interpretation and analy-
sis of Levinas’s use of the Yom Kippur morning haftarah portion on giving 
the bread from your mouth to the hungry (Isa. 58) as well as discussion of 
Levinas’s portrayal of knowledge as active and selective and the resulting 
implication that, in all knowledge, part stands in for or is an image of whole 
and therefore conveys only part of the whole so that knowledge cannot be 
allowed to remain fixed lest truth be incomplete or one-sided.
Chapter 6, “Violence, Freedom, Creation, Knowledge,” argues that Levi-
nas’s views on the topics named in the title remain the same in Otherwise 
Than Being and then goes on to argue that the central characteristic of knowl-
edge distinguishing Plato and Levinas is knowledge as responsive for Plato 
and knowledge as fundamentally active and selective for Levinas. Because 
knowledge is fundamentally active according to Levinas, it is by itself fun-
damentally violent, even when it is a contemplative beholding of what is. 
Levinas deals with the issue of such violence by subscribing to what I want 
to call a principle of epistemological humility in the face of the problem of 
epistemological idolatry, that is, of a fixed saying of what is, which is a deci-
sion rather than simply a type of responsiveness.2 Epistemological humility 
is realized through what Levinas in Otherwise Than Being calls the reduction 
(an idea closely related to Husserl’s epochē and Derrida’s deconstruction), the 
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reduction of the said to the saying, that is, through a resaying—and resaying 
and resaying and resaying—a dizzying back and forth between positing and 
resaying of the said in order to avoid congealment.
The seventh and final chapter, “Glory and Shine,” returns to comparison 
of Plato and Levinas and discusses their treatments of the accessible good—
beauty for Plato and glory for Levinas. I show that each de-emphasizes the 
most accessible good due to our tendency to overidentify with it and, as a 
result, to overlook our deficiencies and our need to remedy them. The dis-
cussion of Levinas includes exegesis of Otherwise Than Being illuminated by 
comparisons to key passages in Jewish liturgy, Talmud, and Midrash. In it, 
I argue that Levinas’s approach to glory and the holy has strong affinities 
to one traditional Jewish approach to them, and that this insight helps us 
think about how to interpret central themes in the discussion of the glory of 
the infinite and in his work as a whole. Some support for this claim is given 
through an interpretation of Levinas’s later essay, “Loving the Torah More 
Than God.” I argue, in addition, that the incomprehensibility of the singular 
other of whom we can only have a trace is echoed by Jewish notions of the 
holy, which is separate, and glory, which is immanent but because immanent 
must be articulated cautiously to avoid idolatry. I also argue against the idea 
that Otherwise Than Being’s austere emphasis on responsibility and gift im-
plies that the more positive topics found in Totality and Infinity, such as love, 
desire, and marvel, have been superseded in the second work. Such topics are 
present but de-emphasized in each work, I maintain, though de-emphasized 
in different ways corresponding to the different rhetorical strategies each 
contains. My discussion of Plato shows that Socrates, when young, values 
beauty so highly that he overlooks his own deficiencies; learns later to care 
less about appearing beautiful if it stands in the way of self-improvement; 
but comes to value beauty once again, in the Hippias Major, when he learns 
that beauty is form or form’s appearance. He learns, as a result, that beauty, 
as the most accessible human good and the source of grace and happiness in 
our lives, also can be dangerous, since our identification with it can lead us to 
overestimate ourselves. I also argue that, nonetheless, eros for the beautiful is 
not in fundamental conflict with passionate bodily eros for Socrates but, in-
stead, begins with it. Eros for the beautiful, which results in beautiful action, 
is the final stage or development of what is intrinsic to bodily passion itself.
2.
My approach in this book is to utilize extended textual exegesis to show both 
Plato and Levinas as philosophers of the other and then go on to show how 
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their philosophies of the other are the same and how they are different. To an 
extent, the texts, once interpreted and set side by side, speak for themselves. 
As a result, the focus of this book is not on analyzing Levinas’s specific com-
ments about his relation to Plato. Some discussion of those comments here, 
however, will set the stage for the exegesis and comparison to follow.
Levinas develops his own work in relation to Plato’s in the 1930s and 
1940s and extensively in his mid-century work—especially in Totality and 
Infinity (1961) and the one-page outline he wrote of Totality and Infinity 
when it was his thesis (1961), but also in other works such as “Philosophy 
and the Idea of the Infinite” (1957) and “Meaning and Sense” (1964). Refer-
ences to Plato decrease after mid-century.3 In the references to Plato, Levinas 
vacillates on whether to identify his work and ideas with Plato’s or to distin-
guish them. He distinguishes them most when he thinks that Plato in much 
of his work is a philosopher for whom thought and spirit more generally 
return to the self. He identifies them most when he identifies his own idea 
of the absolute or singular other with Socrates’s idea of the good beyond be-
ing in the Republic or of the beautiful in the Phaedrus. We can put these two 
gestures together in the following way. For Levinas, Plato is a philosopher for 
whom thought and spirit more generally are a return to the self, though he is 
as well one among a few Western philosophers who sometimes catch sight of 
a beyond being that keeps philosophy from being such a return.
Levinas sees a return to the self in reason, knowledge, recollection, ma-
ieutics, philosophy, love, and desire as Plato understands them. For Socrates, 
according to Levinas, “sovereign reason knows only itself ” and to know 
something is to remove its alterity from it: “To know amounts to grasping 
being out of nothing or reducing it to nothing, removing from it its alterity” 
(TI 43/14, 44/14). Knowing reduces being to nothing because knowing strips 
being of its alterity and reduces it to the self. Recollection, the Socratic way to 
knowledge, remains within the self and is contrasted with teaching as Levi-
nas defines it: “The transitivity of teaching, and not the interiority of reminis-
cence, manifests being” (TI 101/74). Levinasian teaching conveys something 
that is outside the self and, for this reason, is truly transitive. Reminiscence, 
or recollection, to the contrary, is a simple return to the self. Teaching, thus, 
is preferable to maieutics, that is, to Socratic midwifery, because “teaching is 
a discourse in which the master can bring to the student what the student 
does not yet know. It does not operate as maieutics, but continues the placing 
in me of the idea of infinity” (TI 180/155). Maieutics brings out in me what 
I already contain. Levinasian teaching, to the contrary, brings me what I can 
never contain. Socratic philosophy relates to an other through the mediation 
of a third term found in the self: “The relation with the other is here accom-
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plished only through a third term which I find in myself. The ideal of Socratic 
truth thus rests on the essential self-sufficiency of the same, its identification 
in ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is an egology” (TI 44/14). To illuminate or 
know an other is to bring the other within the self. Socratic philosophy, as a 
result, is egology.
Similarly, Socratic love returns to the self according to Levinas. Socrates 
interprets love as a type of desire and desire as a type of need and, for Socrates, 
according to Levinas, “need is a void of the Soul; it proceeds from the subject” 
(TI 62/33). The alterity of what fills or feeds desire, according to Levinas, is 
“reabsorbed into my own identity” (TI 33/3). Here, too, Levinas distinguishes 
his views from Plato’s. For Levinas, love is a type of desire and desire is for 
the absolutely other: “metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, 
toward the absolutely other” (TI 33/3). To the contrary, “love as analyzed by 
Plato does not coincide with what we have called Desire” since its first objec-
tive is not the other, the stranger, but immortality (TI 63/35). In addition, 
need for Plato is simple lack. “Need,” Levinas says, “cannot be interpreted 
as a simple lack, despite the psychology of need given by Plato” (TI 114/87). 
Moreover, for Plato, the lack can be filled since need is the source of resource 
as described in the story detailed in the Symposium according to which Eros 
is the son of Need (penia) and Resource (poros)—that is, eros is need that 
spurs me to the satisfaction of need (TI 115/87). Desire, for Levinas, by its 
very nature can never be satisfied.
On the other hand, Levinas identifies his work with Plato’s when he 
identifies his idea of the singular other—the other who, because singular, 
cannot be related to through qualities—with Plato’s notion of the good or 
the beautiful as beyond being. Plato’s philosophy is ontology and thus egol-
ogy, but Plato sometimes catches sight of a beyond being. To the extent that 
Levinas sees Plato as a philosopher for whom the beyond being is important, 
he identifies his work with Plato’s and considers himself a Platonist. For ex-
ample, in the outline of Totality and Infinity Levinas publishes in 1961 in 
the Annales de l ’Université de Paris, he concludes by describing Totality and 
Infinity as a “return to Platonism” (“Summary,” 121/386).4 What he finds 
important in Platonism, he says in the outline, is the idea of an absolute, that 
is, a principle that is absolved from history and culture. The first intelligible, 
he maintains, is the other revealed by the face rather than disclosed through 
qualities. The first signification, thus, since it is signification of the absolute 
other, emerges in morality and is independent of or absolved from history. 
To say that the other bared of all qualities is the first intelligible, he main-
tains, is “to affirm also the independence of ethics with regard to history” (SU 
121/386).
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Levinas makes a similar point in “Meaning and Sense” in 1964: “the con-
temporary philosophy of meaning is thus opposed to Plato at an essential 
point: the intelligible is not conceivable outside of the becoming which sug-
gests it” (MS 83/30–31). Plato, to the contrary, believes that “the separate-
ness of the intelligible world” means that “the world of meanings precedes 
language and culture, which express it” (MS 84/31).
Levinas associates this absolute first intelligible with the good beyond be-
ing of Plato’s Republic. For example, in the section of Totality and Infinity on 
“Separation and Absoluteness,” he says, “One of the ways of Greek meta-
physics consisted in seeking a return to and the fusion with Unity. But Greek 
metaphysics conceived the Good as separate from the totality of essences, 
and in this way . . . it caught sight of a structure such that the totality could 
admit of a beyond” (TI 102/76). Greek philosophy totalizes, in other words 
but, with Plato’s idea of the good beyond being, catches sight of something 
separate from or beyond the totality. In general, Levinas associates Plato’s 
good beyond being with his own idea of the other as transcendent: “If the 
notions of totality and being are notions that cover one another, the notion of 
the transcendent places us beyond categories of being. We thus encounter, in 
our own way, the Platonic idea of the Good beyond Being. The transcendent 
is what can not be encompassed” (TI 293/269).
Levinas also associates his idea of the absolute other with the idea of the 
beautiful in Plato’s Phaedrus. In that dialogue, Socrates claims that the great-
est goods come to human beings through divine madness. The delirium is 
not irrational, according to Levinas. Instead, it is reason itself in its thinking 
of the ideas. The delirium has to do with “the presence in thought of an idea 
whose ideatum overflows the capacity of thought” (TI 49/20). Such mad-
ness is contrasted with “a thought that proceeds from him who ‘has his own 
head to himself ’ ” (TI 49/20, where the reference Levinas gives is to Plato’s 
Phaedrus 244a). Possession by a god is not irrational but is experience of the 
noumenal and the new (TI 50/20). In other places, Levinas refers to such de-
sire as non-nostalgic (PI 57/242). Regarding love, Levinas once again speaks 
of Plato as catching sight of the true view. For, when Plato’s Socrates rejects 
Aristophanes’s idea of love that brings us together with our ancient missing 
half, Levinas speculates that he has “caught sight” of love and philosophy as 
non-nostalgic: “Has not Plato, rejecting the myth of the androgynous being 
presented by Aristophanes, caught sight of the non-nostalgic character of 
Love and philosophy” (TI 63/34–35; compare PI 57/243).
As with Plato, so also with Western philosophy more generally for Levi-
nas. Most often, he says, it is ontology: “Western philosophy has most often 
been an ontology: a reduction of the other to the same” (TI 43/13). How-
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ever, there are exceptions—cases in which traces of the ethical break through 
(EI 190–91). In addition to Plato’s idea of the good, Levinas also refers to 
Descartes’s idea of the infinite as the relation between thought and an idea 
that thought cannot contain: “the ‘I think’ maintains with the Infinite it can 
nowise contain and from which it is separated a relation called ‘idea of infin-
ity’ ” (TI 48/19). Levinas also refers to Plotinus on the good (OB 95/121) and 
Aristotle on the agent intellect (TI 49/20) as exceptions.
In chapters that follow, I will indicate that desire that does not return to 
the self (homecoming) or to the past (nostalgia) need not be desire for the 
absolute or new but could be, and for Plato is, desire for the eternal. Similarly, 
I will question whether the image of divine madness in Plato’s Phaedrus is 
of thought aiming at something singular or absolute that it cannot contain. 
I will also question Levinas’s view that for Plato reason, knowledge, recol-
lection, maieutics, philosophy, love, and desire all return to the self and will 
maintain instead that in each of these, for him, I am, in part, directed outside 
myself. Plato, in my view, is a philosopher of the other throughout his work. 
My point here is, simply, that Levinas is critical of Plato when he sees Plato 
as one for whom thought and spirit are a return to the self and that he identi-
fies with Plato when he takes Plato to have the same notion of absolute oth-
erness that Levinas has, namely, absolute otherness as an idea that thought 
cannot contain.
3.
A word about my approach to interpreting Plato and Levinas. Plato’s dia-
logues are a combination of argument and action (logos and ergon). The teach-
ings of the dialogues—what we might venture to call Plato’s teachings or 
Plato’s views—are found in both. Argument must be understood in relation 
to action and action in relation to argument.
For example, at one point in the Meno, a dialogue I will discuss in more 
detail in chapter 2, Socrates argues that true opinion is as good as knowledge 
in practice and that, therefore, the prior conclusion they reached that virtue 
is knowledge is incorrect (Meno 97b9–10). Reading the argument he gives on 
behalf of true opinion by itself might lead the reader to the conclusion that 
Socrates no longer believes that virtue is knowledge. However, after Socrates 
gives that argument, Meno is affected and begins to wonder. He wonders 
why knowledge is valued more highly than true opinion (Meno 97c11–d3). 
After he does so, Socrates brings into the discussion the statues of the great 
sculptor Daedalus, which are thought to be so lifelike that they run away if 
they are not chained down, and uses them as an analogy for true opinions 
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since true opinions, according to Socrates, run away from a human being’s 
soul if they are not chained down by reasoning about cause (Meno 97d4–
98a4). The imaginative interlude indicates that their earlier conclusion that 
virtue is knowledge in fact has not changed since knowledge is more secure 
than true opinion. Meno has changed, though. He stops simply repeating 
what he has heard and instead expresses himself. Even more, he expresses 
wonder. Wonder involves awareness of one’s own lack (if you wonder, then 
you do not know). Socrates has created the conditions for Meno to wonder 
and, as a result, actually think instead of simply absorbing someone else’s 
views. Moreover, he has given Meno a reason for valuing knowledge over 
opinion, namely, that knowledge is more secure. Arguments in Plato, the 
example shows, need to be interpreted in their dramatic context.
Drama also is intrinsically important in the dialogues. The whole drama of 
Meno ordering Socrates around in argument and refusing to think is part of 
the dialogue’s teaching on its topic, virtue. The drama illuminates the opening 
question of the dialogue, namely, is virtue teachable and, more generally, how 
is virtue acquired. If virtue is knowledge, then the drama itself is an example 
bearing on the dialogue’s topic since it is the drama of a particular search for 
knowledge. Virtue is as difficult to teach as it is difficult for Socrates to get 
Meno really to inquire about what virtue is. The dialogue, in other words, 
performs an answer to the question whether virtue is teachable. Because it 
does so, it functions as well as an apology or defense of Socrates on the charge 
of corrupting the young. Though Meno is known for his viciousness after 
the dramatic date of the dialogue, the dialogue does not show Socrates as 
culpable but as trying to lead Meno in a better direction and failing due to 
Meno’s own strong tendencies.
I see Plato’s Socrates—the Socrates created by Plato in the dialogues—as 
having the skills of a good teacher, if teacher is the right term, given that 
Socrates, in the Apology, says he is not one. As a good teacher, or at least 
someone very much like a good teacher, Socrates speaks differently to dif-
ferent types of people. Doing so is a principle Socrates himself enunciates in 
the Phaedrus where he laments writing on the grounds that it speaks to every 
person in the same way instead of speaking differently to people who have 
different soul-types (Phdr. 271c10–d2). Socrates is well aware of different 
soul-types—of different personalities or characters, we might say—and ad-
dresses what he says differently to different people. The reader needs to keep 
this in mind in interpreting Socrates’s claims and arguments.
For example, in the Crito, at one point Socrates imagines that the laws 
come in and speak to Crito. They tell him that they are his mother and father 
who bore him and raised him. Therefore, they claim, he should treat them 
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well in return (Cr. 50a6–51c4). Why does Socrates personify the laws in this 
way? The answer lies in recognizing Crito’s age and what it tells us about 
his soul-type or personality. Readers, in my experience, often think Crito 
is young. Instead, he is about Socrates’s age and from the same deme (Ap. 
33d9–e1). What his age indicates about Crito is that his difficulty in un-
derstanding Socrates does not result from youth and inexperience but likely 
from an ingrained tendency only to see things a certain way. Specifically, he 
cannot comprehend any obligation other than an obligation to philoi (family 
or friends) such as Socrates, his contemporary and fellow demesman. Once 
Socrates sees Crito’s ingrained tendency, he realizes that he can only make his 
point about obligation to the city and its laws through personification. Crito 
understands obligation to his philoi—it is because Socrates is a friend that 
Crito comes to steal him out of prison—so Socrates makes the laws into two 
of Crito’s most important philoi, his mother and father. In a number of Plato’s 
dialogues, a crucial moment in the dialogue is a dramatic moment such as 
this one in which Socrates can connect the topic of the dialogue’s argument 
to something about which the interlocutor cares deeply. In the Crito, it is 
family. In the Meno, it is whether there is anything such as virtue and, if so, 
how to get it.
Another aspect of Socrates as a good teacher is that he makes one point at 
a time. A teacher knows that, generally, students can absorb only one or two 
or a few new ideas at once. As a result, what may look like Socrates’s whole 
argument on a topic may in fact just be part of one. For example, book 1 of 
the Republic appears to be a complete argument on justice. In fact, it could 
pass for one complete shorter Platonic dialogue on a “what is it” question 
where the question is, specifically, what is justice—but in the end it takes 
nine more books for the topic to be explored in somewhat complete fashion. 
Socrates is ready to conclude discussion at the end of book 1, but he is pulled 
back into the argument by Glaucon (Rep. 2.357a1–b2). He also might have 
transitioned at the beginning of book 5 right into discussion of the decline of 
regimes, but he is forced by Polemarchus and Adeimantus to continue (Rep. 
5.449a1–b9). If Socrates had gone on to discuss the decline of regimes at that 
point, we would not have seen some of the most important images in the Pla-
tonic corpus, the images of the sun, the divided line, and the cave. Moreover, 
we would not have seen that the tripartite account of the soul and of virtue 
was not Socrates’s final account of the soul and of virtue but only an account 
of the partial development of a soul and of the political or conventional virtue 
that accompanies such partial development.
Similarly, Socrates is ready to stop after he gives his first speech on eros 
in the Phaedrus but is compelled by Phaedrus and Socrates’s daimon to stay 
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and give a second (Phdr. 241d2–243e3). There are a number of reasons why 
Socrates might want to stop at that point. Perhaps he simply does not want 
to make the effort to give an account of the highest or, as we might put it, 
most abstract levels of ontology. Or, knowing Phaedrus’s soul-type, perhaps 
Socrates does not think Phaedrus is, either dispositionally or intellectually, 
up to a discussion of higher-order ontology. In addition, Socrates presumably 
is aware of the erotic possibilities of the discussion. Alone with Phaedrus 
on a hot summer day, the challenge for Socrates is to discuss erotic passion 
without exploiting beautiful Phaedrus. The possibilities of a sexual encounter 
are evident. We know from other dialogues that Socrates tends to avoid such 
encounters: from the Symposium, for example, where Alcibiades describes 
Socrates as having spurned beautiful Alcibiades’s sexual advances even in 
bed and, for another example, the Charmides in which Socrates is aroused at 
Charmides’s naked bodily beauty and calls on a poet and a discussion of the 
question what is moderation (sōphrosynē) to calm himself down.
What the above examples indicate is the importance for us of contextual-
izing even relatively complete parts of Plato’s dialogues lest we miss Plato’s 
points. It would be mistaken to think, due to the interlude on true opinion in 
the Meno, that Socrates has abandoned his earlier view that virtue is knowl-
edge or, because of the parts of the soul account of virtue in the Republic, that 
Plato has abandoned the view that virtue is knowledge. Similarly, in my view, 
it would be inappropriate to critique Plato on virtue on the grounds that 
the argument that virtue is knowledge in the Meno does not state what type 
of knowledge virtue is. The argument is not deficient but incomplete. The 
type of knowledge is spelled out in the Republic where we learn that virtue 
is knowledge of all time and all being including the brightest part of being, 
the idea of the good, as I will discuss in chapter 2. Once someone has that 
knowledge—knowledge that results from an extensive education—not only 
will they know the good, but also they will love the good and do what is good. 
In the Meno, unlike the Republic and Phaedrus, Socrates does not give the full 
ontological account that would explain what kind of knowledge is needed for 
one to be virtuous in the full sense.5
In the Phaedrus and Republic, we see that Socrates also defers, or provides 
an alternative for, direct discussion of higher-order metaphysics by utilizing 
beautiful images, images to be discussed further in chapters 1, 6, and 7. In 
the Phaedrus, Socrates gives an image of the soul as a winged chariot and 
recollection as the ascent of the chariot to a place beyond the heavens where 
the form of beauty is imaged as sitting on a beautiful throne. The image is 
unforgettable. In the Republic, the form of the good is imaged as an illumi-
nating sun and learning (and dare we say recollection?) as the ascent out of a 
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dark cave. In the Meno, the image of recollection is one of remembering what 
the soul learned in a prior life (as we will see in chapter 2). In the Theaetetus, 
recollection is imaged as having birds in a bird cage and then taking them out 
(as we will see in chapter 4).
Images such as these fulfill a pedagogical function in the dialogues. They 
make the abstract metaphysics under discussion easier to comprehend and 
harder to forget. They are not, however, to be taken literally. In both the Meno 
and the Phaedrus, for example, Socrates gives two accounts of recollection, 
first one through an image, and then one that is more literal. In the Meno, 
Socrates’s more literal account of recollection is that it is securing true opin-
ions through causal reasoning (or, we might say, reasoning about why) (Meno 
98a3–4). He indicates that the second is the more literal version of the first 
when he says, about the second, “as we agreed previously” (Meno 98a4–5). The 
two are one because the second is the literal version of the first. Similarly, in 
the Phaedrus, Socrates first gives an image of recollection—as the ascent of a 
chariot to the place beyond the heavens—and then a more literal definition 
of recollection as understanding what is said according to form, moving from 
multiple perceptions to what is gathered into one by reasoning (logismōi) 
(Phdr. 249b6–c4).
Socrates’s use of images is another example of good teaching. People 
have different inclinations for and types of comprehension, and good teach-
ing involves recognizing these and approaching different people differently. 
Socrates does not hide the more literal accounts, though. Instead, he states 
them clearly. However, the images are so powerful that they remain, indelibly, 
in our memories, while the literal accounts and long arguments resist such 
easy assimilation. This is another reason for the use of images—though here 
the reason is as much Plato’s reason as that of the Platonic Socrates—or, if 
not his reason, lest we commit the intentional fallacy, at least the effect of his 
choice. Plato utilizes images so striking and beautiful that virtually no one 
who reads the dialogues can forget them. They function as devices for re-
membering and taking in basic claims and arguments, thus aiding both those 
who are adept at arguments more literally conveyed as well as those who are 
not. The images bring the teachings of the dialogues home.
Where does that leave us on how to interpret the dialogues as a whole? 
Following what has been said so far, it is important that each dialogue be 
interpreted on its own terms since, for one reason, different interlocutors in 
each dialogue will necessitate different dialogical approaches. Still, as indi-
cated above, one dialogue may need another for completion—not for com-
pletion of the dialogue as a literary product since, in my view, each of Plato’s 
dialogues, as a well-composed whole, is in that sense complete. Nonetheless, 
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dialogues may treat only one aspect of a Platonic-Socratic truth, thus making 
it necessary to read the different dialogues together. What one dialogue hints 
at or discusses only on one level, another dialogue may take further. Plato’s 
teachings, thus, are not only found in a whole dialogue under consideration, 
rather than simply in one part or interlocutor in that dialogue, but also are 
found in the dialogues as a whole. Plato’s views are not found in Socrates’s 
mouth, but in the dialogues, and not just in one or two dialogues, but in the 
dialogues as a whole, including all the speakers’ speeches as well as the drama 
of the dialogues.
This, however, does not mean that Plato’s views or teachings—that is, the 
teachings of the dialogues—do not often coincide with things that Socrates 
says. Young Socrates introduces forms in the Parmenides. Forms or ideas are 
an important part of the ontological teachings of Plato. He puts them in 
Socrates’s mouth though we know that it is Plato, rather than Socrates, who 
invented or discovered them (Aristotle, Met. 1.6 987b1–10). Even though 
on good literary grounds we cannot simply assume Socrates as the mouth-
piece for Plato, since sometimes it is the interlocutors who contribute to our 
understanding, nonetheless, often it is the Platonic Socrates, suitably inter-
preted, who articulates the views of Plato in the dialogues. For example, we 
learn a lot about Socrates himself from interlocutors such as Parmenides and 
Zeno in the Parmenides, Meno in the Meno, and Alcibiades in the Sympo-
sium. Moreover, we learn a lot about Plato’s views on the different dialogues’ 
topics from the drama of each dialogue, whether the particular drama is one 
that involves Socrates or simply involves one of the interlocutors—about vir-
tue from Meno’s resistance to inquiry, about the beautiful from Hippias’s 
distaste for publicly admitting his own deficiency, about spiritedness (thymos) 
from Polemarchus’s readiness to come to the defense of Cephalus, and so on. 
On the other hand, ontological ideas Socrates discusses, such as the forms—
including mathematical forms, qualitative forms, and evaluative forms (the 
levels found on the divided line in the Republic)—are ontological inventions 
or discoveries we can safely say are Platonic teachings. That ontology and its 
levels are reflected as well in the discussion Parmenides and Socrates have 
of what things there are forms of in the Parmenides where Socrates, when 
first introducing the notion of forms, is more certain of the type I will call 
transcategorials, such as the one, the beautiful, and the good, than he is of a 
categorial form such as human being (Prm. 130b3–d9). Also, whatever other 
interpretive issues there may be for Plato’s Seventh Letter, forms that cor-
respond to definitions are mentioned in it, specifically, “circle itself ” (Ep. 7 
342c2–3), and Socrates says we can know such forms when they come to 
light, like a spark, all of a sudden (Ep. 7 341c7–8). The reference to light calls 
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to mind the shining light referred to in the Republic and the Phaedrus. As 
both of those dialogues indicate, there is no discursive knowledge of forms. 
They are understood instead through nous or immediate intellectual insight.
A word, now, about my approach to reading Levinas. Levinas interpre-
tation is much more recent than Plato interpretation, of course. Moreover, 
issues about how to interpret Levinas’s work are ongoing ones in which only 
a little at this stage has been worked out to the point of consensus. Because 
of these factors, I will work through the major Levinas interpretive issue that 
affects this book in the book itself, not in the introduction. Some remarks 
here, however, will point to what is to come later.
Of the two major works, Levinas’s main exposition of his work by relation 
to Plato is found in Totality and Infinity. As a result, in the comparisons of 
Plato and Levinas in part 1 of this book, my focus on Levinas is on his views 
in Totality and Infinity. The question of the relation between Totality and 
Infinity and Otherwise Than Being is a live one with the answer still much-
discussed and debated by Levinas interpreters and, given the recent date of 
composition of each work, likely to continue for some time.
An answer that I do not accept is that the basic metaphysics of the first 
of the two works is rejected in the second. If it were, given that much of the 
most important material on Levinas and Plato is in the earlier work, that 
material might be merely of historical interest and much of the central expo-
sition of this book largely unnecessary. In part 2 of this book, then—specifi-
cally in chapters 5 and 6—I argue that Levinas’s fundamental metaphysics 
remains the same in his two major works.
4.
Finally, what about other interpretations of the relation between Plato and 
Levinas? At this point, not much has been written on the topic. Major ac-
counts are those by Adriaan Peperzak, Francisco Gonzales, Sarah Allen, and 
Tanja Staehler.
Adriaan Peperzak’s “The Platonism of Emmanuel Levinas” (1997) brings 
our attention to Levinas’s 1961 summary of Totality and Infinity, Peperzak’s 
translation of which is appended to the article. In addition, the article focuses 
on the Platonism Levinas avows in the summary and also introduces the 
reader to basic similarities and differences between Levinas’s thought and 
Plato’s.
The most important similarity Peperzak describes is the idea of an abso-
lute. Other similarities he mentions are important to note here but of less 
importance: the use of Plato’s distinction, found in the Sophist, between the 
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same and the other in Levinas’s idea of reduction of the other to the same 
(“Platonism of Emmanuel Levinas,” 114–15); the Phaedo’s contrast between 
bodily life and the life of the soul, which Peperzak sees as clearly retrieved in 
the contrast Levinas makes between ego and ethics; the use of kath’ hauto, a 
Platonic term describing a form as pure or without instantiation (116–17). 
Peperzak points out that we cannot take the Phaedo connection very far be-
cause Levinas does not describe the two lives that interest him in terms of a 
body-soul distinction as Plato does nor can we take the kath’ hauto compari-
son to go very far since for Plato it is essences that can be known or intuited 
that are kath’ hauto not the unknowable other as it is for Levinas. In these two 
cases, the use of Plato is more the use of a Platonic motif than something 
substantive. Similarly, though the same/other distinction in Levinas comes 
from Plato’s Sophist, the substantive Platonic contribution of the concept is 
not too great. In the Sophist, the same/other distinction is contrasted with 
the being/nonbeing distinction and that is crucial for Levinas—namely, that 
there is something other than being that is not simply nonbeing. However, 
the Sophist’s distinction merely gives Levinas room to articulate his own way 
of thinking of that. The idea of a singularity that is beyond essence or other-
wise than being is Levinas’s idea, not Plato’s.
Regarding the differences Peperzak describes, each of them needs further 
treatment, in my view. Levinas does not always articulate the most important 
distinctions between his work and Plato’s. Peperzak rightly indicates a cen-
tral difference Levinas points out on love or eros, namely, whether desire is 
a species of need as Socrates and Diotima suggest or not as Levinas claims: 
“at least one radical difference separates Levinas from Diotima and Socrates: 
desire is not a need; it cannot be satisfied; it does not circle back to some lack 
of mine” (115). Platonic need, according to Levinas, aims at completion or 
satisfaction and returns to the self while desire, he maintains, does not. In 
chapter 1, however, I argue that it is not the desire/need distinction that is 
crucial to distinguishing Plato and Levinas on eros since Levinas rejects need 
for the same reason that Plato has Socrates accept it, namely, in order to stress 
human vulnerability. The more important distinction, I argue, is about the 
object of love: for Socrates, the object of love is the eternal, while for Levinas 
it is the new.
Peperzak also points to Levinas’s critique of Platonic maieutics as a return 
to the self (117) and Levinas’s substitution of teaching, as he understands it, 
for maieutics. In chapter 2, I will argue against Levinas that maieutics is not 
a return to the self for Plato. Instead, the object of learning is both immanent 
and transcendent for Plato, since the object of learning is form for him while, 
to the contrary, it is the absolutely transcendent for Levinas since, according 
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to him, only the other can teach us. These distinctions lead to another im-
portant one, between what is hidden but can be disclosed for Plato and the 
foreign that can never be comprehended for Levinas.
Against Levinas, Peperzak asserts that Levinas’s idea of the good is not 
the same as Plato’s. Peperzak’s discussion of his assertion is brief, though, due 
to the length of the article in which it occurs (118–19). I agree that the two 
are different and, in chapter 3, work out my own extended idea of the dif-
ference, in part by giving an extended interpretation of the good and the 
beautiful for Plato. As Peperzak says, the good for Levinas is “the Good of 
human proximity” (118). But what is the good for Plato? I shall answer that 
question in some detail.
The most important similarity between Plato and Levinas according to 
Peperzak is their shared notion of an absolute that is absolved from history 
and culture (discussed in section 2 of this introduction). Peperzak emphasizes 
such an absolute in order to bring out Levinas’s “Platonism” as a response to 
and critique of various philosophical and intellectual tendencies of his time 
that would reduce human beings to parts of a whole from which they derive 
their being or meaning (113–14).
Levinas’s critique of then contemporary “anti-Platonists” is more of a fo-
cus for Peperzak in his article than for me in this book. Levinas, as I interpret 
him, is a transitional figure between modern and postmodern thought. The 
reason for this lies in his basic metaphysics of the self, an idea I delineate and 
discuss in detail in the chapters to follow. For Levinas, the self is essentially in 
relation while, at the same time, it absolves itself from relation (TI 110/82). 
Postmodern thought has affinity with Levinas’s idea that the self is relational 
or essentially outside itself since postmodern thought also has a critique of 
the sovereign self. Modern thought has affinity with Levinas’s idea that the 
self absolves itself of all relation since such a view gives some freedom or 
autonomy to the self. To the extent that Peperzak, in order to bring out the 
idea of Levinas as a critic of the major movements of his time, emphasizes 
Levinas’s claim that both human beings and the good are absolute, he over-
states the importance of human absoluteness for Levinas, in my view, and 
understates the importance of essential relationality for him.
In “Levinas Questioning Plato on Eros and Maieutics” (2008), Francisco J. 
Gonzales, like Peperzak, discusses basic similarities and differences between 
Plato and Levinas: Levinas’s acceptance of Plato’s ideas of the transcendent 
good and of the same and the other (40–42), his critique of Plato’s view of 
eros as an egoistic need understood as lack that requires satisfaction, and his 
criticism of maieutics as a return to the self that, as such, denies exteriority 
(46–50). He also mentions in passing, but does not elaborate on, the idea 
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that there are different objects of eros for Plato and Levinas: “What Levinas 
opposes to Socratic eros, in short, is a ravishment beyond all project, a move-
ment that does not uncover what already exists as hidden, but that instead 
moves toward what does not yet exist and has no quiddity” (49). In chapter 3, 
I will discuss the difference of objects in detail and maintain that the object 
of love for Plato is the eternal while for Levinas it is the new.
Gonzales’s main point, however, is that the fundamental difference be-
tween Plato and Levinas is participation in Plato and separation in Levinas. 
For Levinas, Gonzales says, the soul is fundamentally separate, that is, self-
sufficient or atheist. The soul must be absolutely separate if the other is to be 
absolute in its transcendence (53). For Plato, to the contrary, the same is es-
sentially a transcending toward the other. Gonzales complicates his critique 
by arguing that Levinas’s view involves an unbridgeable dichotomy—a “di-
chotomy between absolute interiority and absolute exteriority”—that Plato’s 
view of the soul does not contain (56).
Like Peperzak, however, Gonzales understresses essential relationality 
in Levinas. For Levinas, there is a relation between the absolved self and 
the absolutely other even though the relation is not participation. Making 
the central difference between the two philosophers one between separation 
(Levinas) and participation (Plato) occludes that fact. In my view, the dis-
tinction would better be articulated as one between two fundamental types 
of relation to the other, one that is a participation relation and one that is 
not. Levinas describes the latter relation in different ways, for example, as 
respect, desire, openness, directness. If we characterize the fundamental dif-
ference between the two philosophers as the difference between participation 
for Plato and, say, respect for Levinas, we have a more fruitful distinction 
from which to begin our thinking. For, put that way, we have two different 
alternatives both of which have appeal rather than two alternatives of which 
we must choose one: one alternative suggests important relations based on 
sharing; the other suggests important relations based on respect for what 
cannot be shared.
Similarly, Tanja Staehler, in “Getting Under the Skin: Platonic Myths in 
Levinas” (2008) and in Plato and Levinas: The Ambiguous Out-Side of Ethics 
(2010), does not see the relation between the self and the other in Levinas 
as a dichotomy. The self for Levinas is absolute in that it can separate itself 
from other and be self-sufficient, she maintains. But, once the self encounters 
an other, such closure is put in question—specifically, its ethical nature is 
put in question. “We can hide in our invisibility, in the interiority of the ego. 
We can do so—but we cannot be right as we do so,” she states in discussion 
of Levinas’s use of the Platonic myth of the ring of Gyges (“Getting Under 
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the Skin,” 67). Like Gonzales, she points out that I can only relate to an 
other as other if I have separated. Without the separation and concomitant 
self-sufficiency, my relation to the other is based on need. Unlike Gonzales, 
however, she claims that my ability to separate is a retreating from participa-
tion and not an original separation that is followed by participation: “this 
encounter [with the other] conditions my enjoyment, since such egoistic 
happiness depends on the fact that I am retreating, no longer participating” 
(“Getting Under the Skin,” 68). In the same vein, I would point to Levinas’s 
idea of a postponement. Referring to a thinking being, Levinas says, “Life 
permits it an as-for-me, a leave of absence, a postponement, which precisely 
is interiority” (TI 55/26). Gonzales’s distinction, then, might better be redone 
in another way—not between participation and separation but between par-
ticipation and postponement.
My general approach to Plato and Levinas shares a lot with Staehler’s, 
then. However, she accepts the idea that the reason the good is beyond be-
ing for Plato is that the good is outside and disruptive of any totality: “the 
Good,” she says, “ruptures and breaks open the totality of beings; this is the 
true meaning of ‘epekeina tēs ousias’ ” (Ambiguous Out-Side, 120). In chapter 
3, I give a different interpretation of the good for Plato. According to my 
interpretation, the good and the beautiful are aspects of ontology that have to 
do with the relation between forms and things, specifically, with the fact that 
forms are in one sense immanent in things and in another sense transcend 
them. I argue that Plato identifies the good with that immanence and the 
beautiful with that transcendence. The good and beautiful, on my account, do 
not rupture being but, instead, are central to it.
In a different vein, in The Philosophical Sense of Transcendence: Levinas and 
Plato on Loving Beyond Being (2009), Sarah Allen gives a God-centered ac-
count of Levinas according to which transcendence “comes to us from God” 
(5) who, for Levinas according to her, is a “source of order that gives direction 
and place to the various voices that constitute philosophical thinking” (315). 
Levinas’s God is similar to the good in Plato for Allen, then, because each 
is a source of order though God is different from the good according to her 
since the good is not personal and not a creator. As an other, though, God 
for Levinas is not so much a source of order for us as a source of rupture, I 
maintain.6 Thus, Levinas’s God would be different from Plato’s good in that 
way as well. How could God be a source of order for us given that we cannot 
cognize him?
For Staehler, then, Plato’s good is, like Levinas’s other, a source of rupture 
in being, while for Allen, Levinas’s God is, like Plato’s good, a source of be-
ing’s order. Instead of either of these two approaches, I want really to preserve 
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two alternatives, alternatives I will describe in different ways in what follows, 
for example, as the difference between form and singularity, sharing and re-
spect, knowledge and openness, the hidden and the foreign, or the eternal 
and the new.
For Levinas, then, multiplicity of persons is the condition for the fullness 
of truth, and multiple standpoints are not a departure from truth but lead 
to truth’s expansion: “It is as if the multiplicity of persons . . . were the con-
dition for the plenitude of ‘absolute truth’; as if every person, through his 
uniqueness, were the guarantee of the revelation of a unique aspect of truth, 
and some of its points would never have been revealed if some people had 
been absent from mankind” (BV 133/163). Levinas’s writing, replete with 
references and allusions to a multiplicity of other philosophers, reflects his 
view of truth. As a result, it can be expanded through interpretations that 
open up differently situated approaches that his comments on and claims 
about different thinkers invite. This book endeavors to accept the invitation 
found in Levinas’s engagement with Plato. Many interpreters of Levinas are 
minimally familiar with Plato or Greek philosophy as a whole while many 
philosophers and theorists who focus on Plato and ancient Greek thought do 
not work on Levinas. Essential Vulnerabilities aims to bring these two groups 
together since Levinas, as portrayed in it, is of interest to Plato scholars and 
Plato, as I describe him in it, is of interest to Levinas scholars, in each case 
due to the book’s stress on essential vulnerabilities, a topic of interest to both 
Plato scholars and Levinas scholars in their development of critiques of early 
modern views of the self. By opening up overlapping strains of interpretation 
of Plato and Levinas, the book aims to affect to some extent the trajectory of 
both fields and of how scholars in them situate their own views in relation to 
others. More broadly and humanely, though, the book, by reflecting on Plato 
and Levinas, is intended to open up for broader reflection two importantly 
contrasting ways in which the self is essentially vulnerable and responsive to 
others.
 PART I
  Totality and Infinity
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C H A P T E R  1
Violence
In one direction, relationships point to violence. For what does the presence 
of an other hold out for me? Will the other harm me, destroy me, subsume 
me, overwhelm me? Or will the other help me flourish, help me develop or 
grow, let me be, let me be me? Plato, in the Phaedrus, and Levinas, in Totality 
and Infinity, are concerned with this issue.1 But their treatment of it strik-
ingly differs. For Socrates in the Phaedrus, reason makes possible a contrast 
between love and assaultive hybris. For Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, we 
must go beyond reason to avoid violence. Why are their views on violence so 
different? Answers revolve around their different treatments of being, desire, 
and cognition. For Plato, being is transcendent and immanent, thus share-
able, and desire is cognitively intentional, as such the source of our ability to 
share with one another the shareable aspects of being. Since desire, for him, 
is for shareable being, my relation to an other need not be a violent, zero-
sum game. For Levinas, being is transcendent, not immanent—it includes a 
multiplicity of separate and singular entities that cannot be cognized or com-
prehended—and desire is noncognitive openness that makes pacific relations 
to singular others possible. Since desire, for him, is a noncognitive relation to 
an utterly transcendent other—to an other who, as transcendent, can neither 
be subsumed by me nor a threat to me—my relations to him or her need not 
be violent.
The similarities in Plato and Levinas’s views on violence are equally strik-
ing. Each thinker is concerned about ordinary, concrete violence, such as rape 
for Plato and war for Levinas. Each focuses on essential human vulnerabil-
ity—described by Plato as being wounded, knocked out, and falling on your 
back and by Levinas as being hollowed out and wounded or tenderized—and 
thinks such vulnerability is key to overcoming concrete violence. Each, in 
other words, adduces a figurative type of violence as the solution to the prob-
lem of ordinary or concrete violence.2 In fact, for each of them, delineating 
this figurative violence and distinguishing it from violence in a more ordinary 
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sense is a major task or goal. For Plato, this figurative violence is described 
metaphorically as being wounded, knocked out, and falling on your back, 
in descriptions that suggest both being overcome and letting something in. 
Levinas uses similar terms, such as wounded, hollowed out, or tenderized, and, 
in addition, calls the figurative violence essential violence since, in allowing 
yourself to be vulnerable to it, your going on being what you are is interrupted 
or violated. Each thinker counsels such openness, vulnerability, or wound, 
even though it is frighteningly similar to our vulnerability to rape or to the 
violence of war, in part because such openness promises great human goods 
to those who can overcome their fear of it.3 If we allow ourselves to be vul-
nerable or wounded in this figurative sense, they suggest, we will experience 
not violence but beauty for Plato, not violence but a new dimension or a 
teaching for Levinas. Each thinker, then, rejects the ideal of utter human self-
sufficiency and instead favors responsiveness in part since each believes that, 
through opening ourselves to what is external to us, we achieve great human 
goods. Finally and centrally, each, in addition, sees responsiveness as leading 
to or being constitutive of service—Levinas in Totality and Infinity speaks of 
being affected by and also having a fecund relation to the other, and Plato in 
the Phaedrus of being moved by and also serving or being a slave to the other.
These similarities in Plato and Levinas’s views are even more striking for 
us because Levinas himself does not see them. He sees Plato not as a phi-
losopher of the other, but a philosopher of freedom: “This primacy of the 
same was Socrates’ teaching,” Levinas says, “to receive nothing of the Other 
but what was in me, as though from all eternity I was in possession of what 
comes to me from the outside—to receive nothing, or to be free” (TI 43/13–
14). Levinas here mistakenly supposes that Socrates teaches us that think-
ing and knowing are a return to the self rather than vulnerability to what is 
outside us. The image of being knocked out and falling on your back suggests 
otherwise, as we will see in what follows.
In this chapter, I shall describe both Plato and Levinas as philosophers 
of the other, and delineate their similarities and differences on violence that 
I have outlined above. In doing so, I will open up for broader reflection two 
importantly contrasting ways in which the self is essentially responsive to—
as well as vulnerable to violence from—the other. The chapter also will sug-
gest a new way of situating Levinas in the history of philosophy, not, as he 
himself suggests, as one of the few in the history of philosophy who has 
a philosophy of the other but, instead, as one of a number of twentieth- 
century philosophers who turn to premodern thinkers for aid in critiquing 
early modern thought on a variety of topics including whether the self is es-
sentially closed or instead vulnerable, open and responsive to what is outside 
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it. As Heidegger—as well as some next-generation thinkers such as Arendt 
and Strauss—turns to the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle, so Levinas 
turns to Hebrew thought. This way of situating Levinas leaves us not with 
the task of considering the implications and legacy of Levinas as one of the 
few philosophers of the other in the history of philosophy, but with the task 
of sorting out the twentieth-century philosophic legacies of two similar and 
also very different premodern philosophies of the other, a task that in one 
rather traditional frame could be seen as part of deciding on, or synthesizing, 
the twentieth-century legacies of Athens and Jerusalem.4 This chapter carries 
out part of that task.5
1.
The Phaedrus includes a reference to rape near the beginning—when Phae-
drus points out their proximity to the site of Boreas’s mythical rape of Orei-
thyia, daughter of the king of Athens (Phdr. 229b4–5)—and ends with 
Phaedrus repeating the Greek proverb “the things of friends are in common” 
(279c6–7). In this way, the dialogue is framed by two directions in which 
relationships point: in one direction toward the possibility of violence or a 
zero-sum game; in the other direction toward mutuality. The setting reflects 
these possibilities. Socrates and Phaedrus walk alone together, outside the 
city, by the river Ilissus, in the warmth of the noonday sun. They talk as they 
walk. At a certain point, Socrates lies down, and they continue talking. What 
will happen between them? Who will get what from whom? Will one take 
advantage of the other?
Violence plays a role in other dramatic aspects of the dialogue as well. 
When Socrates tells Phaedrus that he does not think Lysias’s speech is good, 
Phaedrus playfully threatens to force Socrates to speak: “We two are alone in 
solitude, I am stronger and younger, and from all these things, ‘understand 
what I say to you’ and do not wish to speak as a consequence of violence 
rather than willingly” (236c8–d3). Socrates gives his first speech and is ready 
to leave by crossing the river when Phaedrus encourages him to speak fur-
ther. Socrates then charges Phaedrus with being the cause of a speech be-
ing made and Phaedrus responds by saying, “You do not exactly announce a 
war!” (242b6). Phaedrus moves from pointing out the site of a mythical rape, 
to playfully threatening force against Socrates, to recognizing that war and 
speech (sharing a speech) are opposites, to, at the end, declaring that loving 
relationships involve a common third. What is suggested is that violence is a 
zero-sum game in which one benefits to the detriment of another and that 
its opposite is a situation in which two share in a common third with the 
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paradigmatic case being two people, such as Socrates and Phaedrus, sharing 
in a speech.
At the beginning of the dialogue, Phaedrus comes to Socrates with a 
speech in praise of nonlovers that he is intrigued by and wants to recite. 
Socrates’s central criticism of the speech, written by Lysias, is that its main 
presuppositions about love (erōs) and about the springs of human action are 
false. The speech, Socrates maintains, presupposes that love is the irrational 
desire for bodily pleasures and that there are two sole sources of human ac-
tion (237d6–7)—an innate desire for pleasures and acquired opinion that 
aims at what is best. Sometimes desire and opinion have the same goal, but 
sometimes they do not (237d7–e1). For desire and rational opinion have no 
intimate connection. Desire is not shaped by reason but is irrational and has 
its own natural goal while opinion has no intimate connection with desire 
and, when rational, comprehends what is good or just. When desire and 
opinion do not have the same object, one can control or master the other, and 
then the one in control is the source of our action. Moderation (sōphrosynē), 
a virtue, is one type of mastery or control, specifically, control by rational 
opinion that guides us toward what is best. Hybris, a vice, is the other kind, 
rule by irrational desire that drags us toward pleasures.6 There are a number 
of types of hybris or mastery of desire over reason (logos) including one that 
has to do with the pleasures of food, called gluttony, one that has to do with 
the pleasures of drink, and eros or love, which has to do with the pleasures of 
bodily beauty, that is, with sex. In love, the desire for sex masters opinion that 
has an impulse toward what is right (238b7–c4). With these presuppositions 
in mind, Socrates says, Lysias concludes that since love is a type of hybris, it is 
better to have a relationship with a nonlover than a lover since the nonlover 
will control his desires and aim at what is good.
Socrates does not accept Lysias’s account for he does not accept the idea 
of human self-sufficiency or control on which it rests. In his own speech on 
love, the palinode, Socrates strikingly associates love with lack of control and 
being outside yourself. He associates love with being moved, with being en-
thused (that is, with having a god within), being enslaved, with awe (254b8), 
humility (254e7) and, generally, madness (mania). But he declares that “the 
greatest good things come to us by way of madness when, that is, it is given 
by the divine” (244a6–8) and that love is one example of such divine mad-
ness. The helmsman or governor of the soul, who is identified with reason 
(specifically, with nous), falls on his back at the sight of the beloved and then 
loves him and serves him. He is knocked out and no longer in the things of 
himself (250a6–7).
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Given that Socrates is a rationalist, we might have thought that the pic-
ture of sober relationships drawn by Lysias would appeal to him. For, since 
Euro pean modernity, many philosophers have associated rationalism with 
control or mastery. Descartes, for example, associates his rationalism with 
mastery and possession of nature rather than with responsiveness to it. His 
method is a method of conducting reason, not of being conducted by it or by 
something else to it, and, for him, what we know best are ideas that are in the 
mind rather than mind being fundamentally in relation to something outside 
itself. Cartesian reason is autonomous, and the Cartesian self is closed, not 
transcendent. Cartesian philosophy announces the self-sufficiency of the self 
and of reason.
Socrates’s view of love reflects a different view of reason and the self. For 
him, a certain type of madness or being out of your mind is preferable to 
sober moderation. Eros, according to Socrates, is not simply the desire for 
the pleasures associated with beautiful bodies but a type of divine madness; it 
pulls you out of your self (ecstasy) and draws you up (transcendence). More-
over, though eros is madness, it is not irrational. Instead, in eros, two lovers 
together cognize beauty. They cognize what really is. The ecstatic madness 
of eros leads lovers to the most important kind of rationality, a responsive 
rationality that is a simple beholding of what is.
To illustrate this, Socrates compares our soul to a chariot with a team 
of winged horses, representing spirited and erotic passions, and a winged 
charioteer, representing reason (nous).7 The beautiful and good horse is a 
lover of honor but with moderation and shame, comrade of genuine repu-
tation,8 driven by commands and speech alone. The bad horse, snub-nosed 
like Socrates, is a comrade of hybris and boasting, deaf and barely yielding 
to whip and goads. When we see beauty in the world, we discern its like-
ness to the eternal beauty we saw before we were born. We are drawn up to 
something outside ourselves. We want to fly upward and see that beauty, the 
very form of beauty. When the lover sees a beautiful youth, the hybristic and 
boastful erotic horse jumps on the youth and, carried along by violence, pulls 
them all forward to mention the pleasures of sexual gratification. At the same 
time, the honor-loving spirited horse, since he loves moderation and shame 
and cares about true reputation, due to shame refrains from going forward 
and pulls them all back. They struggle again and again, until the snub-nosed 
erotic horse wins out and leads them to the boyfriend whose face flashes like 
lightning. The charioteer, seeing the bright boy, remembers beauty itself and, 
in fear and awe, falls on his back (254b7–8). He is knocked out and no longer 
in the things of himself (250a6–7).9 His fall compels him to pull back on the 
30 violence
reins and restrain the horses. He restrains the unruly horses again and again, 
until the charioteer wins out and the erotic horse is humbled and follows the 
charioteer’s forethought (pronoia). Then the soul of the lover follows the be-
loved with shame and fear and serves the beloved’s needs. He even serves like 
a slave to him. The youth, seeing the service, is knocked out, and experiences 
love in return. The two share in the vision of the beautiful that flows between 
them. In the best love, their wings grow, and they both ascend to the beautiful 
itself through the activity of philosophizing together (253c7–257b6).
Socrates’s palinode requires interpretation. The ascent to the hyperour-
anian place is recollection where recollection is spelled out by Socrates in the 
dialogue as understanding what is said according to form, moving from mul-
tiple perceptions to what is gathered into one by reasoning (logismōi) (249b6– 
c4). Recollection, in other words, is, roughly, movement from perception to 
the conception or idea implicit in it. When the lover sees the lovely youth, 
his reaction is not just to the boy’s body but also to the boy’s beauty, which 
shines through him or, more mundanely, beauty of which the beautiful youth 
is a visible example or instance. As recollection is movement from perception 
to the conception or idea implicit in it so, Socrates indicates, love is not an 
entirely bodily experience, but cognitively intentional. I love and desire the 
beauty that is in and beyond the boy and his body. Love and desire are not 
simply brute response, in other words, but are cognitively intentional. They 
are response to the beauty I perceive in the boy.
In intimate relations, then, violence is one possibility, nonviolence another. 
Violence results from uncontrolled desire, specifically from uncontrolled de-
sire for the pleasures associated with bodily beauty. Such desire overcomes 
any rational opinion about what is good and results in using the other for 
self-satisfaction at the other’s expense. The dialogue’s frame suggests rape as 
a paradigm case of this. One type of nonviolence results from Lysian virtue 
understood as the tense control of reason, which aims at what is good, over 
desire, which has a different object. Such control, though, is unstable, given 
the lack of connection between desire and reason. Socrates describes another, 
more stable and complete type of nonviolence, one that comes through an 
astonishing mutuality in love, contrary to the normative pattern between lov-
ers and youths in Athens. Socrates says the boy feels love in return but calls 
it friendship, since he does not comprehend it. Both feel intense love because 
of the form of beauty that flows between them (255c4–d6).10 For Socrates, 
then, the two come together over a common third, the form of beauty, which 
they both behold. In love, two come together over something beautiful and 
good that can be shared. Since a form is both in and beyond one who knows 
it, it can be shared by another who knows it as well. This is one of Socrates’s 
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great discoveries, and the core to his solution of the problem of violence in 
relationships. Since being is fundamentally shareable, nonviolence is possible. 
The soul need not be a closed and masterful Cartesian self but, in knowledge 
and in love, can be and is open and vulnerable. Vulnerable to the boy’s beauty, 
the soul opens to the very idea of that beauty and shares it, nonviolently, with 
the boy.
Socrates’s account of love points to his notion of being. Being, for him, is 
fundamentally ecstatic or transcendent. Things are and are not what they are 
since their real being is the form in which they participate but with which 
they do not fully coincide. The very being of things transcends them. The 
transcendence is not utter transcendence, though, since things do share in the 
forms. But it is transcendence nonetheless, since things get their being from 
the forms. Human beings are ecstatic and transcendent, too, in two ways. 
First, like all beings, their being, their form, transcends them. Second, since 
knowledge is of the forms, human knowing is ecstatic and transcendent. It 
is of something outside human beings. Knowing is, fundamentally for him, 
being together with something outside yourself—not of something only as 
outside yourself, though, since knowing is recalling something, or bringing 
out the conception that is implicit in a perception you already have. Eros, 
too, since it is fundamentally a rational or cognitive process, is transcendent. 
But, like knowing, it also is of something within, something you possess, a 
god within, a directedness you already have. Being, then, is ambiguous. As 
Socrates says in the Republic, the things around us tumble about between be-
ing and nonbeing (5.479d3–5). Things are and are not what they are. Knowl-
edge and eros are and are not for something outside. And it is this structure 
that makes nonviolent intimate relationships possible between human be-
ings. For to be outside yourself is not to lose yourself but to enrich yourself, 
and mutual enrichment or growth through mutual beholding of what is—
through mutual participation in the forms—is possible.
Socrates resolves the issue of violence in relationships, then, through un-
derstanding desire as fundamentally cognitive or intentional and as both 
transcendent and immanent, where what is in you is also outside you and 
can be shared by another. When I am in love with an other, something is in 
me but it is also outside me and in and outside the other as well. Being is 
fundamentally shareable.
2.
But according to Levinas on the first page of Totality and Infinity, “being 
reveals itself as war”—even more, war is “the very patency, or the truth, of 
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the real” (TI 21/9). Being is war because of conatus, the fundamental and 
self-interested drive of beings to persist in their being above all else, a drive 
that leaves human beings fundamentally threatened by or allergic to others. 
Nonetheless, peace is possible. For peace, Levinas states in the book’s final 
chapter, is “the unity of plurality” (TI 306/283), and plurality ruptures being. 
Like the Phaedrus, then, Totality and Infinity is framed by two directions in 
which relations to others point: in one direction, toward violence, in another, 
toward the peace of plurality, difference, or alterity. Moreover, as with Plato 
in the Phaedrus, so Levinas in Totality and Infinity focuses on figurative vio-
lence—on an interruptive vulnerability that nonetheless is peaceful—as the 
resolution of the problem of violence in the more ordinary sense. There is a 
rupture in being, he says (TI 35/5, 278/255), an “ontological scission” (TI 
305/282).11 The rupture produces plurality without harm to the constitu-
ents of the plurality: “The fundamental fact of the ontological scission into 
same and other is a non-allergic relation of the same with the other” (TI 
305/282).12 There is a resistance in being (TI 44/14, 197/171), a contestation 
(TI 171/145), a mastery (TI 171/146), a breaking of the ceiling or a breaking 
open of a closed circle (TI 171/146), an opposition (TI 197/171). But it is 
a peaceful one: “pacific opposition” (TI 197/171), nonviolent resistance (TI 
197/171), nonhostile opposition (TI 171/146), mastery that does not con-
quer but teaches (TI 171/146), a breaking open that opens a new dimension 
(TI 197/172). The other is something or someone new (TI 219/194), abso-
lute upsurge (TI 89/62), absolute commencement (TI 272/250). A peaceful 
master who breaks totality open expansively not oppositionally.
Since the other is new and ruptures being, my peaceful relation to him 
or her is not need but desire. For need aims at fulfillment of what already is 
rather than aiming at or intending something other or new (TI 34/4). Desire 
is the nonallergic relation with the other. Apperception of desire, as a result, 
is the aim of the book: “The effort of this book is directed toward apper-
ceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity, toward apperceiving 
Desire” (TI 47/18). Desire is connected to love or eros and fecundity, where 
love, for Levinas, is for what absolutely is not yet (TI 264/242) and fecun-
dity is a relation to an other that is not a power over possibles (TI 267/245). 
Put differently, desire, eros, and fecundity are, according to Levinas, for the 
transcendent—the absolutely transcendent, not found even in potential in 
anything whatsoever that already exists (TI 35/5).13
Like Socrates in the Phaedrus, then, Levinas attacks the problem of vio-
lence by reconceiving desire. For him, though, the important distinction is 
not between desires that are and are not cognitively intentional but between 
need, which is ontological, and desire, which is metaphysical. What distin-
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guishes desire and need is transcendence. Need is for completion, satisfac-
tion, or fulfillment and thus essentially refers back to the self. Desire is for 
what is absolutely other, for what is something else entirely, where absolutely 
and entirely indicate that the other is not found at all in the one who desires, 
not even in potential. Desire is not completed but deepened by what it de-
sires: metaphysical desire “desires beyond everything that can simply com-
plete it” (TI 34/4).14 In desire, the remoteness of the other is not overcome 
but preserved (TI 34/4).
Since desire is for something not relatively but absolutely other, desire is 
not knowledge. Knowledge is a relation to an other through the mediation 
of a third term already given. As a result, knowledge cannot comprehend the 
absolutely other. Knowledge is associated with ontology, or theory as com-
prehension of beings, and is contrasted with metaphysics, or theory as respect 
for exteriority. Ontology promotes freedom since the reduction of what is 
other to the same through a neutral third term prevents alienation by the 
other and preserves my self-sufficient and thus spontaneous activity.15 Meta-
physics is concerned not with freedom but with critique since the presence 
of an unassimilable other, not reducible to my thoughts or to anything what-
soever that I already have, calls my spontaneity into question. Knowledge, 
the reduction of the other to the same, finds only what is already in itself, 
rests on the self-sufficiency of the same, and thus is an egology, a return to 
the self (TI 42–44/12–14). Levinas, like Socrates, then, solves the problem of 
violence through resort to transcendence but, unlike Socrates, resorts to an 
utter transcendence, with no trace of immanence, found in a fundamentally 
noncognitive relation to an other. For Levinas, peace in relationships comes 
from our openness to or respect for an other with whom we are in relation 
but whom we can never contain or comprehend.
Socrates resolves the issue of violence in relationships by reconceiving de-
sire as cognitively intentional and being as fundamentally shareable. Desire, 
for him, can comprehend and desire what is good or beautiful, and what is 
good or beautiful in the most important sense, since it is transcendent and 
immanent, can be shared. The best relationships are those in which desire for 
the other is consummated through sharing the shareable aspects of being. 
Levinas’s approach is to conceive desire as noncognitively intentional. One 
main goal of Totality and Infinity is to describe a type of intentionality that 
is not knowledge. That type of intentionality, according to Levinas, enables 
us to reach beyond being, which is war, toward the absolutely other and, by 
doing so, to establish the peace of plurality. It is an intentionality of a wholly 
different type (TI 23/xii), an intentionality of transcendence (TI 49/20), a 
signification without a context, a vision without an image (TI 23/xii). It is not 
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representation (TI 27/xvi), knowledge (TI 64/36), categorization (TI 69/41), 
disclosure (TI 64/36, 74/47), thought of an object (TI 49/20), or conscious-
ness in the ordinary sense (TI 274/252). As Heidegger argues that our rela-
tion to unknowable death is central to our being in the world, so Levinas 
makes our directedness to the unknowable other the central movement of 
spirit, central as a result to desire and eros.
Neither knowledge nor power, eros is sociality or multiplicity. Knowl-
edge reduces sociality: “Consciousness appears as the very type of existing in 
which the multiple is and yet, in synthesis, is no more, in which, consequently, 
transcendence, a simple relation, is less than being. The object is converted 
into an event of the subject” (TI 274/252). Eros, for Levinas, is not fusion 
but plurality: “Sexuality is in us neither knowledge nor power, but the very 
plurality of our existing” (TI 277/254). In eros, the “I springs forth without 
returning” (TI 271/249). Eros takes place beyond war with an other and his 
or her freedom for “the amorous subjectivity is transubstantiation itself ” (TI 
271/249). In eros, being is produced as multiple or, even more, as infinite. For 
the child is new—a rupture in being, a commencement (TI 278/255). The 
child produced through eros and fecundity is also erotic and fecund and thus 
productive of another, and another, and so on. Fecundity engenders fecundity 
(TI 269/247).16 Moreover, the child produced is free. The relation to the child 
in fecundity is creation ex nihilo, and “Creation ex nihilo breaks with system, 
posits a being outside of every system, that is, there where its freedom is pos-
sible” (TI 104–5/78). As a result, “Being is here produced not as the defini-
tiveness of a totality but as an incessant recommencement, and consequently 
as infinite” (TI 270/248).
Finally, though eros and fecundity are transcendent, they are not ecstatic 
(TI 269/247).17 Love produces plurality, not unity. When I love, I am not 
outside myself nor do I lose myself. Even more, the I is effectuated by its rela-
tion to an other. Fraternity constitutes ipseity (TI 279–280/257). It is for this 
reason that Levinas calls peace the unity of plurality (TI 306/283). The ipseity 
or unicity of each is preserved. Given the nonheroic nature of eros, includ-
ing the fact that in eros I lose my subject position, it may seem strange that, 
according to Levinas, I do not lose but gain my self in love. But this is one 
of Levinas’s fundamental ideas. Through losing my position as a subject, I be-
come my self. The self is not static. It does not remain the same. Instead, the 
self is the being whose existence consists in recovering or identifying itself 
through all that happens to it (TI 36/6). I sojourn in the world but remain at 
home with myself (TI 37/7), beings “remain at their post but communicate 
among themselves” (TI 48/19), each of us has a “universal identity in which 
the heterogeneous can be embraced” (TI 36/6).18 In desire and love, for Levi-
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nas, I go toward the other while retaining my self. The other as such, then, is 
not threatening for Levinas—though, of course, specific others may in fact be 
threatening—since my relations to others are in part constitutive of my self.
Levinas writes at a deep metaphysical level. What does he mean more 
freely? In desire, for Levinas, I intend the other while putting my own in-
terests, needs, concerns, cares out of play. In that sense, I am hollowed out 
or excavated by the other rather than completed by him or her (TI 34/4). In 
addition, I intend the other apart from any preconceptions I have of him or 
her, any evaluations, any standpoints, any categories. Levinas calls this type 
of response to the other a response to the other simply as other, as abso-
lutely other or absolute alterity, as singular. When I desire in this way, rather 
than being diminished, I am increased. I receive a teaching, Levinas says (TI 
197/171), the other opens a new dimension (TI 197/172), the other speaks 
to me (TI 198/172). In addition, when I desire in this way, though I put my 
own cares and interests out of play, I do not lose my self. I remain at a dis- 
tance (TI 34/4, 179/154), but this remaining at a distance from the other is 
the very process in which my self is developed. The self comes into existence 
in a process of responding to an other. The self comes about through a process 
of recovering my self through all my intentions of or responses to the other. 
As a result, I can both retain my self and relate to the other as more than an 
extension of me.
To intend the other while putting my interests and preconceptions out of 
play is not to do something but is to be affected by someone (TI 197/171). 
When I lose my mastery, Levinas says, I am moved or, better, tenderized (TI 
270/248). Love arises in the passivity of a wound (TI 277/254). Love is an 
open responsiveness that, though responsive rather than active, is productive. 
Through it, the other comes to be. Levinas calls the productive or genera-
tive quality of desire and love fecundity (TI 267–69/244–47). I stand back 
and give the other space to be, moreover, to be whatever and whoever he or 
she will be. The concrete case of fecundity is desire leading to the birth of a 
child—a new individual, a singular being, of no genus. Fecundity extends 
beyond this and is the quality of my desire and love for any other person. 
Through open response to an other, I enable the other to be and facilitate his 
or her future projects. My relation to my self can also be fecund. Through not 
conceptualizing but simply responding to my self, I give my self space to be, 
to be me, to be some me I am going to be.
Though the goal is peace, not war, the figurative language in which it is 
discussed is the language of violence—of excavation, rupture, wound, resis-
tance, breaking a circle open, tenderization. The violent language plays a role 
in the account of peace. For the breaking open opens a new dimension rather 
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than being destructive. This type of rupture is not ordinary but “essential vio-
lence”: “What, in action, breaks forth as essential violence (essentielle violence) 
is the surplus of being over the thought that claims to contain it, the marvel 
of the idea of infinity” (TI 27/xv).19 I cannot contain the other in thought—
but the inability points to surplus, not to destruction or diminution. Essential 
violence, unlike ordinary violence, is a marvel. It disrupts my essence—my 
going on being what I am—by supplementing it rather than harming or an-
nihilating it. Essential violence is a breaking open that does not destroy or 
diminish but opens a new dimension. The other peacefully opens me up.
We have seen this type of violent figure of speech before, in Plato. The 
helmsman of the soul feels fear and becomes a slave. The youth, in response, is 
knocked out. Feeling fear, becoming a slave, being knocked out—all suggest 
vulnerability to the other. It is Socrates’s job to describe a beneficial, rather 
than harmful, vulnerability, a vulnerability that is not a violation of limits, a 
vulnerability that enables one to develop, grow, or flourish. Phaedrus fears the 
other. Socrates teaches him that there are others to whom one may be vulner-
able without fear. What the helmsman feels is not fear in the ordinary sense. 
Hence, when Plato says the helmsman feels fear and awe, he means fear, that 
is, awe. Similarly, the lover’s service to the beloved may feel like slavery to 
one unaccustomed to vulnerability, but it is not. For it is a mutually beneficial 
service, rather than the harmful service to a master that is slavery in the ordi-
nary sense. We are witness to Socrates’s ontological expansion of vocabulary.
Similarly, Levinas uses the language of violence—of essential violence—to 
describe a vulnerability that is not a violation but a type of increase. Com-
merce with “the alterity of infinity does not offend (blesse) like an opinion,” 
he says; “it does not limit a mind in a way inadmissible to a philosopher” (TI 
171/146). Why not? Because “limitation is produced only within a total-
ity, whereas the relation with the Other breaks the ceiling of the totality. It 
is fundamentally pacific” (TI 171/146). The contrast to our relation to the 
absolutely other is our relation with others as conceived by those who see 
us as arbitrary, spontaneous, pure freedoms who as a result are necessarily 
in conflict one with another. “The other is not opposed to me as a freedom 
other than, but similar to my own, and consequently hostile to my own. The 
Other is not another freedom as arbitrary as my own, in which case it would 
traverse the infinity that separates me from him and enter under the same 
concept” (TI 171/146). The other breaks me open—peacefully. I am not just 
an arbitrary freedom for whom the encounter with any other freedom, any 
other person, is essentially threatening.20 The other is not essentially a threat 
but is instead an addition. Levinas goes on to say about the other, “His alter-
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ity is manifested in a mastery that does not conquer, but teaches. Teaching 
is not a species of a genus called domination, a hegemony at work within a 
totality, but is the presence of infinity breaking the closed circle of totality” 
(TI 171/146). The other teaches me, where teaching is giving me more than 
I already contain. Commerce with the other, then, does not hurt you, harm 
you, destroy you.
Essential violence is clearly distinct from violence in the ordinary sense, 
as awe is different from fear. I learn from the other’s teaching without shock: 
“The idea of infinity, the overflowing of finite thought by its content, effectu-
ates the relation of thought with what exceeds its capacity, with what at each 
moment it learns without suffering shock” (TI 197/171). The relation with 
the other absolutely other “is maintained without violence, in peace with this 
absolute alterity. The ‘resistance’ of the other does not do violence to me, does 
not act negatively” (TI 197/171). The other resists me. I cannot grasp the 
other. There is “total resistance to the grasp” (TI 197/172). But the resistance 
occurs “only by the opening of a new dimension” (TI 197/172).
Finally, as with Socrates, so also with Levinas, not only his conception of 
desire, but also his conception of being is key to his solution to the problem 
of violence. Being, in Totality and Infinity, is plural.21 Outside any conceptual 
scheme, any totality, lies the other. The other is singular where singularity is 
different than particularity. For a particular is always a particular of a certain 
genus. A singular has no genus: “The unicity of the I does not merely consist 
in being found in one sample only, but in existing without having a genus, 
without being the individuation of a concept. The ipseity of the I consists in 
remaining outside the distinction between the individual and the general” 
(TI 117–18/90). What makes the other is not a set of properties that distin-
guish it but its refusal of properties: “the refusal of the concept is not only one 
of the aspects of its being, but its whole content” (TI 118/90).
For Levinas, too, then, the issue of violence in relationships is resolved by 
reconceiving desire and being. Desire for him is noncognitive intentionality, 
noncognitive vulnerability to an other who is beyond any conceptual scheme 
or totality, in which we are resisted but not violated, mastered but not con-
quered, broken open expansively and not oppositionally. Desire, in addition, 
is fecund or generative rather than threatening. Through open responsiveness, 
desire makes others, and their future projects, possible. Finally, desire is tran-
scendent but not, in Levinas’s sense, ecstatic. When I desire, I move toward 
an other without losing myself. As a result, desire’s transcendence is nonvio-
lent. Desire points to plurality or multiplicity, to the peaceful coexistence of a 
multiplicity of singular beings.
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3.
Though Plato argues that reason is the source of nonviolence and Levinas 
that we must go beyond reason to overcome violence, we can see now that 
the two thinkers’ views on violence and the other are not completely different 
but share a common core: each, in his treatment of violence, stresses vulner-
ability and responsiveness to the other and rejects the idea of fundamental 
human self-sufficiency. As we have seen, a personified reason, according to 
Socrates, falls on its back when it sees the beautiful youth. The image is a 
dramatic, lovely, and philosophically important one. The helmsman of the 
soul, nous, sees the boy, remembers the form of beauty and, in fear and awe, 
falls on his back. He is knocked out and no longer in the things of himself 
(Phdr. 250a6–7). Reason, then, is not turned in on itself and in control but 
affected by the other outside itself. Being affected in this way causes reason, 
and eventually the reason-infused whole soul, to follow the beloved in awe 
and to serve the beloved’s needs. Even eros in the end is affected by the youth 
and, once affected, along with the rest of the soul, follows and serves him.
The language used to describe eros is violent but is used to convey some-
thing that is not, literally, violent. Love need not be assault, Socrates teaches 
the beautiful and justifiably nervous Phaedrus. Socrates’s lesson is not just for 
Phaedrus, but for any Athenians still influenced by a decayed heroic ideal. 
Love always disrupts you, Socrates suggests. It knocks you out. It takes you 
outside yourself. But the disruption is welcome. It stimulates you to grow and 
puts you in touch with something good. As Socrates puts it, it causes your 
wings to grow and draws you up to the form of beauty.
Levinas’s term for the disruption we experience in love, and in all direct 
relations to others, is essential violence, which, as we have seen, is not violence 
in an ordinary sense but rupture that gives me something I do not already 
have. When Levinas speaks of a breaking open that opens a new dimension, 
or of a mastery that does not conquer but teaches, he, like Plato, is refer-
ring to an initially shocking but ultimately welcome or desirable vulnerability 
to an other. I learn from the other “without suffering shock,” Levinas says. 
What I gain from the rupture called essential violence is a surplus, a marvel: 
“What, in action, breaks forth as essential violence is the surplus of being 
over the thought that claims to contain it, the marvel of the idea of infinity” 
(TI 27/xv).
Moreover, for Levinas, the self is not harmed but effectuated by its vulner-
ability to an other. Fraternity constitutes ipseity, as we have seen (TI 279–
80/257); I become my self by being affected by the other; the existence of the 
self consists in recovering itself—or, better, in identifying itself—through all 
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that happens to it (TI 36/6); I sojourn in the world but remain at home with 
myself (TI 37/7); each of us has a “universal identity in which the heteroge-
neous can be embraced” (TI 36/6). Each of these statements is a formulation 
of Levinas’s central metaphysical idea, of a self that is essentially in relation 
while, at the same time, absolves itself from those relations (TI 110/82).
With Plato and Levinas, then, we have not a philosopher of freedom and a 
philosopher of the other, but two philosophers of the other. Each considers 
human beings to be essentially, shockingly, and marvelously open, vulnerable, 
and responsive rather than closed, self-sufficient, and self-involved. Each finds 
the solution to the problem of violence in that openness to an other. At the 
same time, the type of responsive relatedness described by each is different: 
one type is cognitive and takes place through mutual beholding of what is, 
while the other is accomplished by bracketing cognition of what is and relat-
ing to the other as singular.
Do philosophies of the other fall into two fundamental kinds on the model 
of the two kinds that Plato and Levinas delineate for us? The ideas developed 
in this chapter leave that an open and lively question to be pursued. At the 
very least, the chapter leaves us with grounds for disagreeing with Levinas’s 
characterization of himself as one of very few in the history of philosophy 
who have a philosophy of the other. Instead, our inquiry in the chapter sug-
gests we might best characterize Levinas as one in a group of twentieth-
century philosophers who find rich resources in premodern thought for 
critiquing early modern ideas of the self as closed rather than open, vulner-
able, and responsive to the other, with Levinas turning to a fundamental kind 
of resource he describes as Hebrew and Heidegger and his students turning 
to a fundamental kind we, if we follow Levinas, could call Greek.22
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C H A P T E R  2
Freedom
1.
As we have seen, when Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, asserts that Plato 
is not a philosopher of the other, he focuses his critique on the concept of 
freedom. Speaking of Socrates’s views, he says, “This primacy of the same 
was Socrates’s teaching: to receive nothing of the Other but what was in me, 
as though from all eternity I was in possession of what comes to me from 
the outside—to receive nothing, or to be free.” Still speaking of Socrates’s 
views, Levinas goes on to amplify and delineate his critique by claiming that 
Socrates identifies cognition and freedom: “Freedom does not resemble the 
capricious spontaneity of free will; its ultimate meaning lies in this perma-
nence in the same, which is reason. Cognition is the deployment of this iden-
tity; it is freedom” (TI 43/13–14).
Levinas tends to speak of the history of Western philosophy as though it 
had one chapter—the chapter about freedom according to which the other 
is a threat and cognition is freedom. Speaking of the relation with absolute 
otherness, he says, “it does not limit a mind in a way inadmissible to a phi-
losopher” (TI 171/146) as though all philosophy were coextensive with the 
philosophy of freedom—except for a few rare cases in which traces of the 
ethical are visible “breaking through” the ontological but not quite break-
ing through all the way (“Ethics of the Infinite,” 190–91). Similarly, Levi-
nas praises Aristotle’s conception of agent intellect for being a receptivity 
of something external, something that comes “in by the gates” (TI 49/20, 
51/22), as if it were not the case that even sense perception is a type of recep-
tivity (to dektikon) according to Aristotle (De An. 424a17–19). For Aristotle, 
cognition is not freedom but receptivity.
Freedom is not a central concept in Plato’s work. There is no dialogue on 
freedom. Freedom is not on Plato’s list of virtues. In the Gorgias, it is Gor-
gias and Callicles who espouse freedom as an ideal and Socrates who refutes 
them.1 When Callicles defines virtue and happiness as luxury, uncontrol, and 
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freedom, Socrates claims against him that an orderly life is better than an 
uncontrolled one (492c3–493c7). Freedom appears at the beginning of the 
Lysis where Socrates argues against the view that we are happy when we are 
free to do whatever we want with respect to something rather than when we 
are wise about the thing, using as example a boy rather than a knowledge-
able charioteer driving a chariot (208e4–c2, 210a9–c4). In the Republic, greed 
for freedom in democracies leads to neglect of law and decline into tyranny 
(562a4–b12). In the Laws, the Athenian stranger claims freedom in the city 
must be supplemented by concern for wisdom and criticizes the Athenians 
for allowing unlimited freedom (698a5–701e8). Plato’s views, then, have 
more in common with Levinas’s than Levinas supposes. Both value respon-
siveness over freedom, heteronomy over autonomy.
Levinas, for example, questions the “undiscussed value of spontaneity” (TI 
83/55) and the centrality of freedom understood by him as “the determina-
tion of the other by the same” (TI 85/57). His whole work is devoted to pro-
viding an alternative to viewing the other as a threat (“Ethics of the Infinite,” 
182). “The Other,” Levinas says in Totality and Infinity, “is not opposed to me 
as a freedom other than, but similar to my own, and consequently hostile to 
my own” (TI 171/146). Instead, as we have seen, Levinas seeks a nonopposi-
tional relation to the other: “The effort of this book is directed toward apper-
ceiving in discourse a non-allergic relation with alterity, toward apperceiving 
Desire” (TI 47/18). In desire, as we have seen, I am opposed (TI 197/171), 
mastered (TI 171/146), or broken open (TI 171/146) by the other, but the 
opposition is a “pacific opposition” (TI 197/171), the mastery a “mastery that 
does not conquer but teaches” (TI 171/146), the breaking open a breaking 
open that opens “a new dimension” (TI 197/171). We can summarize, then, 
that the other is not a threat to my freedom but is a peaceful master who 
breaks totality open expansively not oppositionally. Justice, too, for Levinas 
is not “reconciling my freedom with the freedom of the others” (TI 83/55) 
but “consists in recognizing in the other my master” (TI 72/44). Justice is the 
“face to face approach” (TI 71/43), the most direct approach to an other there 
is. The “work of justice” is “the uprightness of the face to face” and “nothing 
is more direct than the face to face, which is straightforwardness itself (la 
droiture même)” (TI 78/51).
Levinas’s attack on Plato as a philosopher of freedom who believes that I 
receive nothing from the other that was not already in me perhaps finds its 
source most centrally in the Meno. However, in the Meno, it is not Socrates 
but Meno who is characterized as seeking freedom—in fact, as letting his 
desire for freedom get in the way of his ability to recollect or think for him-
self. Moreover, the dialogue is replete with references to limitation, some of 
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them functioning as similes for virtue. Overall, the dialogue can be seen as 
a critique of the emphasis on freedom common in Greek cultural life rather 
than as an exaltation of it. To have virtue, for Socrates, is to be limited in a 
certain way—specifically, in a good way. It is not to be free.
Readers of the Meno wonder about the role of the geometrical demonstra-
tion Socrates conducts with a slave, one of Meno’s entourage, a geometrical 
proof used as a demonstration of Socrates’s idea of recollection, the view that 
the soul knew all things before we were born and, as a result, all learning is 
simply recollection of something the soul knew before. The demonstration 
seems inconclusive, at best, if not ludicrous, with Socrates asking the slave 
leading questions to help him solve a difficult geometrical problem the so-
lution to which rests on knowledge about irrational magnitudes. The slave 
does not contribute much to the solution he reaches since he only solves 
the problem after Socrates shows him where to draw the figure on which 
the solution depends. Though there is some truth to Socrates’s belief that he 
is demonstrating the truth of recollection through his interchange with the 
slave,2 what is more obvious is that the demonstration is a big joke. Socrates 
uses it to draw a picture of Meno as a slave. Earlier in the dialogue, Meno 
makes an image of Socrates as an ugly numbfish, with bulging eyes and a flat 
nose, who paralyzes anyone who comes into contact with him. Socrates says 
he will not take Meno up on the challenge to make a return image of him, a 
verbal game of mutual insult common at the time, and goes on instead with 
the topic of their discussion, namely, the question of what is virtue. Later, 
though, after Meno has himself paralyzed inquiry entirely by raising a ques-
tion about the very possibility of inquiry in the well-known Meno problem, 
Socrates does draw an image of Meno in return. It is Meno as no better than 
a slave—no better, or even worse, since his ignorance does not spur him on 
to inquiring further. Socrates’s goal in using a slave as an image of Meno is to 
shame Meno into inquiring further, that is, to shame him into recollecting, a 
goal Socrates never achieves, except briefly later in the dialogue.3
In the protracted and funny slave demonstration, Socrates gets revenge 
on Meno by doing what he said he would not do, making an image of him 
in return, an image of Meno as a slave. It is Meno, not as Levinas thinks, 
Socrates, who prides himself on his freedom. At one point in the dialogue, 
Socrates says that Meno, being spoiled, orders Socrates around in the discus-
sion like a tyrant would (76b4–c2). Later, after the dialogue’s long digression 
on recollection, Socrates again points out that Meno wants to rule him and 
adds that Meno does not want even to be ruled by himself since he wants to 
be free: “you do not even try to rule yourself, so that you may be free, but you 
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try to and do rule me” (86d6–7). Meno is a rich, handsome, spoiled youth 
who prides himself on being free—on being in control, on being the boss.
The geometrical demonstration is interrupted by asides in which Socrates 
speaks to Meno and, clearly, compares Meno to the slave. At one point, when 
the slave declares he does not know what the double square is, Socrates says, 
“At first he did not know what the base of the eight-foot square was just as 
even now he does not yet know, but then he believed at least that he knew, 
and answered confidently like a knower, and he did not think himself at a 
loss. But now he does think himself at a loss, and as he does not know, so 
he does not believe he knows” (84a4–b1). A few lines later, Socrates says, 
“Indeed, we have probably accomplished something useful, as it seems, for 
discovering how things stand. For now, since he does not know, he would 
pleasantly inquire while then he believed he could easily and often make 
fine speeches before many people about the double square and said that it 
must have a base of double length” (84b9–c2). This refers back to what Meno 
said when he was at a loss about the definition of virtue, “I do not have an 
answer to give you. Yet, on a thousand occasions, I have made very many 
speeches before many people about virtue, and made them very well, as at 
least it seemed to me, but now I cannot even say at all what it is” (80b1–4). 
Socrates goes on to say that being numbed, a reference back to Meno’s as-
sertion that he has been numbed by Socrates, is a benefit to the slave, since 
now he will begin to inquire. Socrates’s point, to Meno, is that he is no better 
than an ignorant slave. Socrates at least is ruled by himself. It is Meno, then, 
not Socrates who wants to be free and would be ashamed to be the opposite 
of free, namely, a slave.
Earlier in the dialogue, shape is used as a simile for virtue. Shape is de-
fined as the sole thing that always follows color (75b10–11) and then as the 
limit of a solid (76a6–7). About the first definition, Socrates says, “I would 
be satisfied if you defined virtue to me in this way” (75b11–c1). In the Meno, 
the examples themselves echo the freedom/slavery subtheme of the dialogue, 
suggesting that virtue would not be freedom, but would be a form of limita-
tion or of following (or, alternately, that if virtue is a type of freedom it is the 
type that results from observing limitation, like the freedom a chariot driver 
has when he limits what he does in accord with the observed conditions of 
the road).4 If the teaching of the dialogue is that virtue is knowledge or wis-
dom, and I think it is, then the point would be that virtue is being limited by 
or following the forms. Socrates, referring to the two definitions of shape as 
one, says he likes the (one) answer regarding shape better than a later answer 
he gives regarding color (76e6–7). Virtue is a form of being limited by or 
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following something—specifically, we can imagine, it is being limited by or 
following, the forms.5
Socrates’s argument in the Meno that virtue is knowledge is preceded by 
another major argument, namely, that no one desires anything bad (77b2–
78a8). Meno, at one point, tries out a definition of virtue as desire for fine 
things and the ability to get them. Socrates divides the proposed definition 
into two parts and changes fine to good, leaving for their consideration the 
claim that virtue is the desire for good things.6 He then argues that no one 
desires anything bad, at least as end not means, since no one desires to be 
miserable or unhappy. Socrates’s argument that virtue is knowledge is that 
there is nothing good that knowledge does not comprehend. External goods 
such as health, strength, beauty, and wealth (a proverbial list) are only good if 
used correctly by good qualities of the soul such as moderation, justice, cour-
age, intelligence, or quick thought (eumathia), magnificence (megaloprepeia), 
and these qualities of the soul are only good if they are knowledge or wisdom. 
What is called courage, for example, if it is not wisdom, is not good but in-
stead is recklessness. Since virtue is good and there is nothing good that is 
not knowledge or wisdom, virtue, then, must be knowledge or wisdom.
This is a simple and powerful argument. There is no desire for anything 
bad, thus ruling out the possibility that there are desires or impulses that run 
counter to the simple model of positive for positive, negative for negative: 
positive feelings for positive things (love for beauty, for example) and nega-
tive feelings for negative things (for example, fear for danger). This rules out 
the existence of will, since will is an impulse that breaks the model—we can 
will something unpleasant, or have a weak will when we cannot make our-
selves will what is unpleasant. There is no concept of will in the Meno and, 
I maintain, in all of Plato. But, without a concept of will, how does action 
take place? Simply put, we are compelled to do what we perceive to be good. 
That is why Socrates can claim that virtue is knowledge. All our desires are 
for what we take to be good. The only thing that is missing for us to do what 
is good, then, is knowledge of what good is. We do not need, in addition, a 
faculty that pushes us toward it, the will, since the desire is already present. As 
Chrysippus, the Stoic, later points out, the Academic view of action theory is 
simply that when something appears to us in a certain way, namely, as good, 
action follows without any other function of soul taking place. Chrysippus, 
to the contrary, adds a third: between perception and action lies synkatathesis, 
sometimes translated as assent, and properly seen as a forerunner of or in the 
same family with the idea of will.7
If all this is correct, then Socrates’s view of human motivation does not 
rest on the idea of freedom or of autonomy. Instead, something outside me 
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limits me and governs me, namely, I would argue, the forms. When I see the 
form of the good or, more specifically, when I see something or someone as 
good, I am compelled to move toward it, toward him or her. I always follow 
them, just as shape always follows color. They are a limitation on my action, 
on what I can and will do. Socrates’s views are not as different from Levinas’s 
as Levinas thinks.
We saw in the preceding chapter that, in Totality and Infinity, Levinas 
describes my relation to the other—the absolute other—as one in which I am 
not agent but instead am moved by the other (TI 270/248), my spontaneity 
or freedom is called into question by the other (TI 42–44/12–14), I lose my 
subject position (TI 270/248) and am wounded by the other (TI 277/254), 
resisted (TI 44/14, 197/171, 197/172), mastered (TI 171/146), and so forth.8 
This relationship to the other is, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, a 
noncognitive intentionality in which I put all my preconceptions and inter-
ests out of play in an intentionality that is not full-blown Husserlian inten-
tionality but what Levinas calls “an intentionality of a wholly different type” 
(TI 23/xii) or an “ ‘intentionality’ of transcendence” (TI 49/20). Describing 
this type of intentionality is the very goal of Totality and Infinity according to 
Levinas: “But it is a ‘vision’ without image, bereft of the synoptic and total-
izing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or an intentionality of a wholly 
different type—which this work seeks precisely to describe” (TI 23/xii).9
The intentionality Socrates utilizes, as we have seen, is not Levinas’s non-
cognitive intentionality but is cognitive—a seeing this as that as Socrates in-
dicates by comparing knowledge to imagination in the divided line section of 
the Republic. Still, the lack of agency he describes is strikingly similar to that 
described by Levinas. In the Phaedrus, as we saw in the preceding chapter, 
Socrates describes the helmsman of the soul as being moved, knocked out, 
outside himself,10 enslaved, and falling on his back in response to the sight 
of a youth. Then the soul is drawn upward to the place beyond the heavens 
where the forms dwell. Since the helmsman of the soul is identified with 
nous,11 we can say less poetically that reason does not act but is acted upon by 
the form, specifically, by the youth as visible instantiation of the form.
The process of going from the beautiful youth up to the form of beauty 
is, for Socrates, an example of recollection. Recollection, in the Phaedrus, is 
described in two ways, one poetic and in need of interpretation (Socrates says 
he is saying what the soul is like not what it is), one more literal. The poetic 
interpretation is that recollection is an ascent of the chariot of the soul to 
a place beyond the heavens. The literal interpretation is that recollection is 
the movement from perception to idea implicit in it. In the Phaedrus, then, 
as in the Republic, Socratic intentionality is a seeing this as that. The poetic 
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interpretation is helpful, though, because it makes clear that the form is not 
in the soul but outside it. The helmsman is portrayed as outside himself and 
ascending to the place of the forms—outside and ascending since outside 
suggests other and ascent suggests value. The issue in the Phaedrus is whether 
relations to others can be valuable.
Someone could object, though, that these examples are from the Phaedrus 
not the Meno, and take Levinas’s position that, in the Phaedrus, Socrates is 
changing his position and beginning to glimpse Levinas’s position, though 
perhaps not fully. The point of the Meno on action, though, is the same as that 
of the Phaedrus, namely, that I am moved by the form, or by instantiations of 
it. Once I know what is good, I have no choice but to do what is good. I am 
not free. I am compelled. I am moved by what is good.
On the other hand, in the Meno, Socrates says that the forms are in my 
soul. This, again, would be problematic for Levinas since if the forms are al-
ready in my soul, to be moved by them is not to be moved by something other 
or new but by myself. Remember, Levinas charges that the primacy of the 
same is Socrates’s teaching: “to receive nothing of the Other but what was in 
me” (TI 43/13–14). But are the forms really in the soul for Socrates, even in 
the Meno? In the Meno, as in the Phaedrus, there are two accounts of recollec-
tion, one poetic, one literal. Interpreters often miss the second one. Socrates 
says that recollection is tying down true opinions by aitias logismōi, reasoning 
about cause (98a). What exactly he means by aitias logismōi is not made clear, 
but it might mean reasoning about the why, that is, why an opinion is true, 
or, alternately, it might mean reasoning about the most important causes for 
Plato, namely, the ideas. In either case, there is no sense here that what you 
know is something you have always known. Instead, what you know but have 
forgotten is spelled out either as what you can reason to from your true opin-
ion about why the opinion is true or the form implicit in your true opinion 
that causes it to be true. The latter definition of recollection is a close varia-
tion of Socrates’s clearer definition of recollection in the Phaedrus as moving 
from perception to the idea or concept implicit in it. What it means, then, in 
the Meno to say poetically that what you seek is something you already know 
is that what you seek is implicit in or connected to what you already know 
and simply needs to be made explicit or discovered by following out the con-
nections.12 At the very least, we could point out that to say that learning is 
remembering what the soul knew but forgot is not clearly saying that what 
I seek is in the soul, but saying that it is and is not in the soul, since I knew 
it, but forgot it: in the soul suggesting that what I seek is connected to or im-
plicit in what I already know; not in the soul suggesting that what I seek is not 
determined by me but determines me—it limits, governs, and compels me, as 
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we have seen. If I, the same, am determined by the other that I seek, then I 
am not free since, as we have seen, freedom for Levinas is the determination 
of the other by the same (TI 85/57).
Contrary to Levinas’s belief, then, Socrates does not have a philosophy of 
freedom. He does not understand cognition as freedom. Instead, cognition, 
and virtue, are types of response to the external or other, as the ethical is for 
Levinas. We are, according to Plato, moved by the idea of the good or the 
beautiful—or, more specifically, by an other who is beautiful or good—as we 
are moved by the singular other according to Levinas.
2.
But the picture is not that simple. In a complex and often understated way, 
Plato is a proponent of freedom—a complex type of freedom that results 
from wisdom. What reader of the Republic can forget the image of the one 
who, bound in a cave, frees himself from the bonds—bonds of convention—
and ascends to the ideas? Central to the Republic, the image is in addition a 
paradigm of a certain way of thinking about what philosophy is. Freedom is 
not a negligible idea for Plato, then. Philosophy is associated with freedom 
for him, as Levinas maintains—specifically with the type of human freedom 
we have when we are wise. Moreover, wisdom, as we have seen, is a type of 
responsiveness for Plato. For Plato, then, human beings possess freedom, but 
freedom of a complex sort. We are free, paradoxically, when we are in response.
Levinas, too, gives freedom a significant role in his thought even though 
initially he is freedom’s critic. Merely espousing some kind of freedom, then, 
cannot be a mark of distinction between the two thinkers. For Levinas in 
Totality and Infinity, an arbitrary freedom first emerges on the atheist stage 
when I resist the totality to become a psychism or self. It is this accomplish-
ment of the self and of freedom that makes will possible. On the sociality 
stage, however—beyond arbitrary freedom—lies a different type of freedom, 
namely, responsibility as freedom. The other calls my arbitrary freedom into 
question (TI 43/13). The other’s presence arouses me to responsibility or 
goodness and so promotes and founds my freedom. Responsibility to the 
other, then, is not a restriction on freedom but founds it. For Levinas, too, 
then, human beings have a complex type of freedom that paradoxically is 
found in response.
Levinas is wrong, then, when he attacks Plato as a philosopher of freedom 
and suggests that he himself is not one. To the contrary, each thinker dis-
cusses a type of arbitrary freedom: freedom as doing whatever you desire for 
Plato; freedom as resistance to the totality for Levinas. Each rejects arbitrary 
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freedom and puts in its stead a fundamental responsiveness: knowledge or 
wisdom (understood as responsive) for Plato; responsibility to the other for 
Levinas. Each finds true freedom—a complex type of freedom—there, in 
that very responsiveness, as I will show in what follows.
Socrates, the gadfly, is a critic of Athens, the city that prides itself on its 
freedom. In perhaps the best-known image in the Republic, an image of hu-
man beings in their education and lack of it, he portrays human beings bound 
in a cave. He tells Glaucon that they are like us, indicating that the image is 
universal and does not exempt democratic Athens (nor, we might add, does 
it exempt us). Instead, human beings in general are in bonds, compelled as 
a result to perceive the images cast on the wall of their cave as true. What 
they think are true are simply the shadows of artifacts held up by hidden but 
important others (Rep. 7.515c1–2).
The presence of the others in the image indicates that we are seeing in it 
human beings in different stages of the education that leads up to and culmi-
nates in philosophy. There are those in bonds, being educated. There are those 
standing behind a wall that is placed above and behind those being educated. 
The people behind the wall hold up artifacts, of human beings and other 
animals. The artifacts, due to a fire above and behind them all, cast shadows 
on the wall of the cave that those in bonds can see. Since the bonds prevent 
them from looking behind themselves, they take the shadows they see to be 
what is true.
What they think are true are shadows of artifacts held up by others. Since 
artifacts are human-made and the image is about education, knowledge, and 
philosophy, we can assume that the artifacts are opinions or views. In our 
early education, what we think are true are simply reflections of the views 
of others—authoritative others who make sure that their views are influ-
ential in our milieu, that their artifacts cast shadows placed so that we will 
see them from our limited position in our particular cave. We do not know 
it, then, but our opinions are reflections of the opinions of others—others 
who, with good or bad intentions (the image does not say, so they could be 
either), wish for our views to reflect or be based on theirs. In a Spartan cave, 
for example, we would see a man with military prowess as one with the high-
est virtue. In an Athenian cave, we would see a man who speaks well in the 
assembly as possessing it. We would see the person that way because of the 
particular artifact of a human being that is held up in the cave in which we 
live. Our perceptions of a human being, and of other things, are shaped by the 
dominant views in our city, in our cave. If we lived in a Homeric cave—that 
is, if we lived in a Homeric milieu—we would see a short and ugly man as 
negligible, such as Thersites, the only short, ugly man in the Iliad or Odyssey 
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whom, appropriately, Odysseus beats up. In a Platonic cave, we would see 
one short, ugly man as a new type of hero—Socrates, of the prominent eyes 
and flat nose.
The as structure is important. One sees the warrior as virtuous. Another 
sees the statesman as virtuous. Such perception is based on a conception—
based on an idea, to speak more platonically. In the cave, we assume that 
idea—in this case, an idea of what virtue (aretē) is. Without making explicit 
and investigating that idea, we simply apply it. If virtue is associated with 
virility (aretē with ar- meaning maleness, as in Ares, the god of war), we per-
ceive the warrior to be virtuous, and not the statesman or philosopher. What 
we think is real—the warrior really is the height of virtue, for example—is 
simply the reflection of authoritative views in our milieu, in this example, in 
our Homeric cave.
Of course, not everyone remains bound. Some are behind the wall pro-
jecting images for us to see. And there is one or more who, by nature, are 
forced to go up (7.515c4–8). They break the bonds—the bonds of conven-
tion. Why call them bonds of convention? In the Republic the leaders of the 
city put forward opinions meant to shape the citizens’ opinions, as we see in 
the discussion of virtue that accompanies the account of the tripartite soul. 
Virtue, in that discussion, is based on those views—meant to have the force 
of convention—not on knowledge, and it is the job of the rulers to promote 
those conventional views. What the citizens think are real are reflections of 
conventional views, just as what the prisoners think are real are reflections of 
artifacts—unless they break their bonds.
To break the bonds and become free, then, is to break the bonds of con-
vention. But there are two stages to achieving freedom. The first stage is turn-
ing around and seeing that the views I think are mine are instead reflections 
of the authoritative views of others in our cave. The second stage—a stage 
not reached by very many according to Socrates—is ascending out of the 
cave and checking whether those views accord with reality. Outside the cave 
are human beings, the moon, the stars, the sun, sunlight, and so on. These 
represent ideas as we know from the fact that the sun is one of them, and the 
sun, for Socrates in the Republic, represents the idea of the good. What really 
is good? What really is virtue? What is a human being? By answering these 
questions, we could decide who is right about the paradigm of virtue: Is it the 
warrior? The statesman? The philosopher? All this depends on what a human 
being is, what virtue is, what it is to be good. In other words, we decide whom 
we should honor as most virtuous by seeing the forms that are alluded to 
when we answer “what is it” questions—when we answer them for ourselves 
rather than simply taking and applying the answers others have provided us.
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Socrates does not use the word freedom in this passage, however. Moreover, 
the passage is about imprisonment, not about slavery, Socrates’s most com-
mon opposite for freedom. Still, he does talk about one who breaks the bonds, 
bonds I have argued are the bonds of custom or convention. The image as a 
whole, then, is still an image of liberation or freedom—freedom from an im-
prisonment even more powerful in one sense because those who suffer from 
it do not realize that they do and why. In addition, the freedom portrayed is 
a complex kind. We are not exhorted in this image, as in Rousseau, to reject 
custom and follow our own mind: “Today . . . one follows custom, never one’s 
own genius.”13 This image is not Emerson exhorting us to reject the newspa-
per that constructs reality for us and instead trust ourselves: “Trust thyself: 
every heart vibrates to that iron string.”14 Rather, for Socrates, we turn from 
custom not to ourselves but to the ideas. They should shape and determine 
how we perceive things. We lose our bonds and are free, then, according to 
Socrates when what we think and do is in response to what is, that is, to the 
ideas including the idea of the good. Without perceiving and following the 
ideas—that is, without understanding things and persons in terms of the 
forms they instantiate and basing our actions on such understanding—we 
are not completely free. Some presumably make it only to the first level of 
freedom, the stage of seeing that the views they hold are not actually their 
own. Only a few work out their own views in a philosophic way, going all the 
way up to the forms and to the first among the forms—the brightest part of 
being—the idea of the good (tou ontos to phanotaton, 7.518c9). What results 
is a complex type of freedom as Socrates’s description of the one who frees 
himself indicates. He is described as being compelled by nature to go up. He 
is forced, in other words, to be free. This is Socrates’s way of indicating the 
complexity of freedom as he understands it. We are most free when, para-
doxically, we are in response—specifically, in response to what is.
Moreover, it is these people, according to Socrates in the Republic, who 
ought to rule in a city, who ought to come back down into the cave and 
project their philosophically supported views to influence others, some of 
whom will simply be shaped by those views, others of whom will themselves 
actually reflect philosophically on those views. Freedom eventually means 
service to others for Socrates as it does for Levinas. For Levinas, freedom is 
found in responsibility, which is a type of response to autrui, the other per-
son. For Socrates in the Republic, freedom results in political service since the 
philosopher becomes a philosopher-king. This is not the only kind of service 
Socrates describes in the Platonic corpus, however, since he also describes 
service in the Phaedrus. In that dialogue, as we saw in chapter 1, service re-
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sults from seeing the form of the beautiful and is a more personal kind. It is 
service to one’s beloved—erotic not political service we could say.
It is not only in the Meno, then, but also in the Republic that Socrates 
stresses following and being limited by the forms. The best city will be one 
that is based on them—particularly on the form of the good and on justice—
and the best human beings will be those who know and follow them. More-
over, and crucial for the argument of this chapter, it is when we are, in this 
way, responsive to the ideas that we are free.
If Plato’s Socrates believes in human freedom, though, why is he so quiet 
in espousing it? Why is his defense of freedom so understated? As men-
tioned before, there is no dialogue on freedom; freedom does not appear on 
any list of virtues; and generally it is the interlocutors who appear to espouse 
freedom as an ideal and Socrates who refutes them. A plausible answer is 
that the ethos of freedom in Athens is so dominant that, rhetorically speak-
ing, Socrates must emphasize the response aspect of complex freedom rather 
than the freedom aspect if his point is to be effective and heard. Socrates 
wants freedom-enchanted Athenians to see the responsiveness that is neces-
sary—more specifically for him, the wisdom that is necessary—if they are 
to have any real freedom. Moreover, he does, in an understated way, espouse 
freedom. As we have seen, in the Meno Socrates playfully and pointedly im-
ages Meno as more of a slave than the actual slave who participates in the 
geometrical demonstration. The slave is politically enslaved while Meno, 
though politically free, is enslaved in his soul. Meno believes what Gorgias 
believes, as a number of opening passages are meant to suggest (71c8–d2). 
Socrates’s suggestion is that Meno will only truly be free if he recollects—
breaks the Gorgianic bonds—and attains wisdom. When Socrates says, as 
previously quoted, “you do not even try to rule yourself, so that you may be 
free” (86d6–7), there is an ambiguity that points to two different types of 
freedom. The passage suggests, on the one hand, that Meno does not try to 
rule or control himself because he wants to be free (that is, “you want to be 
free by not ruling yourself ”). The other suggestion is that if Meno did rule 
himself, then he would in fact be free (“you do not do what would make you 
free, namely, rule yourself ”). The latter suggests, once again, a complex type 
of freedom, namely, freedom attained through self-rule or self-control. Self-
rule, for Socrates, is another way of describing the freedom that comes from 
responding to what is, that is, to the forms or to things and persons in terms 
of the forms that make them what they are. Freedom results from the type of 
response to what is that is knowledge or wisdom. Such freedom can also be 
called self-rule or self-control.
52 freedom
Socrates mentions self-rule in response to an assertion of unlimited free-
dom also in the Gorgias. When Callicles says that justice is for the rulers to 
have more than the ruled, Socrates asks him if he means that rulers should 
have more than themselves. Don’t you think it is necessary, Socrates goes 
on, for each person to be his own ruler? Or do you think that each person 
must rule only other people and not also himself ? He goes on to explain, to 
an uncomprehending Callicles, that what he means is nothing complicated 
but simply moderation and control (Grg. 491c6–e1). Callicles’s response to 
Socrates’s suggestion of self-control indicates the job he has in persuading 
his cohorts of any kind of limitation. “How can a human being be happy,” 
Callicles asks, “if he is a slave to anything at all?” (Grg. 491e5–6). The ethos 
of freedom is so strong that there is an aversion to any kind of control, even 
self-control, even the freedom of self-guidance by wisdom or idea. The iden-
tification of happiness with freedom is not simply the view of a few unsavory 
characters such as Callicles. Instead, that identification is a central compo-
nent of the Athenian ethos. Consider, for example, the association of hap-
piness with freedom in Pericles’s funeral oration as described by Thucydides: 
“happiness is freedom” (Hist. 2.43.12–13).15
The same connection between happiness and freedom is mentioned by 
Socrates in his discussion with Lysis, in the dialogue on friendship, of Lysis’s 
relation to his parents. Freedom is identified in the discussion with doing 
whatever you desire or wish. First, Socrates and Lysis agree that Lysis’s par-
ents want him to be happy. Socrates then asks Lysis whether it is possible 
for a human being to be happy “if he is a slave and not able to do everything 
he desires” (Lys. 207e1–2). Lysis agrees that it is not. Socrates goes on more 
explicitly to make the connection between freedom and wisdom that is indi-
cated more imagistically in the description of the cave in the Republic.
He does so by arguing that one who does what he desires does not nec-
essarily do what he wishes. He points out that Lysis’s parents do not actu-
ally allow him to do whatever he wishes but prevent him from doing many 
things—driving a chariot in a contest, ruling over a mule team, touching and 
using the parts of a loom, or even ruling over himself. In each case, it is not 
Lysis but one who is knowledgeable or wise who does what he wishes: the 
charioteer (a hireling), the muleteer (a slave), his mother (a woman), his at-
tendant and teachers (slaves). On the other hand, they do allow Lysis to do 
whatever he wishes with regard to letters (reading or writing them in what-
ever order he wishes) and in regard to a lyre (loosening, tightening, plucking, 
or striking its strings as he wishes). The reason for allowing him to do what 
he desires in these cases, Lysis maintains in response to a question from 
Socrates, is that Lysis knows (epistamai) letters and the lyre. It is not, Socrates 
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points out, because of Lysis’s status—as young not old, or a freeman not a 
slave. The slaves, hireling, and woman are more free regarding the things 
about which they are knowledgeable than free, male Lysis is. Even the son of 
the Great King, though eventually he will rule all of Asia, Socrates points out, 
would not be allowed to do whatever he wishes—to throw things in a meat 
sauce that is cooking or to take care of his own eyes if they were diseased.
It is not some conventional status, in other words, but lack of knowledge 
that leads parents to prevent their child from doing whatever he wishes in 
certain circumstances. Even more, according to Socrates making his culmi-
nating point, if we are wise about things, we will do whatever we wish in 
regard to them, we will be free with regard to them, they will be ours, and 
we will benefit from them: “With regard to the things in which we become 
wise (phronimoi), everyone—Greeks as well as barbarians and both men and 
women—will entrust them to us, we will do in regard to these things what-
ever we wish, and no one will voluntarily impede us. Instead, we ourselves 
shall be free (eleutheroi) with regard to them and rulers over others, and these 
things will be ours, for we shall profit from them” (Lys. 210a9–b6). On the 
other hand, if we lack intelligence (nous) about things, we will in fact be 
subject to others regarding them, and, because they do not benefit us, they 
will not be our property: “But regarding those things in which we do not 
acquire intelligence (nous), no one will entrust us to do what seems best 
to us concerning them, but everyone will impede us as much as they are 
able—not only aliens but also our father and mother and whatever may be 
more closely akin than they are. And we ourselves shall be subject to others 
in regard to those things, and they will be alien to us, for we will not profit 
from them” (Lys. 210b6–c4). Socrates’s crucial point about freedom in this 
passage is that we are free if we know or are wise about the things to which 
we relate. If we are not wise about them, we do not do with them what we 
wish. In addition, Socrates appears in the passage to be suggesting that the 
reason we are free regarding things we know is that things we know profit 
us. If we are knowledgeable charioteers, for example, we will attain the end 
we had in driving.
That Socrates believes that the reason we are free regarding things we 
know is that things we know profit us is borne out in the Gorgias. There 
Socrates explains the claim that people who do what seems best to them do 
not necessarily do what they wish and that they do what they wish if they 
have wisdom. Socrates argues with Polus that we do not wish for what we 
do each time or for what seems best to us but we wish for the end at which 
our action and opinion aim. For example, when we take medicine, what we 
wish for is not the drinking of the medicine itself but the aim of that unpleas-
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ant action, namely, health; when merchants or traders go to sea, they do not 
wish for the dangers and discomforts of the long sea voyage itself but the 
aim of their voyage, namely, wealth; and so on for all actions, we wish not 
for the action itself but for the end at which it aims. Similarly in the case of 
the rhetor whom Polus says can put someone to death, banish someone, or 
take someone’s property as he wishes, Socrates maintains that he does these 
negative things because he believes he is achieving some good for himself 
by doing so. We choose all such bad things as well as neutral things such as 
sitting, walking, running, sailing, or, in a different vein, stones and wood, for 
the sake of something good. When we do bad or neutral things believing 
they benefit us when in fact they harm us, we do not do what we wish even 
though we do what we desire. The rhetor whose beliefs about what benefits 
him are false, Socrates implies, does not do what he wishes—even though 
he does what seems best to him, even though he kills, banishes, and takes 
property with impunity.
The argument brings out the meaning of Socrates’s claim, to Lysis, that 
freedom results from wisdom. It is not simply that we are free of parental 
or societal impediment when we are wise. For, why are those impediments 
lifted? Why do not Lysis’s parents allow him to drive a chariot? Because what 
would seem best to him when he is driving will not be what actually is good 
since he lacks the relevant knowledge. When we lack wisdom, we do not 
actually do what we wish even though we do what seems best to us. The dia-
logue invites us to consider this in relation to each of the examples Socrates 
has given. If Lysis does not know how to drive a chariot, he will crash rather 
than racing forward with speed and accuracy. If he does not know how to 
rule a mule team, he will have resistant rather than cooperative mules and will 
stall. If he does not know how to use a loom, he will tangle rather than weav-
ing the wool. If he does not know how to rule his own life, he will be exposed 
to harmful rather than beneficial things and people and will learn slowly if at 
all. Since he does not understand these things, the chariot, mules, and loom 
themselves will prevent him from doing what he wishes (to race forward, to 
weave, etc.). You are not doing what you wish when you crash a chariot in 
a race, stall a mule team, or tangle a loom. The parents’ constraint of Lysis, 
then, reflects a more primary constraint that, if unimpeded, he would experi-
ence from the things themselves as a result of his lack of wisdom. Without 
wisdom, then, he is not free because he does not do what he really wishes. 
Without wisdom, Lysis is more of a slave than a hireling, a conventional 
slave, or a woman for he in fact does not do what he wishes.
Freedom for Socrates, then, results from wisdom (epistēmē, phronēsis, nous). 
The Lysis and Gorgias square with and elucidate the suggestion in the Re-
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public’s image of the cave that we are free when we are wise where wisdom is 
identified with knowledge of ideas, especially knowledge of the idea of the 
good. As in the Lysis and Gorgias, so the centrality of the idea of the good 
in the cave image suggests that we are not free when we simply do what we 
desire unless what we desire in fact is good. We must break the chains of con-
vention and learn what really is good. The Lysis, Gorgias, and the cave image 
in the Republic all suggest that Socrates is a proponent of a complex form of 
freedom, freedom as response, specifically, the type of response Socrates calls 
wisdom or knowledge of what is good.
Later parts of the Republic, too, bear out this suggestion since in them 
Socrates maintains that the tyrant is a slave—specifically, a slave to his de-
sires. This claim is part of Socrates’s general defense of an argument on behalf 
of justice, specifically of the argument that justice is happier than injustice. 
Once again, Socrates identifies happiness and unhappiness with freedom and 
slavery. The tyrant, because he is a slave—a slave to his desires—is not happy.
The claim is not immediately persuasive because slave to is in need of jus-
ti fication. Why not say, simply, that the tyrant is in accord with or follows his 
desires? Why the pejorative term? In addition, since the one who is fond of 
wisdom, that is, the philosopher, is the contrast term to the tyrant, why not 
say that the philosopher, too, is a slave—a slave to ideas—and hence unfree 
and unhappy?
A simple answer is that, for Socrates in the Republic, the tyrant is a slave 
because the best part of his soul is enslaved by the worst part and the worst 
part is master of the best. Such a soul, according to Socrates, is slave not free 
and will least do what it wishes. When the soul is forcibly pulled by desire, 
the soul will be full of confusion and regret (9.577d1–e3). Such a soul is not 
guided by reason (it is full of confusion) and, as a result, experiences bad 
things that it has reason to regret. It is alright to be directed by, even enslaved 
by, wisdom since wisdom, unlike confusion, leads toward what is good.
The Republic has much more to say on the topic, though. How free are we? 
Who is free? How? One way to think about these questions is to look at the 
two, even three, accounts of the soul in the Republic as well as the two, even 
three, accounts of the virtues. The first account of the soul is the well-known 
tripartite soul in book 4 accompanied by the first account of the virtues. 
Readers often overlook Socrates’s clear statement that there is something de-
ficient about the first account. Socrates says, for example, that another, longer 
road is required to get the finest look at the soul and the virtues and that the 
statements made in the first account of them are lacking in precision (Rep. 
6.504b1–7). The longer road takes Socrates and his interlocutors up to the 
ideas, all the way up to first and brightest among them, the idea of the good. 
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There is, Socrates says then, a turning around of the soul from becoming to 
being and the brightest part of being, the good. After asserting this, he says, 
“Therefore, the other so-called virtues of the soul probably are somewhat 
close to those of the body—for they really are not present at first but later are 
produced by habits and practices—while the virtue of exercising wisdom is 
something more divine than anything, as it seems” (Rep. 7.518d9–e3). True 
virtue, then, is not virtue as understood in the book 4 account of the parts of 
the soul. Instead, virtue in its strongest sense is wisdom.
In the myth of Er in book 10, Socrates underscores that there are two lev-
els of virtue. He says there of the one who practiced virtue by habit without 
philosophy in his life that in the afterlife he will choose for his next life the 
greatest tyranny (through folly and gluttony and without considering clearly) 
(10.619b7–9, 619c6–d1). When there is no constraint from the regime, the 
one who has the type of virtue described in book 4 will do what he or she 
really desires. The point about superficial, constraint-induced virtue is made 
another time in the discussion of the soul that in sleep is not constrained in 
its dreams either by shame (spiritedness) or wisdom (calculation) and dares 
to do all the things it would not do in life: have sex with a mother or anyone 
else at all, human being, god, or beast; commit every type of foul murder; eat 
every type of food (9.571b2–d4). Once again, when societal constraints are 
off, the soul’s underlying tendencies come out, indicating the superficiality of 
the virtues so understood.
Socrates argues for the tripartite soul in book 4 based on the law of con-
tradiction. Since the same thing cannot both desire and be averse to the same 
thing, there must be two parts of the soul, the calculative part and the desir-
ing part, one that, for example, desires drink and the other, the calculative 
part, that draws it back from drink. There is a third part, too, the spirited part, 
since, as the example of Leontius suggests, often something else draws us 
back. Leontius desired to see corpses but was disgusted by them at the same 
time and says to his eyes: “Look, unhappy ones, take your fill of the beautiful 
sight” (Rep. 4.440a2–3). Desire and spiritedness are not partners. They con-
flict, indicating two nonrational parts of the soul.
Book 4 virtues are based on these parts—calculation, spiritedness, desire. 
In justice, each part of the soul does what belongs to it—the calculating part 
rules, the spirited part obeys or is an ally, and these two are set over desire 
(4.441d12–e6). In courage, the spirited part preserves, through pains and 
pleasures, what has been proclaimed in speeches about what is fearful and 
what is not (4.442b11–c3). In wisdom, the ruling part possesses the knowl-
edge of what is beneficial for each part and for the whole composed of the 
community of the parts (4.442c5–8). In moderation, the ruling part and the 
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ruled parts are of the same opinion that the calculating part ought to rule and 
do not make faction against it (4.442c10–d1). We can see that the person 
who has these virtues will be somewhat freer than one who does not—so 
long, at any rate, as the ruling part really does know what is beneficial for 
each part of the city and for the city as a whole. For desires and wisdom will 
be in accord so that what he or she desires and what he or she wishes will 
not be in conflict. But the good opinions the soul has are liable to “run away 
from the soul,” to use a phrase from the Meno, since the book 4 virtuous per-
son does not have knowledge but has true opinions ingrained in him or her 
through hearing music containing salutary speeches and engaging in salutary 
gymnastic habits and practices. The afterlife story and dream account suggest 
that that education is not ingrained in us like the grain that grows naturally 
in wood. It is more superficial, liable to dissipate. One who has book 4 virtue 
does what he wishes—but, in the strongest sense, is it what he wishes? Or is 
it what the city wishes?
There are other difficulties as well with the book 4 account. For example, 
have the parts of the soul been delineated in the best possible way? Socrates 
calls the rational part calculative. We would expect him to call it wisdom 
(phronēsis), knowledge (epistēmē), or insight (nous). Calculation (logistikē), for 
Socrates, is only the first stage of higher education (Rep. 7.521c1–528e2). It 
precedes and does not include knowledge of the good. Perhaps calculation 
would be useful for strategizing how to achieve what is good, but not for 
knowing what in fact is good, a necessary component in any strong account 
of Socratic virtue.
In addition, gone in this account is Socrates’s often stated view that we all 
desire what is good so that all we need to ensure that we will do what is good 
is to know what the good is. Instead, in book 4, each desire has its own proper 
and descriptive, not evaluative, object—thirst is for drink, for example, and 
thirst of a particular kind for drink of a particular kind (4.439a1–b2): “There-
fore the soul of the one who is thirsty, to the extent that it thirsts, wishes 
for nothing other than to drink, and stretches out for this and is impelled 
by this” (4.439a9–10). Thirst is for drink, as Socrates self-consciously goes 
some length in this account to maintain, and not, as we would expect him to 
say, for good drink. So long as desire is understood in this way, it has its own 
object and will sometimes be out of sync with the good objects reason would 
prescribe. There is need for an account of the soul in which reason and desire 
are not so separate that reason could go one way and desire another and vir-
tue be achieved only through some kind of constraint or inculcation. Virtue 
understood in this way is second-order virtue of the soul, close in its nature 
to virtues of the body. It is habitual virtue, not virtue in the strong sense. It is 
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something superficial added on top, not something already there that later is 
shaped and developed.
For all these reasons, it is not surprising, though often overlooked, that 
Socrates gives a better account of virtue, virtue as wisdom, as we have seen. 
It is developed through the entire higher education Socrates describes, start-
ing with calculation but culminating in dialectic that includes knowledge of 
the ideas including the idea of the good. This virtue, “the virtue of exercising 
wisdom,” is “something more divine” than book 4 virtues (Rep. 7.518e2–3). 
Not many people will achieve it, but those who do will have all the virtues 
described in book 4 in a stronger way.
What is this higher-level virtue of the soul like for Socrates? As we have 
seen, the soul can be turned around from becoming to being and to the 
brightest part of being, namely, the good. Once it is, we are virtuous. Those 
who are turned toward being’s brightest part are those who love wisdom, that 
is, philosophers. Philosophers, like lovers of all kinds, love everything related 
to what they love, in their case wisdom. They love every type of learning 
and delight in and are insatiable about it. They care for everything related to 
wisdom, especially truth and what is rather than what seems or convention. 
They have an insatiable love for it so that they do not care about the pleasures 
of the body. They are moderate and do not care about money, since what it 
makes possible are pleasures about which they do not care. They contemplate 
what is eternal—all time and all being—and, out of the resulting magnifi-
cence, do not take human life to be anything great. As a result, they do not 
fear death. This is virtue of the soul: to know the good and, because knowing 
it, love it and love it so much that other objects of desire have little or no 
appeal and the fears ordinarily in need of spirited control have little or no 
impact. For Socrates, to know the good is to love it and to love it is to do it 
since nothing else in comparison has any considerable motivational appeal.
The difference between this type of virtue, virtue in the strong sense, and 
habitual virtue is that, in virtue in the strong sense, what reason knows and 
what desire desires are the same, namely, the good. Desire’s object is not a 
descriptive but an evaluative one and, as a result, can be, and in the case of 
wisdom is, the same object reason would counsel. Reason and desire are not 
completely separate but united in their object. Reason is not calculation but 
wisdom and so is capable by itself of guiding toward what is good. There is no 
need for rule over spiritedness and desire. There is no need for preservation 
in spiritedness of a salutary view of death. Instead, desire of this kind can be 
allowed full activity. When such desire is active, money, death, and pleasures 
of the body all have negligible impact. With virtue of this kind, we can be 
truly free for our desires are shaped by our very own reason—by wisdom, in 
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fact—so that when we do what we desire, we in fact do what we wish. This 
second account of the soul and virtue—the soul that knows and desires the 
good and in so doing has virtue—corrects the first and resolves the problem 
of freedom.
In book 9, there is a third account of virtue and the soul. In the third 
account, the soul has three parts, as in the first, but they are described dif-
ferently—desire as money-loving and gain-loving, spiritedness as victory-
loving and honor-loving and reason not as calculation but as learning-loving 
and wisdom-loving or philosophic (9.581a3–b10). The soul, so described, is 
also imaged as a complex beast composed of a human being (also consid-
ered divine), a lion, and a many-headed beast composed of tame and savage 
heads in a ring. All three of these animals are found inside a human being 
(9.588d10–e1) with the result that a human being is described in total as a 
human being with a many-headed beast, a lion, and a human being inside.
This third account of the soul is better than the first, though not as good as 
the second. It is the account of the soul that has been informed by the good, 
not just by convention, but only informed by the good to a certain extent. In 
the account, calculation is replaced by learning and wisdom—so that the soul 
has, or at least can strive for, knowledge of what is good. It gives each part of 
the soul its own characteristic two desires in which, in the case of desire and 
spiritedness, the first of the two is more specific and descriptive—like desire 
as described in the dialogue’s first account of the soul—while the second is 
more general and evaluative; and, in the case of reason, each avoids separating 
wisdom and desire. As a result of each of these, the third account gives wis-
dom more influence over desire. In addition, the account provides an answer 
to the question, what justifies Socrates in using the pejorative term a slave to 
when arguing that the tyrant is unhappy because he is a slave to his desires. 
Why for Socrates is the tyrant, who follows his passions, a slave while the 
philosopher, who loves or follows wisdom, is free? The answer is found in the 
fact that Socrates identifies the wisdom-loving part of soul with the human 
being and maintains that it is better for us to be ruled by the human being 
than by the beast within (9.588c7–590d6). Socrates, then, has a hierarchy of 
human passions and desires, those that are human and those that are not—
that is, we may say, those that are our own and those that are not. In follow-
ing those that are not his own, he does not do what he wishes even though 
he does what he desires or what seems best to him. The philosopher, to the 
contrary, is not slave but free, for in doing what he desires or what seems best 
to him, he in fact does what he wishes.16 
The philosopher, then, is free because in doing what he desires he does 
what he wishes. He does what he wishes because his desires are shaped by 
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wisdom, which is knowledge of what is good, that is, of what is best for him. 
He does what he wishes because his passions and desires are his own: they are 
not shaped by others whose views he unreflectingly accepts, as in the image 
of the cave, but they are shaped by him since they are shaped by his wisdom 
and wisdom is the human being within.
In Totality and Infinity, Levinas, too, is a proponent of a complex type of 
freedom that results from response. For him, there are two types of freedom, 
an arbitrary freedom that emerges when I resist the totality to become a 
psychism or self and a justified freedom that results when, aroused by the 
presence of an other who calls my arbitrary freedom in question, I respond 
to him or her. The former is fundamentally atheistic or all about the self. The 
latter is fundamentally social, fundamentally in relation to an other. In that 
type of freedom, the presence of the other, for Levinas, does not restrict but 
founds my freedom. I am free when I respond to the other.
Levinas describes three stages of human development. Freedom is found 
in the second and third stages. In the first, the il y a stage, I am immersed 
in the totality, immersed in what is or would be external to me, not clearly 
distinct from it. The self, for Levinas, is not there from the beginning. It is 
not a given. Instead, it is an event—specifically, an event of resistance: I resist 
the totality to produce a self, a psychism, an interiority. Referring to the one 
who resists in this way as the Same, Levinas says, “The separation of the Same 
is produced in the form of an inner life [une vie intérieure], a psychism. The 
psychism constitutes an event in being” (TI 54/24). Psychism and thought, 
for Levinas, do not merely reflect what is. This is crucial for our discussion 
of differences between Plato and Levinas. Instead, from the beginning for 
Levinas, our inner life is active: “The original role of the psychism does not, 
in fact, consist in only reflecting being; it is already a way of being, resistance 
to the totality” (TI 54/24). Thought or psychism opens a new dimension: 
“Thought or the psychism opens the dimension this way requires. The di-
mension of the psychism opens under the force of the resistance a being 
opposes to its totalization; it is the feat of radical separation” (TI 54/24). Far 
from being a mere given, the self or psychism is an accomplishment, a feat of 
radical separation—and with radical separation, I am in the second stage of 
development, the atheist stage.
Atheism, for Levinas, is separation—“separation so complete that the 
separated being maintains itself in existence all by itself without participat-
ing in the Being from which it is separated” (TI 58/29). The psychism or soul, 
“being an accomplishment of separation, is naturally atheist” (TI 58/29). On 
the atheist stage, I resist integration and relation. In that sense, I am free. I 
am not immersed in the totality of what is, but separate from it. Using spatial 
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language to refer to my original immersion, Levinas says, “by virtue of the 
psychism the being that is in a site remains free with regard to that site; pos-
ited in a site in which it maintains itself, it is that which comes thereto from 
elsewhere” (TI 54/25). It is an absence or postponement: “The being that 
thinks at first seems to present itself, to a gaze that conceives it, as integrated 
into a whole [un tout]. In reality it is so integrated only once it is dead. Life 
permits it an as-for-me, a leave of absence, a postponement, which precisely 
is interiority” (TI 55/26). If development stopped at the atheist stage for 
Levinas, he would not be a philosopher of the other.
For Levinas, interiority or psychism is the condition of freedom. Interior-
ity is contrasted with history since history is a realm of causality. As a histori-
cal being, I am part of a whole, controlled by its forces, effected by its causes. 
On the atheist stage, there is a “refusal to be purely and simply integrated 
into history” (TI 57/28). Human beings, according to Levinas, possess “a 
secrecy that interrupts the continuity of historical time” (TI 58/29). Historical 
objectivity does not exhaust the real. There is, in addition, interiority and its 
intentions. Human beings have an inner or psychic life that is “a dimension 
in being, a dimension of non-essence” that “does not exhibit itself in history” 
(TI 57/28). Psychism—my resistance to the totality—makes free will pos-
sible: “We name ‘will’ a being conditioned in such a way that without being 
causa sui it is first with respect to its cause. The psychism is the possibility for 
such a being” (TI 59/30). The “free will is necessity relaxed and postponed” ac-
cording to Levinas. It is “détente or distension” (TI 224/200). Psychism makes 
freedom possible, then, since psychism—my resistance to the totality—is the 
condition for free will.
Separation or psychism is accomplished through enjoyment ( jouissance). 
Essential to enjoyment is nourishment, the transmutation of the other into 
the same: “an energy that is other, recognized as other . . . becomes, in enjoy-
ment, my own energy, my strength, me” (TI 111/83). In enjoyment, in other 
words, what is other becomes me—and this is so whether what is other is air, 
light, spectacles, work, ideas, sleep, handling a hammer or machine. I “live 
from” these things. They nourish me, like “good soup” (TI 110/82). “These 
contents,” Levinas says, “are lived: they feed life” (TI 111/ 83).
One might conclude from this that in enjoyment we are not free but de-
pendent since I live from contents. However, we are not dependent or “en-
slaved,” according to Levinas, because we enjoy contents. In enjoyment, we 
depend on contents but then embrace and master them: “enjoyment is the 
ultimate consciousness of all the contents that fill my life—it embraces them” 
(TI 111/83). “Living from . . . is the dependency that turns into sovereignty, 
into happiness—essentially egoist” (TI 114/87). What I enjoy becomes me. 
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The me, the ego, the psychism is reasserted in enjoyment: the psychism 
“dwells in what is not itself, but it acquires its own identity by this dwelling 
in ‘the other’ ” (TI 115/88). Enjoyment, according to Levinas, is “the very pul-
sation of the I” (TI 113/85). The I expands to take in contents and contracts 
to make them itself. In enjoyment we see Levinas’s central metaphysical idea, 
of the I that connects to what is other while at the same time remaining itself.
What is this, however, but freedom? According to Levinas, “freedom de-
notes the mode of remaining the same in the midst of the other” (TI 45/16). 
“Such is the definition of freedom,” Levinas says, “to maintain oneself against 
the other, despite every relation with the other to ensure the autarchy of 
an I [moi]” (TI 46/16). Separation is freedom, then, since separation is ac-
complished in enjoyment and enjoyment is taking in contents but remaining 
distinct from them. In enjoying contents, I make them my own. I transmute 
the other into the same. Such “imperialism of the same is the whole essence 
of freedom” (TI 87/59).
How, concretely, do I maintain myself as a self (a psychism, an ego) while 
living from what is not myself ? That is, how do I, concretely, maintain my 
freedom? I do so in a home. A home both protects me from what is outside 
and enables me to connect to and utilize it. In a home, I withdraw from 
the elements in which I have been immersed—elements that are indefinite 
(apeiron) and thus threatening—and recollect myself. Interiority, in other 
words, is accomplished in a home. The home breaks “the plenum of the ele-
ment” (TI 156/130), and it does so without isolating me. The dwelling re-
mains open to the element from which it separates. It is both removal and 
connection (TI 156/131). The window concretely makes the ambiguity of 
removal and connection possible.
Enjoyment is sensibility. It is prior to consciousness and comprehension: 
“ ‘anterior’ to the crystallization of consciousness, I and non-I, into subject and 
object” (TI 188/162). Its function is not objectification, not even a “fumbling 
objectification [objectivation qui se cherche]” (TI 187/161), but a “transcenden-
tal function” (TI 188/163). Enjoyment is “by essence satisfied” (TI 187/161). 
It is an “immediate relation” (TI 158/131). In it, sensibility is “steeped in the 
element” (TI 158/131) and “ ‘possesses’ without taking” (TI 158/131).
Enjoyment can, however, move into objectification with vision or the 
gaze: “objectifica tion operates in the gaze in a privileged way” (TI 188/163). 
Vision and representation move into grasp, specifically, into touch and labor: 
“The connection between vision and touch, between representation and labor, 
remains essential. Vision moves into grasp” (TI 191/165). Unlike enjoyment, 
vision is not transcendental but is horizonal or perspectival: “Vision opens 
upon a perspective, upon a horizon, and describes a traversable distance, in-
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vites the hand to movement and to contact, and ensures them” (TI 191/165). 
Concretely, when I look through the window of a home, I am not immersed 
in elements but gain some distance on them so that I can grasp the elemental 
and labor (TI 158/131). The laboring hand that grasps, Levinas says, “takes 
and comprehends” (prend et comprend ) (TI 161/135). The hand that com-
prehends “is mastery, domination, disposition,” and these “do not belong to 
the order of sensibility” (TI 161/135). In grasping or comprehending, the 
hand postpones the future through possessing, storing, protecting, and so 
on: “Possession masters, suspends, postpones the unforeseeable future of the 
element—its independence, its being” (TI 158/132). Labor “in its possessive 
grasp suspends the independence of the elements” (TI 158/132). The suspen-
sion is comprehension or ontology: “in this suspension possession compre-
hends the being of the existent” (TI 158/132). “The thing evinces this hold or 
comprehension—this ontology” (TI 158/132). The postponement or separa-
tion takes place in the body, which is “the very regime in which separation 
holds sway” (TI 163/137). But there, as with enjoyment, there is an ambiguity 
in the mastery of freedom: “To be a body is on the one hand to stand [se tenir], 
to be master of oneself, and, on the other hand, to stand on the earth, to be in 
the other, and thus to be encumbered by one’s body” (TI 164/138). The ambi-
guity is simultaneously one “of sovereignty and of submission” (TI 164/138). 
This simultaneous ambiguity is consciousness: “The ambiguity of the body 
is consciousness” (TI 165/139). Comprehension and consciousness, then, 
evince a higher degree of freedom on the atheist stage. Enjoyment is the am-
biguity of independence through dependence on another. Comprehension or 
consciousness is the increased freedom of postponement and comprehension 
which ambiguously takes place within suffering.
The freedom found within consciousness, comprehension, and ontology 
delineates clearly the second stage of development according to Levinas as 
well as taking us into the central concepts of Totality and Infinity. The first 
stage is the stage of the il y a or immersion in the totality, in which there is no 
clear distinction between I and not-I. The second stage is the stage of athe-
ism or interiority, in which there is objectification and ontology. Ontology, 
as Levinas says in a crucial passage, is the intelligence of beings, which pro-
motes freedom by reducing the other to the same. Intelligence is “the logos 
of being—that is, a way of approaching the known being such that its alterity 
with regard to the knowing being vanishes. The process of cognition is at this 
stage identified with the freedom of the knowing being encountering nothing 
which, other with respect to it, could limit it” (TI 42/12). “Ontology, which 
reduces the other to the same, promotes freedom—the freedom that is the 
identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other” (TI 
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42/13). Ontology, then, postpones being that affects it, objectifies being and 
reduces it to the same. Consciousness is not mere reflection or reception but 
is, from the very first, active and resistant. The resistance takes place through 
enjoyment, postponement, objectification, and reduction of the other to the 
same. What I enjoy becomes me (my contents, my contentment). What I 
comprehend is brought into my horizon (my perspective). This, for Levinas, 
is freedom on the atheist stage. It takes place first through enjoyment and 
then through comprehension, intelligence, or knowledge. Knowledge is the 
height of this type of freedom: “If freedom denotes the mode of remaining 
the same in the midst of the other, knowledge, where an existent is given by 
interposition of impersonal Being, contains the ultimate sense of freedom” 
(TI 45/16).
But there is a way of relating besides knowledge and a level of devel-
opment beyond interiority, namely, the social stage on which I accept that 
there is something—someone—other than me, separate from me, radically 
exterior to me. Hence the subtitle of the book, An Essay on Exteriority. By 
sociality, Levinas means relating to an other without assuming the other to 
myself, that is, without either enjoying the other, and thus transmuting the 
other into my contents, or knowing the other by bringing the other into my 
own horizon. On the social stage, I do not reduce the other to the same but 
welcome the other, where welcoming is not sensibility or comprehension but 
a different type of response. With sociality, I cease ontologizing. I do not 
see the other as an object. Instead, sociality is metaphysics: “Metaphysics, 
transcendence, the welcoming of the other by the same, of the Other by 
me” (TI 43/13). Metaphysics is transcendental not atheistic. It welcomes the 
other rather than being all about the self. It is exteriority not interiority or 
immersion. With sociality, metaphysics, transcendence, exteriority, we attain 
a new level of freedom, a grounded or founded freedom not an arbitrary one. 
It is because Levinas believes there is a metaphysical stage that he can be a 
philosopher of the other.
Metaphysics “is concretely produced as the calling into question of the 
same by the other” (TI 43/13). What is called into question, more specifi-
cally, is my freedom. Ontology, we have seen, reduces the other to the same 
and promotes freedom. Metaphysics “calls into question the freedom of the 
exercise of ontology” (TI 43/13). Metaphysics is critique: “critique does not 
reduce the other to the same as does ontology, but calls into question the ex-
ercise of the same” (TI 43/13). The calling into question cannot occur within 
the free self turned in on itself. Instead, the other brings it about: “A calling 
into question of the same—which cannot occur within the egoist spontaneity 
of the same—is brought about by the other” (TI 43/13).
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Reason is the manifestation of arbitrary freedom since, as Levinas regu-
larly maintains, thought and reason know themselves: “That reason in the 
last analysis would be the manifestation of a freedom, neutralizing the other 
and encompassing him, can come as no surprise once it was laid down that 
sovereign reason knows only itself ” (TI 43/14). The manner in which this ar-
bitrary freedom of the interiority stage takes place is through understanding 
the other by way of a concept or a theme, through understanding the other 
as an object. I reduce the other to the same, and in so doing produce my ar-
bitrary freedom “by interposition of a middle and neutral term that ensures 
the intelligence of being” (TI 43/13).
But I am not successful. Something—someone—is beyond me. The other 
cannot be captured in my concept, but escapes it. This is not surprising to us 
as readers, since we know that, according to Levinas, the other, like ourselves, 
is a self by resisting the totality, that is, by resisting concepts (TI 118/90). 
Knowledge, then, does not by itself attain its own goal of letting the other 
appear without it being affected by the process of knowing: “Knowledge or 
theory designates first a relation with being such that the knowing being 
lets the known being manifest itself while respecting its alterity and without 
marking it in any way whatever by this cognitive relation” (TI 42/12). An-
other relation is required to achieve the goal of relating to being or the other 
without affecting or marking it. Sometimes Levinas calls the relation respect: 
metaphysics, he says, is “respect for exteriority” (TI 43/13). Often he calls it 
desire or metaphysical desire, that is, the type of desire that does not stem from 
need: “The metaphysical desire tends toward something else entirely, toward 
the absolutely other” (TI 33/3). “Metaphysics or transcendence is recognized 
in the work of the intellect that aspires after exteriority, that is, Desire” (TI 
82/54). Sometimes he calls it transcendence: “the transcendence of the rela-
tion does not cut the bonds a relation implies, yet . . . these bonds do not unite 
the same and the other into a Whole” (TI 48/19). Sometimes he refers to it as 
openness: the transcendent “is openness preeminently” (TI 193/167).17 More 
generally, he calls it response. Speaking of the other who puts my freedom in 
question by overflowing me, Levinas says, “I do not struggle with a faceless 
god, but I respond to his expression, his revelation” (TI 197/171).
My freedom is put in question not by an experience that shows my pow-
ers to be weak but by an experience that shows a certain type of power to be 
completely lacking, namely, the power to transmute the other into myself: 
“Over him, I am not able to be able [ je ne peux pouvoir]” (TI 39/9).18 I cannot 
integrate the other, I cannot reduce the other, for the other, like me, is resis-
tance to totality, to concept, to history. The other, in other words, is singular 
and cannot be conceptualized. Levinas speaks of “singularities, irreducible to 
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the concepts they constitute in communicating their world” (TI 252/230) or 
to any other generic classification we might wish to use: “The unicity of the 
I does not merely consist in being found in one sample only, but in existing 
without having a genus, without being the individuation of a concept” (TI 
117–18/90).
The other resists me by a resistance that does not weaken me or do vio-
lence to me but instead is an amplification, an opening: “The ‘resistance’ of 
the other does not do violence to me, does not act negatively” (TI 197/171). 
The other, being without determination, is infinite and “the infinite presup-
poses the finite, which it amplifies infinitely” (TI 197/170). “The relation 
with the Other breaks the ceiling of the totality. It is fundamentally pacific” 
(TI 171/146). The other is other than me, more than me, higher than me: 
“The Other—the absolutely other—paralyzes possession, which he contests 
by his epiphany in the face. The other can contest my possession only because 
he approaches me not from the outside but from above” (TI 171/145). He, or 
she, overflows me: “The presence of a being not entering into, but overflow-
ing, the sphere of the same determines its ‘status’ as infinite” (TI 195/169–70). 
The other is not an arbitrary freedom, hostile to my arbitrary freedom, aim-
ing to integrate me. Instead, the other gives me something—a teaching—and 
opens me up: “The Other is not another freedom as arbitrary as my own, in 
which case it would traverse the infinity that separates me from him and en-
ter under the same concept. His alterity is manifested in a mastery that does 
not conquer, but teaches. Teaching is not a species of a genus called domi-
nation, a hegemony at work within a totality, but is the presence of infinity 
breaking the closed circle of totality” (TI 171/146).
The responsive rather than subsumptive relation to the other takes place in 
language—not in speaking about but in its speaking to or interpellation. When 
I address someone directly, I respect their singularity: my effort “to reach the 
other is realized in the relationship with the Other that is cast in the relation 
of language, where the essential is the interpellation, the vocative. The other 
is maintained and confirmed in his heterogeneity as soon as one calls upon 
him” (TI 69/41). In speaking to him, I am not reducing him to a category but 
instead “he is ‘respected.’ The invoked is not what I comprehend: he is not 
under a category. He is the one to whom I speak—he has only a reference to 
himself; he has no quiddity” (TI 69/41).
My freedom, then, is put in question but not in the way Sartre would sug-
gest. For Sartre, the other sees me and, thus, I am not free but object, which 
leads to conflict: “The essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not 
the Mitsein [being with]; it is conflict” (Being and Nothingness, 555). Instead, 
for Levinas, my freedom, understood as the ability to determine whatever is 
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other than I am, is put in question by something that I cannot determine, the 
other who escapes determination. I cannot determine the other. Instead, I 
can only respond to her, open myself up to him. I can only receive the other 
who, unique to my categories and classes, is a gift.
What, then, happens to my freedom? On the interiority stage, it is arbi-
trary. On the sociality stage, it is put in question. I respond to the other who 
is beyond me. Does this mean that I am not free? Even more, the questioning 
of my freedom is put into play by the other. Does this mean that I am deter-
mined by him or her? Instead, for Levinas, as for Plato, it is in the response 
to the other that mature freedom lies. Levinas says that my encounter with 
the other founds, grounds, or invests my freedom. In this way, it is no longer 
arbitrary.
To say that the other founds freedom is to raise the question whether the 
foundation of the self is in the self. Levinas rejects the view that it is, common 
since the Enlightenment. Instead, it is “the other who founds,” and by assert-
ing this Levinas separates himself “from a whole philosophical tradition that 
sought the foundation of the self in the self, outside of heteronomous opin-
ions” (TI 88/60). For Levinas, there is for me a dependence on an other that 
nonetheless allows me to retain my independence. This is another version of 
Levinas’s central metaphysical idea, of the self that connects while retaining 
itself, that relates while remaining across from the other, of beings in relation 
that absolve themselves from the relation. This is, on the deepest level, what 
the self is like according to Levinas: I am a self by relating to another while 
remaining myself. The self is the process of relating to other while retaining 
identity. “The I [le moi],” Levinas says, “is identical in its very alterations.” 
It is “universal identity in which the heterogenous can be embraced” (TI 
36/6). He says, “The I [le moi] is not a being that always remains the same, 
but is the being whose existing consists in identifying itself, in recovering its 
identity throughout all that happens to it” (TI 36/6). Though I relate to the 
world, the world does not absorb me. Using temporal language to explain 
what in fact is fundamental ontology, or metaphysics as he calls it, he identi-
fies the relation of the I to the world as a sojourn, that is, a temporary stay. 
“The world, foreign and hostile, should, in good logic, alter the I [le moi]. 
But the true and primordial relation between them, and that in which the 
I [le moi] is revealed precisely as preeminently the same, is produced as a 
sojourn in the world” (TI 37/7). My relation to the world is a stay, a visit, 
because I relate to the world, a temporary stay because I remain myself in 
the relation. Using spatial language, Levinas speaks of sojourning but also of 
staying at home with oneself [chez soi]: “The way of the I against the ‘other’ 
of the world consists in sojourning, in identifying oneself by existing here at 
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home with oneself [chez soi]” (TI 37/7). The I, le moi, is produced by remaining 
oneself while relating to other.
Freedom has a similar dialectic. We experience, Levinas says, “a depen-
dence upon an exteriority without this dependence absorbing the dependent 
being, held in invisible meshes. This dependence, consequently, at the same 
time maintains independence” (TI 88/61). Freedom of this sort takes place 
only in relation, only in response to another (as the self is produced only 
in relation, only in response to the other). The relation of dependence that 
maintains independence is, specifically, the face to face relation (TI 88/61). 
The face to face relation, in which I relate to the other as other and the other 
relates to me, takes place in language (TI 39/9). Language is “a relation in 
which the terms absolve themselves from the relation, remain absolute within 
the relation” (TI 64/35–36).
The dialectic of the self and of freedom are interconnected for Levinas. 
“The ‘at home’ [‘chez soi ’] is not a container but a site where I can, where, de-
pendent on a reality that is other, I am, despite this dependence, or thanks to 
it, free” (TI 37/7).19 Just as despite my relation to the world, I remain my self, 
so despite my dependence on the world, I remain free. Similarly, just as owing 
to my relation to the world, I remain my self, so owing to my dependence on 
the world, I remain free.
So, in my relation to the other, my dependence on the other, my response 
to the other, I become myself and I am free. What, though, about the other? 
Does the other remain free? Since the other is like me, the answer ought to 
be, and is, yes. “He escapes my grasp by an essential dimension,” Levinas says. 
“He is not wholly in my site” (TI 37/7). The other, “despite the relationship 
with the same, remains transcendent to the same” (TI 39/9).
For Levinas, then, I am free in dependence, free in response to the world 
and, most of all, to the other. The other, whose presence leads to the critique 
of my freedom, founds my freedom. On the unfounded, atheist stage, it is 
all about me, not about an other. But is it, really? No, I only take it to be 
so. In enjoyment, I forget what it is that I enjoy. In comprehension, I forget 
the things comprehended (and the other perspectives and horizons in which 
I can see them). Instead, enjoyment is of something—something indefinite 
that goes beyond me. Comprehension, too, is of something—in the case of a 
personal other, of something infinite that transcends me. It is in relating to 
those others that I am me.
Both Plato and Levinas, then, believe that I am free when I am in relation to 
an other outside myself. Each, in other words, believes in complex freedom. 
Nonetheless, their views on freedom are different since for Plato we are free 
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when we respond to the other by knowing the forms the other instantiates, 
assumes, or is, while for Levinas we are free when we respond to the other as 
a singular other that, as such, has no form. For Plato, when I behold others as 
what they are, my ways of responding to them are not thwarted. For Levinas, 
when I respond to the other as singular, I break up the enchainment to my 
self that sovereign reason produces and maintains (since “sovereign reason 
knows only itself,” TI 43/14). For each, freedom in the strong sense is not 
achieved by turning within but by allowing oneself to be vulnerable to and 
affected by the other outside the self. At the same time, their approaches to 
essential human vulnerabilities are as different as the responsive knowledge 
of form is from the noncognitive response to the singular other.
3.
But the difference has to be traced further. Why do Plato and Levinas dif-
fer in this way? What is the source of the difference? One answer to that 
question is that their views of what knowledge is are so different. As stated 
before, for Plato knowledge is vulnerability and response, portrayed as falling 
on your back and then loving and serving the other in the Phaedrus, and as 
being moved to action in the Meno. For Levinas, to the contrary, knowledge 
is active from the very beginning. The very development of the psychism 
is an active resistance of what is. Thought, too, is active rather than a mere 
reflection: “to know,” Levinas says, “is not simply to record, but always to 
comprehend” (TI 82/54).
In this distinction, Plato and Levinas stand in for (some) ancients and 
(some) moderns, respectively. Aristotle, too, understands knowledge as recep-
tivity, specifically, receptivity of form, and many starting in the Renaissance 
but going on into the Enlightenment and beyond maintain that knowledge 
is active. For Vico, knowledge is a form of making. Bacon, in a rape metaphor, 
portrays knowing as forcing nature to give up her secrets. Descartes describes 
knowledge as mastery and possession of nature. And for Husserl, so influen-
tial on Levinas, there is no consciousness without meaning or, put differently, 
thought is fundamentally noematic. Levinas, in his approach to the other, 
draws the consequences of modern views of knowledge for our relation-
ships to the other. It is the very activity of knowledge as understood by many 
thinkers since the Enlightenment that implies knowledge is not freedom. 
The activity of knowledge implies that in knowing we are chained to the self. 
As we have seen, “sovereign reason knows only itself ” (TI 43/14). Know-
ing, for Levinas, is horizonal, and the horizon is always my horizon. Only in 
relating to the other in a relationship other—or otherwise—than knowing 
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do I break the chains that bind me to myself. Levinas draws in detail the 
consequences for our relationships to others of his view that knowledge is 
active. Not knowing, but going before knowing, or beyond knowing, is what 
is needed in those relationships—before knowing, to what makes knowing 
possible, the other; beyond knowing, past any forms or determinations.
I will discuss creation, a third key concept in Totality and Infinity, in chap-
ter 3, and look further at Plato’s and Levinas’s views on knowledge in chap-
ters 4, 5, and 6. In chapter 4, I will compare and contrast maieutics and 
knowledge for Plato with teaching and revelation for Levinas. In chapter 5, I 
will discuss Levinas’s idea that knowledge is active and selective so that, in it, 
part stands in for whole and therefore conveys only part of the whole, and so 
must not be allowed to remain fixed lest truth be incomplete or one-sided. In 
chapter 6, I will discuss Levinas’s idea of the reduction, a process of reducing 
the said to the saying or whole back to part. Through the reduction, according 
to Levinas, we avoid the idolatry of taking what is incomplete to be complete, 
perspective to be the thing itself, or ideology to be truth.
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C H A P T E R  3
Creation
For Socrates, in the Symposium, eros is a type of desire, and desire is a type 
of need. For Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, desire is contrasted with need. 
Are their views of desire, then, completely different? No, I will argue in this 
chapter, they are not as different as they seem since Socrates invokes need 
for the same reason Levinas rejects it: in order to highlight human vulner-
ability to the other—for Socrates, to reject a decayed masculine ideal of self-
sufficiency, for Levinas, to eliminate the return to the self predominant in 
Western philosophy. How, then, do their views of desire differ? After all, as 
Levinas rightly points out, Socrates rejects Aristophanes’s view that love re-
unites a split being, a view Levinas appropriately takes to imply that love is a 
return to the self (TI 254/232).1 Why, then, does Levinas nonetheless charge 
Socrates with an egoist understanding of love (TI 63/35)? One answer, I 
will argue, is found in the centrality, for Levinas, of a concept of creation (TI 
63/35, 104/78, 292–94/268–70), a concept that, as Levinas claims, is lacking 
in Plato who, in the Timaeus, substitutes instead the demiurgic informing of 
matter (TI 63/35).2 Love and desire, for Levinas, are accomplished in fecund 
production, for example, the fecund production of a child who, though the 
father’s issue, is nonetheless absolutely other than the father—a creation ex 
nihilo, a true other (TI 63/35). The created other is, according to Levinas, 
absolute upsurge (TI 89/62) where the absoluteness of the upsurge indicates 
that the other’s coming to be is not the informing of matter or the develop-
ment of potential, but the coming to be of something entirely new. Love, 
Levinas says, aims at the other, the stranger and not, as Socrates would have 
it, immortality (TI 63/35).3
Levinas is not consistent, however, in contrasting his view of desire with 
Socrates’s. For though Levinas contrasts his creation ex nihilo or absolute 
upsurge with the informing of matter in the Timaeus, he also associates de-
sire both with his absolute other and with Socrates’s good beyond being (TI 
292/268; Rep. 6.509b6–10). For Socrates, the beautiful is a closely related 
transcategorial to the good beyond being, and the beautiful and the good 
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are the ultimate objects of love. If Socratic transcategor ials are the same as 
Levinas’s good beyond being, then the Socratic and Levinasian views of de-
sire do not really differ and Levinas’s critique of Socrates on love and desire 
collapses. If instead Levinas and Socrates have different ways of thinking of 
the good beyond being, as I will maintain, desire is different for them as well: 
for Socrates, desire is responsiveness to the forms of persons or things while 
for Levinas instead desire is an open responsiveness, a responsiveness to the 
singular beyond or before form.4 On my interpretation, then, though each 
philosopher highlights fundamental human vulnerability and responsiveness 
to the other, creation ex nihilo—absolute upsurge—distinguishes their views 
of love and desire.
In this chapter, I will show that Socrates invokes the concept of need for 
the same reason Levinas rejects it, namely, to highlight human vulnerability 
to the other (section 1); that their concepts of desire are, nonetheless, differ-
ent owing to the presence or absence of a concept of creation ex nihilo (sec-
tion 2); and that Levinas’s good beyond being is not the same as Socrates’s 
so that the outlined difference in their concepts of desire due to creation 
remains and points to two fundamental types of human vulnerability to the 
other (section 3).
1.
References to human vulnerability are legion in the Symposium, beginning 
with the dramatic date of the drinking party itself: 416 b.c.e., the year that 
Agathon put on his first tragedy. The dramatic background, as a result, is 
the Peloponnesian War during which a self-confident Athens overextended 
itself and fell. Even more, Socrates claims for himself a teacher who is a 
woman, Diotima, and, as a woman, hardly a symbol of heroic self-sufficiency, 
not to mention the fact that she identifies eros with pregnancy, a paradigm 
of being taken over by another.5 Diotima is from Mantineia, too, where in 
418 b.c.e. the Athenians overestimated themselves and were defeated by the 
Spartans. And she teaches Socrates that love is not all-good or all-beautiful 
but in between, a peculiar combination of ability and vulnerability, power and 
need, poros and penia—a lot like Socrates himself, a powerful, magnetic figure 
sought out by the young for his wisdom though the only wisdom he claims is 
awareness of ignorance, and a lot like philosophy, too, which is not wisdom, 
according to Socrates, but the loving pursuit of it based on awareness of its 
lack. According to Diotima, “love is a philosopher” (204b4).
The critique of the male model of heroic self-sufficiency begins earlier in 
the dialogue in the frame dialogue between Apollodorus and his compan-
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ion. The companion wonders about Apollodorus’s nickname, the soft, given 
how savage Apollodorus is in his attacks on those who spend their time in 
pursuits other than philosophy (Sym. 173c2–d3). Apollodorus is a comic im-
age of Socrates, comic because he goes too far both in his savagery and, as 
his nickname suggests, his softness.6 The dramatic foreshadowing continues 
when Aristodemus and Socrates, in the next frame dialogue, are on their way 
to the party according to Socrates “to corrupt the proverb ‘to a good man’s 
feast the good go uninvited’ ” (174b3–c4). The superficial corruption is the 
pun on Agathon’s name, which means good—as if the proverb were to say “to 
Goodman’s feast the good go uninvited”—while the deeper corruption is a 
disagreement with the claim that the good go to the good, the beautiful to 
the beautiful. Instead, the soft or vulnerable, such as Menelaus, the soft war-
rior, go to the good, such as Agamemnon (174c5–d1). Clearly, the heroic 
model is under attack in this dialogue.
Soon, too, those present in the central dialogue, the dialogue that takes 
place at the symposium itself, are divided into those who are capable and those 
who are incapable—again foreshadowing the ability/vulnerability theme of 
the dialogue, though in this case, ability and vulnerability regarding drink, 
with Aristophanes, Pausanias, and Agathon on the side of those who are ca-
pable; Eryximachus, Aristodemus, and Phaedrus on the side of those who are 
incapable; and Socrates, not surprisingly, in the middle since he can go either 
way. The capacity to drink large quantities of wine is associated with madness 
and incapacity with soberness, leaving Socrates in the middle associated with 
what we might call sober madness. Socrates can drink or not. He is able and 
vulnerable, sober and mad, in his mind and out of it. It sounds like the son of 
Poros and Penia is Socrates and not, as Diotima claims later in the dialogue, 
Eros. That’s not surprising, though, since not only does Diotima describe eros 
as a philosopher, but Socrates identifies himself with eros when he says that 
the only subject he knows is “ta erōtika,” love matters or erotic things (177d6–
e3). The Symposium is another dialogue in which Socrates is identified with 
a more than human figure—with Achilles in the Apology, for example, with 
Heracles in the Republic, and here in the Symposium with Eros.
Before considering the central dialogue’s series of speeches about love, 
what in general were the issues about the love in classical Athens? Homo-
sexuality was not the issue, nor was the age of those involved in homosexual 
love (since youths had relationships with men at about the same age that girls 
were married). Instead, what was at issue was aggression (hybris) and insatia-
bility.7 That Plato was concerned about the former is clear from the dramatic 
framing of the Phaedrus’s discussions of love in the context of the mythical 
rape of Oreithyia by Boreas (Phdr. 229b4–5). Insatiability comes up in the 
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Gorgias when Socrates caricatures Callicles’s view of the hedonistic good life 
as being like the life of the charadrios, a mythical bird that constantly eats and 
immediately excretes (Grg. 494b6–7). In the background of the Symposium, 
then, as in the background of the Phaedrus, is the Greek male concern with 
the idea of control—represented in Greek iconography by the heroic small 
penis.8 It is a concern with not overstepping the boundaries of others, as in 
rape, and with not allowing others—other things, such as food, drink, or sex, 
or other people—to overstep one’s own. Here again Socrates is a peculiar, and 
striking, middle figure. Aware of the problem of aggression, he nonetheless 
is comfortable with the idea that, in love, we’re out of our minds. In fact, ac-
cording to Socrates, the greatest good things come to human beings by way 
of madness if that madness is divine (Phdr. 244a6–8). So there is divine and 
human, all-too-human, madness and moderation, the divine represented by 
love, philosophy, or Socrates and the human, all-too-human, by the comic 
figure of Apollodorus as well as various less savory figures such as Callicles, 
who pictures the good life as constant inflow, or Lysias, who, in the Phaedrus, 
would seduce Phaedrus for sex through a lie about love, namely, that he is not 
in love with Phaedrus and that nonlove is better anyway since it is moderate, 
not mad.
At the drinking party, Phaedrus, a sober speaker, makes love, a great god, 
something useful. Great benefits would be derived from having a city or 
army composed of lovers and their youths since before their boyfriends lovers 
would be inspired toward virtue by shame and love of honor and would even 
die for their boyfriends’ sake. There is nothing better for a youth, Phaedrus 
maintains, than a “good lover” (Sym. 178c3–5). But Phaedrus’s language is the 
language of heroism, all about avoiding shame and being motivated by love 
of honor to do great deeds. He neglects love as vulnerability or a source of 
incompetence. In quoting Hesiod’s description of Eros, Phaedrus leaves out 
the description of Eros as the limb-loosener who weakens the mind in the 
breasts of human beings and gods (178b5–7).9 For Phaedrus, love is all about 
seriousness, virtue, and boldness and not at all about being soft or vulnerable. 
His example of vulnerability is Orpheus who, soft and lacking the boldness 
to die for the woman he loves, dies at the hands of women (179d2–e1).
Pausanias, a mad speaker and Agathon’s lover, is less sanguine about love. 
He does not think all of it is good and describes better and worse types, Ura-
nian (heavenly) and Pandemian (popular). Uranian lovers are manly. They 
love only youths—stronger youths who have mind—and love them only after 
their mind has begun to form. Pandemian lovers, to the contrary, love both 
women and mindless youths. They care only about the sex act itself and, un-
like Uranian lovers, leave the youths they have sex with rather than loving for 
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life (180c3–182a6). There is a queasiness in Pausanias’s feelings about love 
that is evident even when he argues for what he takes to be the better type 
of it. In attending to their youths, Pausanias maintains, lovers “are willing to 
perform slavish acts not even a slave would perform”—acts that would be seen 
as flattery and unfree if done to attain wealth, office, or power—and beloveds, 
too, are voluntarily slavish when they have sex with their lovers, though they 
are justified in engaging in those slavish acts if the acts are for the sake of vir-
tue (183a2–c2). Pausanias’s association of love with slavery echoes tyrannical 
Meno’s refusal, in the Meno, to be governed even by the forms of things when 
he is thinking, as discussed in chapter 2. In the Phaedrus, Pausanian willing 
slavery foreshadows Socratic eros later in the dialogue as ability and vulner-
ability, power and need, poros and penia but differs since Pausanian love has 
an extrinsic aim—sex for the lover and virtue for the beloved. For Socrates 
instead, love’s vulnerability is for its own sake since it is vulnerability to the 
good or the beautiful itself—the good or beautiful the youth instantiates. For 
Socrates, service is not something shameful endured because it is for the sake 
of something else that is good. Instead, the service itself is something good.
Eryximachus, one of the sober speakers, is a doctor. An orderly techni-
cian, he’s puzzled by Heraclitus’s view that opposites are unified. If they are 
unified, they cannot be opposites. If things differ, they cannot agree. That, he 
says, would be “quite absurd” (pollē alogia) (187a6–8). But is he right? Love 
relationships suggest the opposite since often it is because two people differ 
that they are agreeable to one another. It seems it is the very tension—their 
very vulnerability to the other—that they crave. In addition, separation of-
ten brings us together. “Absence makes the heart grow fonder,” as we pro-
verbially say. Perhaps then Heraclitus is right to say, presumably about all 
of reality, that “being brought apart (differing), it is brought together with 
itself (agrees); there is a back-stretched connection, as in the bow and lyre.”10 
Perhaps, as Heraclitus suggests, unity, at least for human beings, requires a 
certain tension and vulnerability, requires something brought apart that is 
brought together, as the unity of a bow results from the fact that, at one and 
the same time, the string pulls in and the bow pulls out.
Not so for sober Eryximachus whose idea of eros is of a great and wonder-
ful god, found not just in love relationships but in all things, an all-powerful 
source of happiness. For Eryximachus—Phaedrus’s lover—all sciences are 
erotic sciences, and the better eros is an orderly eros that makes hostile ele-
ments come to love one another (186b2–188d3). Love, in other words, is har-
mony of elements that previously differed not of elements that currently do 
(187a8–c2). It is unity with no difference, tension, or vulnerability, whether in 
relationships or in medicine, music, astronomy, or other areas (186b2–188d3).
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The drama of the dialogue suggests a different view of love. Eryximachus’s 
speech is preceded by Aristophanes’s hiccups (185c4–e5). Their rhythmical 
quality mimics the sex act and reminds us that human beings willingly en-
gender its tension. Eryximachus’s suggestion that, to cure the hiccups, Aris-
tophanes should tickle his nose and induce sneezing mimics the sex act, too, 
as well as all activities in which we induce tension in order to resolve it. Love, 
the dialogue suggests at this point, is not an orderly unity without tension 
and difference. Instead, in love we intentionally make ourselves vulnerable 
and tense in order to enjoy the tension’s resolution.
For Aristophanes, whose well-known speech follows, human beings are, 
to the contrary, a paradigm of vulnerability to the other. Previously, we were 
circle people, terrible in our strength and power, who thought great thoughts 
and tested the gods (190b5–6). We had two heads and necks, four arms, four 
legs, two sets of genitals, and we moved by rolling around with great force. 
Now, we are sick and need healing because the gods, frightened of our power 
and hybris, sliced us in half (190d6–7). Love draws our archaic nature back 
together and tries to make us one out of two. What lovers desire is to be fused 
together into one. Love, then, is the desire and pursuit of wholeness (192d2–
193a1). For Aristophanes, eros is not a sign that human beings are manly, 
powerful, and invulnerable, as the first three speakers suggest, but a sign that 
human beings are wounded and need healing. His comic speech critiques 
the heroic ideal, which stresses human ability and downplays human need. 
It makes fun of manly pretensions and points to what we lack. Eros is a sign 
that we are missing part of ourselves, part of what it is to be complete, to be 
fulfilled, to be whole.
The fact that there are more speeches about love at this climactic point 
suggests some aspect of the critique of the heroic ideal of self-sufficiency may 
remain to be discussed. Agathon, the tragic playwright, provides the need for 
continuing the critique when, in his speech, he praises eros as most beautiful 
and best—beautiful because young, tender, and graceful; best because pos-
sessed of all the virtues. Eros is just, not violent, since people willingly serve 
it; moderate because stronger than all other desires and pleasures; courageous 
because Aphrodite defeated Ares; wise because eros makes every person a 
poet, creates all living beings, and brings renown to the varied craftsmen 
it teaches (195a5–197b9). Eros, Agathon says, is of beauty. There’s nothing 
ugly about it. And eros is the cause of peace, intimacy, goodwill, and more. 
Eros, in other words, is all-good.
Agathon’s vacuous tragic speech gets the most applause presumably be-
cause it is a tour de force, beautiful in poetic form. In content, it is similar to 
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the part of Phaedrus’s speech that makes eros fundamentally good. Socrates 
refutes Agathon in short order using wisdom he received from his female 
teacher, Diotima. Love, Socrates argues, is a species of desire, and desire a 
species of lack or need. If love is of what is beautiful, then love lacks what is 
beautiful and is not itself beautiful. Since beautiful things are good and love 
lacks beautiful things, love lacks what is good as well (200a2–e6). Socrates 
has learned well his lesson from Diotima—whom, presumably, he made 
up—that love involves vulnerability, lack, or need. As a young man, he, like 
Agathon, thought love was beautiful and good. Instead, love is not a god but 
a daimon, the son of Poros (resource) and Penia (need) (203c5–6). Human 
beings are not utter vulnerability, as Aristophanic comedy suggests, nor are 
they complete ability, as Agathon’s tragic poetry maintains. Instead, Socratic 
philosophy teaches, human beings are in between—as is awareness of igno-
rance. Ignorance makes us needy; awareness is the resource for overcoming 
our need. In Socratic eros, awareness of need becomes the resource to over-
come it. In addition, eros is not a desire for wholeness. It is not a desire for 
one’s lost other half but for what is good. Socrates agrees with Aristophanes 
that eros is a sign of need or lack. But he disagrees that what is needed or 
lacking is a part of oneself. For Socrates, eros does not return to the self.
It does not return to the self even though, as Socrates learned from Di-
otima, eros is desire for immortality (207a3–4). For immortality according 
to her is found most of all in form as she suggests in remarking on the fact 
that a body remains even though all its material parts—hair, flesh, bones, 
and blood—pass away (207d4–e1). Similarly, the pregnant lover reproduces 
eternal form, for example, in a child who reproduces human form or, for an-
other, in speeches about what makes a man good, speeches he shares with a 
youth he educates that are reflective of the beautiful itself—the form of the 
beautiful, which is eternal (208e1–209c7). Love begins as a desire to have 
what is good forever (206a11–12). Since that is not literally possible, love 
becomes the desire to generate and reproduce in someone beautiful (206e5). 
As such, it is a desire for immortality (207a3–4). Love is not, then, a desire 
for one’s missing half but is a vulnerability or need that results in generation 
and reproduction, realization and sharing, of eternal form. We begin by lov-
ing beautiful bodies, then beautiful souls, then beautiful practices, laws, and 
knowledge, and then beauty itself, the form of the beautiful—beauty in all 
its universality and of every type—and, as a result of our love, we generate 
and reproduce it. Socrates introduces need, then, to highlight human vulner-
ability and critique the heroic ideal of masculine self-sufficiency dominant in 
his time. In fact, the Symposium’s carefully crafted critique of self-sufficiency 
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culminates with Socrates’s speech, a speech portrayed as superior to Aris-
tophanes’s in its turn away from the self to the beautiful and good, which are 
eternal.
Unlike Socrates, Levinas, in Totality and Infinity, argues that desire is not a 
type of need.11 In striking contrast, though, he does so to underline, not deny, 
fundamental human vulnerability to the other. As a result, the two philoso-
phers’ views of desire are not as different as they seem since they share a com-
mon aim. Socrates underlines human vulnerability by rejecting heroic male 
self-sufficiency. Levinas, in a similar vein, does so by rejecting the return to 
the self that, according to him, dominates Western philosophy. Western phi-
losophy, Levinas says, most often is ontology, “a reduction of the other to the 
same” (TI 43/13). Like Aristophanes and Socrates, Levinas rejects the idea 
of human invulnerability. Like Socrates and unlike Aristophanes, however, 
Levinas rejects the idea that love aims at fusion. “Man’s relationship with the 
other,” Levinas says, “is better as difference than as unity: sociality is better 
than fusion. The very value of love is the impossibility of reducing the other 
to myself, of coinciding into sameness. From an ethical perspective two have 
a better time than one [on s’amuse mieux à deux]!” (EI 188). Aristophanes’s 
mistake, he says, is thinking that love “can be reduced to . . . fundamental 
immanence, be divested of all transcendence, seek but a connatural being, 
a sister soul, present itself as incest. The myth Aristophanes tells in Plato’s 
Symposium, in which love reunites the two halves of one sole being, interprets 
the adventure as a return to self ” (TI 254/232). Desire, for Levinas, is about 
the other, not about the self. The objective of desire’s movement is “the other, 
the Stranger.” Desire “is absolutely non-egoist” (TI 63/35).
For Levinas, desire is metaphysical and need ontological where ontology 
is comprehension of beings and metaphysics is respect for exteriority, that is, 
respect for the other as other (TI 42–43/13). Desire is not a species of need, 
he says, though it is customarily interpreted that way, interpreted to “be at the 
basis of desire” such that desire is thought to “characterize a being indigent 
and incomplete or fallen from its past grandeur” and to “coincide with the 
consciousness of what has been lost.” When understood as a type of need, 
desire is “essentially a nostalgia, a longing for return” (TI 33/3).
For Levinas, however, desire is not a longing for return and “does not 
rest on any prior kinship” (TI 33–34/3). It is not about the self—not about 
returning to it, nourishing it, or completing it: “The metaphysical desire has 
another intention; it desires beyond everything that can simply complete it. 
It is like goodness—the Desired does not fulfill it, but deepens it” (TI 34/4). 
The other deepens desire, or even hollows it out (le creuse). The other does 
not feed me: “The other metaphysically desired is not ‘other’ like the bread I 
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eat, the land in which I dwell, the landscape I contemplate” (TI 33/3). On-
tology, for Levinas, promotes freedom, specifically “the freedom that is the 
identification of the same, not allowing itself to be alienated by the other” 
(TI 42/13). But I am not essentially defined by freedom. In metaphysics, the 
other critiques my freedom: metaphysics “discovers the dogmatism and naïve 
arbitrariness of its spontaneity, and calls into question the freedom of the ex-
ercise of ontology.” It “calls into question the exercise of the same” (TI 43/13).
In metaphysical desire, then, I am confronted by my vulnerability. The 
other, who cannot be integrated, who cannot be consumed by me or reduced 
to me, disrupts me, disrupts my sense of my self as all there is, a sense I achieve 
at the very same time that I achieve a self—an I, an egoism, a psychism—
namely, in the atheist stage, as Levinas calls it, the stage in which I resist the 
totality of what is to form a self. Atheism, for Levinas, is separation. Resistance 
takes place through a process of taking in and feeding on what is outside 
myself while at the same time remaining distinct from that on which I feed 
(TI 112/84, 122/94). Atheism is accomplished, concretely, in a home, since a 
home, with its doors and windows, enables me to connect to what is outside 
while retreating to recollect and retain myself (TI 154/127, 156/129). In the 
atheist stage, I move from enjoyment, and sensibility broadly speaking, to 
perception to consciousness, that is, comprehension, representation, inten-
tionality, or knowledge. In comprehension and representation, I dominate the 
other by capturing him or her in a concept, a concept that reduces the other 
and prevents me from seeing that other as other (TI 163–68/137–49).
But the other, like myself, resists the totality and cannot be fully integrated 
or reduced. The other contests me (TI 171/145), opposes me (TI 197/171), 
masters me (TI 176/146). The other breaks the ceiling of the totality, breaks 
totality’s closed circle (TI 171/146). For Levinas, as for Socrates and Aris - 
tophanes, desire is not a sign of heroic mastery but an indication of funda- 
mental human vulnerability. And, as with Socrates, the vulnerability is not 
harmful since, to use Levinas’s term, the other as such is a marvel (TI 292/269). 
The other who disrupts me opens a new dimension (TI 171/146). The op-
position is pacific (TI 197/171), the resistance nonviolent (TI 197/171), the 
opposition nonhostile (TI 171/146). The other is a master who does not con-
quer but teaches (TI 171/146). What the other teaches is his or her very oth-
erness, sometimes referred to by Levinas as height (TI 171/146), sometimes 
as surplus (TI 97/70). The teaching of the critique of heroic or Western self-
sufficiency is that there is a type of vulnerability, a type of openness, that does 
not leave me vulnerable to harm, but instead is positive—positive, though, in 
different ways for Socrates and for Levinas as we have seen in chapter 1 and 
will see again in this chapter though delineated in a different way (section 2).
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Desire, according to Levinas, is accomplished in the face to face rela-
tion with the other and in fecundity. The face to face relation, the relation in 
which I relate to the other as other and the other relates to me as other, takes 
place in language—not in the content of language but in language’s function 
of direct address, not in the speaking about but in the speaking to, not in the 
said but in the saying, as Levinas says in Otherwise Than Being. Language, 
Levinas says, is “contact across a distance” (TI 172/147), where distance is 
metaphorical and suggests that I can never know or represent the other in 
his or her otherness, that the other’s otherness can never be a given for me. 
The personal other for Levinas is infinite where infinite means indefinite but 
in such a way as to be contrasted with the way in which the elemental world 
is indefinite and which Levinas designates with a Greek term for indefinite, 
apeiron. What is apeiron, such as a forest of which I only see a part or a sea 
all of whose elements I cannot perceive from my current position, can be dis-
closed. What is infinite, the other, cannot (TI 158–59/132, 192–93/166–67). 
The infinite can only be revealed, where revelation for Levinas is distinct 
from disclosure. The one who speaks is not disclosed. He or she is not placed 
in the light of another but, in articulating the world, is announced across 
what he or she presents (TI 65–66/37).
Fecundity, the second accomplishment of metaphysical desire, is a type of 
relation with the future that is “irreducible to the power over possibles” (TI 
267/245). The biological sense of fecundity is the father’s production of the 
child but fecundity is broader than that (TI 247/225). Fecundity in general is 
found in relations between one person and another and between the I and it-
self (TI 306/283). In fecundity, we surmount the passivity to which our will is 
exposed. Our will is free—the possibility of its freedom is produced when, in 
the atheist stage, we resist the totality to form an egoism—but the will is im-
mediately exposed and vulnerable. The work of the will can be taken or sold 
(TI 227/202–3). The will itself, because of its necessarily material manifesta-
tion, is subject to violence, and we are subject to death (TI 229/205, 224/199). 
This suffering and death are surmounted in fecundity (TI 236–40/213–17). 
Human existence, for Levinas, is not, as Heidegger avers, being toward death 
but is the not yet or a way of being against death (TI 224/199). We surmount 
our passivity and death in fecundity, in the production of inexhaustible 
youths. “Fecundity,” Levinas says, “continues history without producing old 
age.” In fecundity, he goes on, the I “meets with no trammels to the renewal 
of its substance” (TI 268/246). In this way, the I exists infinitely, since fecund 
desire produces another who desires: “Here the desire which in the first pages 
of this work we contrasted with need, the desire that is not a lack, the desire 
that is the independence of the separated being and its transcendence, is ac-
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complished—not in being satisfied and in thus acknowledging that it was a 
need, but in transcending itself, in engendering desire” (TI 269/247)
2.
How, then, are Socrates’s and Levinas’s views of love and desire different? 
Each, as we have seen, rejects the idea that love is a return to the self: for 
Socrates, love is, first of all, a desire to have the good for oneself forever—but 
then it is the desire to generate and reproduce and, by doing so, to produce 
immortality; similarly, for Levinas, love in one respect is need—but in an-
other is fecund desire and exists infinitely, beyond death (TI 254–55/232–
33). Each sees love as a sign of human vulnerability, an example of the central 
other-directedness of human beings and of human subjectivity or soul. Each, 
then, in his understanding of love, is a philosopher of the other.
The difference is in what the generativity or fecundity is like. Here is a 
real difference between the two philosophers, not that one is a proponent of 
self-sufficiency or autonomy and the other of vulnerability or heteronomy, 
but that one sees immortality in the persistence of form while the other sees 
it in a series of creations ex nihilo. One draws a relation between immortality 
and the eternal while the other connects what is beyond death to the upsurge 
of something new. Levinas is wrong when he states that the way in which he 
differs with Socrates on love is that Socrates thinks immortality is the object 
of love while he, Levinas, thinks love’s aim is the other, the stranger: “love as 
analyzed by Plato does not coincide with what we have called Desire. Im-
mortality is not the objective of the first movement of Desire, but the other, 
the Stranger” (TI 63/35). Instead, both philosophers believe love defeats 
death and, as we have seen, both believe love is, fundamentally, a directedness 
to something outside oneself. The difference in their views is, instead, the dif-
ference between the eternal and the new.
Levinas says “desire in its positivity” is “affirmed across the idea of creation 
ex nihilo” (TI 04/77–78; see also 63/35). By associating love and desire with 
creation ex nihilo, Levinas does not mean to refer to the creation of the uni-
verse and its contents in six days. Instead, he wants a “rigorous concept of cre-
ation” (TI 292/268–69) by which he means a philosophic idea that carries its 
own weight and is not grounded in appeal to religious text. The other in his or 
her singularity is a creation ex nihilo for Levinas because singularity is lack of 
determination (since determination implies generality) and production out 
of anything determinate (that is, out of anything whatsoever) would be pro-
duction of something determinate. Creation ex nihilo is not the development 
of potential, not the realization of projected possibility: “This future is neither 
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the Aristotelian germ . . . nor the Heideggerian possibility” (TI 267/245). 
Instead, it is the production of something that is its own beginning.
How can that be? Creation ex nihilo is found, in the most concrete case, in 
the production by the father—or, dare we say, by the father and mother—of 
a child who in some way, nonetheless, is his or her own beginning: “the sepa-
rated and created being is thereby not simply issued forth from the father, 
but is absolutely other than him” (TI 63/35); in fecundity, being is “produced 
not as the definitiveness of a totality but as an incessant recommencement” 
(TI 270/248). Every human being begins as a child who is immersed in the 
totality of what is and not clearly distinct from it due to an original in-
ability to distinguish subject from object. Each one produces his or her self, 
ego, psyche, or singularity by resisting the totality: “The psychism constitutes 
an event in being” and “is already a way of being, resistance to the totality” 
(TI 54/24). The resisting is a resistance to all concept, all determination. In 
that respect, the self is not composed of or produced out of anything, but 
is instead a resistance to everything determinate. The resistance continues 
throughout life since the self, though essentially its contents, always remains 
distinct from them (TI 112/84, 122/94). This is Levinas’s core metaphysical 
idea, of a self that constantly emerges in or offers a variety of forms while, at 
the same time, resisting the forms in which it emerges or which it offers, a 
self that is essentially in relation while, at the same time, absolving itself from 
the relations (TI 110/82).
Both in its biological meaning and in its extension to the relation of one 
person to another and of the I to itself, fecundity denotes a relation to anoth-
er’s future that is not a power: “The relation with such a future, irreducible to 
the power over possibles, we shall call fecundity” (TI 267/245). Fecundity, the 
very accomplishment of desire, is not heroic. Like Socrates, Levinas is a critic 
of the heroic masculine ideal, in his case perhaps best represented by aspects 
of Heidegger’s philosophy, for example, resolute and authentic being toward 
death. The erotic relation involves “a characteristic reversal of the subjectivity 
issued from position, a reversion of the virile and heroic I” (TI 270/248). The 
erotic subject is initiation not initiative (TI 270/248).
Similarly, for Socrates, love is not heroic. In the Phaedrus, as we saw in 
chapter 1, the helmsman or governor of the soul, who is identified with rea-
son (specifically with nous), falls on his back at the sight of the beloved and 
as a result loves him and serves him. The helmsman is knocked out by the 
sight of the youth and no longer in the things of himself (Phdr. 250a6–7). He 
even serves like a slave to his beloved (Phdr. 252a1–b1). The lover’s nonheroic 
service to his beloved, though, is differently characterized than the relation 
to another that is not a power described by Levinas. The lover, according to 
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Socrates, at the sight of the beloved ascends to the place beyond the heavens 
up to the very forms themselves, a process Socrates calls recollection of those 
eternal forms, and then descends and, in the best cases, joins together with 
the beloved in philosophy, that is, in a sharing of the very eternal forms the 
sight of the beloved has spurred him to recollect. The lover and his beloved 
youth come together over an eternal third that they share in common (Phdr. 
248d2–4, 252e11–253b1). Similarly in the Symposium, as we have seen, im-
mortality is illustrated by Diotima’s example of matter that changes while 
form persists and is exemplified by the production of a child who shares 
human form and by the educative function of sharing with a youth speeches 
about what is good in the hopes that the youth will be affected by such con-
versations to become beautiful and good, that is, to share in those forms 
(Sym. 206c1–212a7).
For Levinas, to the contrary, the effect of fecundity is not to reproduce 
eternal form. Instead, fecundity involves relating to an other in such a way 
as to facilitate the arising of something that has not in any sense been be-
fore. The ability to relate in this way to the future is fecundity, and the way 
of relating is contraction—“contraction that leaves a place for the separated 
being” (TI 104/77). For Levinas, the fundamentally ethical way of relating is 
a contraction that enables the wholly other and his or her projects to be. Fe-
cundity plays this role not just in erotic relations narrowly speaking but in all 
desire, since fecundity is the accomplishment of desire, and in our face to face 
relations to others and our relation to our self, since fecundity extends from 
the biological to both of these. Antiheroic reversion, initiation, and contrac-
tion play a role in all desire for Levinas, then, since all desire is a type of 
contraction in relation to an other that allows the other and his or her future 
projects—in their newness—to be. For Levinas, love and desire are genera-
tive vulnerability to what is fundamentally other or new.
3.
But Levinas is not consistent in contrasting his view of love and desire with 
Socrates’s. Though he contrasts his creation ex nihilo or absolute upsurge with 
the informing of matter in the Timaeus, he nonetheless identifies Socrates’s 
good beyond being in the Republic with his own metaphysical separation. If 
they were the same—that is, if Socrates’s good beyond being were the same 
as Levinas’s—the distinction between Socratic and Levinasian love and de-
sire would collapse. If they were the same, Socratic eros would have to be for 
the new not for the eternal since the object of Socratic eros is the good (or 
the beautiful, a closely related transcategorial). But it is not for the new, as 
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Diotima’s example of the matter that changes while the form persists indi-
cates. Socrates must mean something else, then, when he says that the good 
is beyond being.
There is more reason to think that Socratic transcategorials are different 
than Levinas’s good beyond being than just this textual argument. For one 
thing, if the object of desire for Socrates were the good beyond being in 
Levinas’s sense—that is, radical singularity—then we would expect Socratic 
virtues to be different than they are. We would expect Socrates to discuss vir- 
tues of the same general type as kindness, compassion, and faithfulness— 
virtues that go past knowledge of an individual’s characteristics and are directed 
instead to the singular individual him- or herself. Virtues of this type do not 
in fact play a central role in the Platonic corpus. Instead, the whole point of 
Socratic virtue seems to be to critique the heroic male ideal of power or force 
and replace it with knowledge—not with what is beyond or before knowl-
edge, but with knowledge. A central argument for Socrates regarding virtue 
is that we all desire good and so virtue is not desire but knowledge or wisdom: 
we all desire what is good, Socrates argues, so if we do not pursue it, it must 
be that we do not know what it is (Meno 77b2–e2). Of course, Socrates’s 
goal is to replace the ideal of virile force with knowledge understood as wis-
dom, not merely with being intelligent or smart (as the suggested rejection, 
at Meno 88a6–b6, of the equation of virtue with eumathia demonstrates) so 
that someone could object that the idea that virtue is not simply knowledge 
but wisdom could be translated into the claim that virtue is the encounter 
with the other as singular. Justice, they might say in support of their objec-
tion, could be equated with wisdom in this sense. What, though, I want to 
reply, about moderation and courage? These seem to have nothing to do with 
singularity and more to do with awareness of what is appropriate or best. We 
perhaps are asking too much of Socrates if we ask both that he endeavor to 
eradicate an old ideal of virtue as power and replace it with virtue as knowl-
edge or wisdom and, at the same time, that he introduce the ideal of response 
to human singularity. Moreover, if he had introduced that ideal, wouldn’t it 
be likely that Aristotle, his follower and great critic, would respond to such 
a crucial conceptual innovation? He does not respond to any such idea but 
instead responds to what he thinks is an overly intellectualist idea of virtue in 
Plato that he moderates by stressing the importance of emotional develop-
ment. Virtue, for Aristotle, is not simply knowledge, as it is for Plato, but also 
requires suitable emotional development.
What, then, is the good beyond being according to Socrates?12 It comes 
up during a discussion in the Republic of the mathematical and eidetic or 
formal aspects of beings, aspects that are known, respectively, by discursive 
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rationality (dianoia) and by rational intuition (nous) (511d2–5).13 As a result 
of this location in the dialogue, the strong suggestion is that the good beyond 
being is not a nonbeing but a hyperbeing or second-order being—beyond 
(epekeina), hyper, or second order because it is beyond the mathematical and 
the eidetic aspects of beings (as I have argued elsewhere), that is, beyond both 
what we might call the this and the what.14 Beings, in the Republic, are called 
originals to distinguish them from images. In images, such as the image of a 
tree on water, the mathematical and formal or eidetic aspects are very sepa-
rate. In originals, such as a tree, they are more together. The good is respon-
sible for their being together. The good is the togetherness of the this and the 
what, the mathematical and the eidetic, and, as such, we may call the good 
the fitting meaning the fit between a thing and its qualities or the conformity 
of a thing to its type.
That Socrates identifies the good with the fitting, or with related terms 
such as sufficient, proper, complete, or perfect, is indicated by numerous pas-
sages: in book 1 of the Republic, Socrates suggests that only if owed means 
fitting (prosēkon) is justice giving the owed to each (332c2); in book 4, that 
justice is doing one’s thing or doing the proper (to ta hautou prattein, oikeio-
pragia) (433b4, 434c8); in book 8, that the best for each is also what is most 
proper to it (oikeiotaton) (586e2); in the Gorgias, that moderation is doing 
the fitting (ta prosēkonta) concerning gods and people, that justice is doing 
the fitting concerning people, and piety doing the fitting concerning gods 
(507a7–b3); in the Philebus, that two signs of the good are the complete or 
perfect (teleon) and the sufficient (hikanon) (20d1–6). All these terms have 
to do with the fit of this to what, mathematical to eidetic, with complete and 
perfect indicating that something entirely fits while sufficient or proper are 
deficient cases of the complete or perfect: the sufficient just meets the mark, 
we could say, while the perfect meets it entirely.15
The beautiful, for Socrates, would be another such second-order being or 
transcategorial (to use a somewhat Aristotelian term) but one that empha-
sizes another aspect of mathematico-eidetic beings than togetherness. In-
stead, the beautiful points not to the togetherness but to the separation of the 
mathematical and the eidetic, to the transcendence by a this of its what. In 
the case of a painting of a tree, the painting in one sense simply is shapes and 
colors on a surface, but those shapes and colors point beyond themselves. The 
beauty of something is beyond that something’s qualities, as the use of the 
term surpassing (294b2) in the Hippias Major, the dialogue on the beautiful, 
indicates. Since the Hippias Major has not been commented on as extensively 
as other Platonic dialogues such as the Republic, I will now give a detailed in-
terpretation of it. The interpretation will show that the beautiful, for Plato, is 
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a transcategorial. In addition, I will return to discussion of the Hippias Major 
in chapter 7, where I will show how it contributes to a discussion of Plato’s 
views on human vulnerability.16
In that dialogue, Hippias’s first definitions of the beautiful fail because 
they reduce beauty to a beautiful being (maiden) or to a beautiful quality 
(gold) rather than seeing that beauty is in and through the qualities of a be-
ing but beyond them (Hipp. Maj. 287e4, 289e3). So also in the case of every 
being—every original, to use the term from the Republic—form not only is 
together with thing but transcends it, as the generality or universality of form 
indicates. The beautiful for Socrates, then, indicates an aspect of the puz-
zling phenomenon of the relationship between this and what, between the 
mathematical and the eidetic, in all beings, with the good, as I have argued 
elsewhere, indicating their togetherness and the beautiful indicating their 
separation.
Consider the Hippias Major as a whole. The dialogue is full of twos. Soc-
rates doubles himself. He talks to himself. The first Socrates, the one who 
talks the most to Hippias, seems to need the second Socrates, who is not 
fine or beautiful at all but trashy: “not refined (kompsos) but trashy (surphetos), 
giving thought to nothing other than the truth” (288d4–5). At the end of 
the dialogue, Socrates indicates that he needed Hippias, as well, for what he 
learned in the discussion (304e6–7). What he learned is not on the surface 
clear, of course, since the dialogue is aporetic. It ends without an obvious an-
swer to the question, what is the beautiful. Socrates does say, though, that he 
seems to himself to know, as a result of his conversation with Hippias, what 
the proverb means that says that fine or beautiful things are difficult: “For 
I seem to myself to know (eidenai) what the proverb means that says, ‘the 
beautiful things are difficult’ ” (304e7–9). Not surprisingly, the ending sug-
gests that Socrates has gained some knowledge (he seems to himself to know) 
of ignorance (that beauty is difficult). So there is something difficult—dare 
we say permanently difficult?—about beauty, but there appears to be some 
knowledge, too. What exactly is the difficulty? What is the knowledge? And 
what is their connection to the twos that are found in the dialogue?
One way to approach the question is to ask what is the dialogue’s answer 
to the question, what is the beautiful. Despite the fact that the dialogue is 
aporetic, some answers are suggested. The dialogue, read in a zealous way, 
does provide some knowledge. As is often true in a Platonic aporetic dialogue, 
the mistakes in or halting parts of the argument suggest directions Socrates 
might have wanted to take, or directions of argument Plato is leaving for us 
to take. For example, one definition in the dialogue remains unrefuted, as 
commentators have pointed out.17 It is the definition of the beautiful as the 
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fitting (to prepon) (293e2–4). Gold is only beautiful when it is fitting, they 
conclude in the refutation of gold as the beautiful. So perhaps the beautiful 
is the fitting. The proposed definition runs aground, though, when Socrates 
asks Hippias whether the fitting is what makes something be or seem beauti-
ful (293e11–294a2). Hippias’s answer is that it makes something seem beauti-
ful. Hippias tends to focus on seeming, but if we follow his lead completely, 
the definition does not work. Whatever the beautiful may be, it must make 
that which it qualifies be beautiful not merely seem beautiful.
Hippias gives his answer, that the fitting is what makes something seem 
beautiful, because he is thinking of an external beauty that attaches to some-
thing and hides that something’s own lack of beauty. It is superficial beauty 
that hides something, not a beauty that qualifies something that still shows 
forth in and through the beauty. Still, there is something important about the 
discussion of this definition even though Socrates and Hippias leave it be-
hind. Socrates—and the reader—learn something from it. It is important to 
note that the term I have translated here as fitting is not the term translated 
as fitting in the Republic, to prosēkon, but instead is to prepon, which can also 
mean the seemly.18 If we translate that way, then Hippias’s reluctance to go 
Socrates’s way is not surprising since the seemly can be something you attach 
to something else to hide what is not attractive or not appropriately exposed. 
A good suit on a homely man, for example, is seemly, as is a towel that hides 
one’s intimate parts (or, even, the phrase “intimate parts” itself ).
We know early in the dialogue that Hippias is not averse to hiding things, 
that he is not an entirely honest, or at least frank, person. For example, he 
thinks he has surpassed his contemporaries and the ancients in power and 
wisdom (281d1), but confesses that he does not usually say so because he 
pays heed to the envy of the living and fears the wrath of the dead (282d6–8). 
For another example, early in the dialogue, we learn that though Hippias 
claims to teach virtue, when Spartans will not allow him to do that, he is 
satisfied instead to teach them what pleases them most, namely, stories about 
ancient things such as heroes and human beings who founded cities (285d3–
5). The first of these two examples shows his deceptiveness; the second both 
his deceptiveness and, as Socrates implies, his lawlessness since to be lawful is 
not simply to do what is allowed but to do what is good (284e5–7). It is not 
surprising, then, that beauty for Hippias has to do with how things appear 
and is deceptive.
But Socrates in the end takes up Hippias’s idea that beauty has something 
to do with appearance. Is this what he needed Hippias for—to learn that 
beauty has something to do with appearance? We know that in the Phaedrus, 
Socrates refers to the beautiful as that which most appears, which shines 
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forth most or which most comes to light—ekphanestaton (Phdr. 250d7). 
What Socrates means there is that the beautiful is the one form that appears 
to everyone. Not everyone will see prudence or the good. But everyone sees 
the beauty of a beautiful youth or child or beloved. Maybe what Socrates 
needed from Hippias was a spur to think more about appearing and not as 
much about being. Can we square that idea with the rest of the dialogue?
We can if we consider the idea that the seemly is what makes things not 
just seem but be beautiful. Then beauty might in fact be appearance itself—
or, to be more complete, the appearance of form. How would that work? At 
one point in the dialogue, Socrates apparently identifies the beautiful with 
the surpassing (tōi hyperechonti, 294b2). It is just an example, but as is not 
unusual in Plato, the example is more of a paradigm or parallel. Things are 
great by the surpassing, Socrates says, in giving a paradigm or parallel of how 
to answer regarding the beautiful. Just as the good is beyond being, so the 
beautiful is the surpassing. Just as the good is in the brightest or shiniest part 
of being (to phanotaton, Rep. 7.518c9) so the beautiful is that which shines 
forth most (ekphanestaton, Phdr. 250d7). Just as the good is the fitting (to 
prosēkon), so the beautiful is the seemly (to prepon) (that is, the kind of fitting 
that specifically has to do with appearance). What is the difference? In the 
case of the good, Socrates is talking about what we might call realization, an 
ontological change into form or whatness, whereas in the case of the beauti-
ful he is talking not about realization but about shining forth or appearing 
to us, which is an epistemological change, or at least a change for a knower.
Both of these have to do with a two. In one case, one thing realizes an-
other. In the other case, one thing discloses another or brings it to light. 
Hence it is not surprising, in retrospect anyway, that Socrates goes on to 
talk about the general idea that sometimes when there are two things, both 
together are something different than each is separately. In the ontological 
realm, when the head of the hammer is with the hammer’s handle, then the 
head can be a head rather than simply an interestingly shaped piece of metal. 
In the realm of beauty, when a patch of the color red is together with the more 
predominant grays, greens, and browns of the painting—Georgia O’Keefe’s 
Lake George Barns, for example—the grays and greens are more vivid. They 
were there all along, but they show up more or stand out more. Without the 
red patch, the other colors do not stand out for us. So as Socrates in the The-
aetetus and Aristotle in the Metaphysics suggest regarding ontology that the 
whole is something different than a heap of parts (Tht. 201d8–206b12; Met. 
1041b11–33), Socrates here suggests regarding appearance that when two are 
together, something else arises for us.
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Once again, though, the example is left hanging. With the example of the 
surpassing, Socrates appears to push Hippias toward, or at least set things up 
to allow for, the idea that in beauty, both together are different than each is 
separately (300b6–8). If that is true of beauty, and I am arguing that Socrates 
thinks it is, Socrates likely was waiting to see if Hippias would agree. But 
Hippias is so far from agreeing that he does not even move in the general 
direction Socrates leaves open to him, namely, the direction of thinking that 
beauty has something to do with twos, that is, with something new that re-
sults when both of two things are together.
This, perhaps, though, is part of the point of the dialogue. The dialogue 
is frustrating because Hippias does not seem to get it—to get much of any-
thing Socrates is saying. The dialogue, in other words, is not just aporetic, 
but frustratingly aporetic. Does Hippias resist?19 Or does he just not get it? 
We can compare Hippias to other interlocutors, such as Theaetetus or Meno. 
Theaetetus is refuted again and again, but keeps coming back with suggested 
alternative answers. Meno, to the contrary, resists many (though not all) of 
the refutations Socrates makes. His resistance appears in the form of an at-
tack on Socrates (as like an ugly stingray that immobilizes what it contacts) 
or, in some cases, his willfully changing the subject, bossing Socrates around 
by pushing him to consider something other than Meno’s answer. Give me 
another answer about color, he orders when Socrates has defined shape. Can 
you teach me that learning is recollection? he asks, when Socrates has just 
argued that there is no teaching but only recollecting.
Hippias is not like either of them. Unlike zealous Theaetetus, he does not 
really push to find another answer that responds to Socrates’s criticisms. He 
gives definitions, but they do not really respond to Socrates’s objections. What 
is important, though, is how his definitions fall short. When Socrates’s coarse 
double asks Hippias the first time to define the beautiful and makes it clear 
that he does not want the answer to the question what is beautiful but what 
is the beautiful, Hippias responds in such a way as indicates that he is ignor-
ing the distinction on which Socrates has clearly insisted and answers that 
a beautiful maiden is beautiful (not the beautiful, but beautiful ).20 Socrates 
indicates that he thinks Hippias cares more about giving answers that seem 
or look good rather than ones that are adequate when he replies, “You an-
swer beautifully at least, by the dog, and reputably [eudoxōs]” (287e5–6). Mere 
beauty, then, is delineated by Socrates as being a positive seeming (eu + doxōs) 
that goes no further. Hippias goes on to say that the answer cannot be refuted 
because it seems so (dokei) to everyone (288a4). Anyone, he continues, who 
asserted that “what you say” is not beautiful would be ridiculous (288b1–3). 
The point is to say something that is beautiful and will seem beautiful to 
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everyone. This becomes clear when Socrates proceeds next to list examples. 
Hippias is fine with the idea that a beautiful mare praised by the gods is 
beautiful, and with the idea that a beautiful lyre is beautiful but not with the 
third example, a beautiful pot. His response is that the answer is a base an-
swer about a dignified topic (Socrates “dares to name base—phaula—names 
regarding a dignified—semnōi—matter”) (288d1–3). In reply, Socrates in the 
guise of the double says that he is not refined but trashy, caring for nothing 
other than the truth (288d4–5). Hippias and Socrates’s double make quite a 
fine pair—or, should I say less ironically, a comical or ridiculous pair—with 
Hippias caring only that his answer seem so to others and Socrates’s double 
caring only that the answer be true. The difficulty here is not, as some com-
mentators say, that Hippias thinks beauty cannot be defined but can only 
be understood through examples.21 Instead, the difficulty is that he cannot 
allow an answer that indicates that beauty is besmirched by any touch of the 
ugly or the plain. It must be dignified. As a result, he does not understand 
the very power of the beautiful, namely, to raise the ugly or plain to a higher 
level, specifically, to a level on which it is beautiful or to a level on which the 
beautiful is beautiful in and through what is by itself ugly or plain. It is this 
combination of what is beautiful with what is ugly that characterizes Socratic 
wisdom or, more generally, Socrates himself as the representative of specifi-
cally human wisdom and of all that is in between: knowledge of ignorance, 
resource and poverty, beauty and ugliness, and, more generally, ability and 
vulnerability. Even this discussion of beauty in the Hippias Major is a critique 
of the heroic ideal, since the discussion critiques the ideal of self-sufficiency 
that would not be touched by anything low or plain, just as Achilles would 
not reenter the battle because he had been disrespected or a soldier was not 
to return without his beautiful shield even if, despite losing it, he had won 
the battle. In comparison with the gods, Socrates says, a beautiful maiden 
is ugly, so that the example of beauty that Hippias started out with was no 
more beautiful than ugly. Things, Socrates indicates in the Republic, tumble 
about between being and not being—in this case, between being and not be-
ing beautiful (Rep. 5.478e1–479d6). Or, as Heraclitus says, and as Socrates 
quotes him here, “the wisest human being, in comparison with a god, will ap-
pear an ape both in wisdom and in beauty and in all other things” (289b3–5).
Given that his first answer was refuted on the grounds that things are 
a mixture of beauty and what is not beautiful, and given that Socrates is 
looking for the form due to whose presence things are adorned and appear 
beautiful, Hippias’s next answer is gold. Gold is not a thing. When it is pres-
ent, things are adorned and appear beautiful. The problem with Hippias’s 
answer is not simply that it is an example rather than a definition. Even 
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more, it is problematic because once again it is an answer that would not 
allow for the combination of beautiful and the ugly or plain that is found in 
things. Gold covers over what is ugly or plain. It is as if Hippias were to say, 
“You want beauty? Add some gold.” The word translated here as “adorned,” 
kosmeitai, has two different meanings. One is related to kosmos as beautiful 
order. One is related to beautification in cosmetics. An order or arrangement 
of things that by themselves are not beautiful allows those things both to 
show themselves as what they are and to be beautiful. Cosmetics, instead, 
covers things that are not beautiful and, by doing so, makes them beautiful.22 
Once again, Hippias does not understand the power of beauty, which is to 
be beautiful in and through what is by itself ugly or plain. Socrates’s double 
responds with the example of the eyes of Pheidias’s statue of Athena, which 
were not made of gold but of ivory, as were the face, feet, and hands, and the 
middle of the statue’s eyes, which were not made even of ivory but of stone 
(290a8–d4). Even stone is beautiful, Hippias agrees, when it is fitting (prepōn) 
(290c7).
The fitting (to prepon) is what strikes the senses in such a way as to be 
conspicuous or clearly seen. The fitting, thus, has to do with appearance, and 
can denote either the shining forth that makes something susceptible to be-
ing clearly seen, or the being seen itself, that is, either the appearance or the 
perception. The conspicuous is not just what is seen, but what is clearly seen. 
The conspicuous stands out for us, is obvious or striking. Another meaning 
of to prepon is the fitting or seemly. What is fitting is appropriate or suitable 
to something else. What is seemly is what is of good or pleasant appearance, 
or what conforms to propriety. What is true of beauty as to prepon, then, is 
that it involves something that can be seen standing out so that it can be seen 
clearly; it involves my perception of that which stands out; and it involves 
the fit of one thing to another such that something stands out. Socrates uti-
lizes the third sense of to prepon and goads Hippias by suggesting then that 
when we fill the pot he mentioned previously with beautiful soup, a ladle of 
fig wood would be more beautiful in the pot than one of gold. The homely 
answer irritates Hippias, but he is forced to agree with it.
Frustrated, Hippias attempts one more definition. You might think his 
definition would reflect what was learned in the discussion of the last ex-
ample. If it did, it could include the simple idea of seeming or appearance, 
the idea of something that appears standing out even more, or the idea of the 
fitting or suitable. All of that could be encompassed by the idea of to prepon 
perhaps best translated as the seemly, should we strain the resources of the 
English language to put all this in one word in this context. For Hippias, it 
would be easier, as he could simply say to prepon.
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Instead, ignoring what could be learned from their discussion so far, Hip-
pias reverts to another example of beauty as a cover-up of what is not beauti-
ful at all. If you are wealthy, healthy, and honored, it is beautiful to give your 
parents a beautiful funeral and for you to be beautifully and magnificently 
buried by your children. What a grim answer! Death is not so beautiful for a 
Greek, given what existence is like in Hades or the familial tomb. The funeral 
covers over an eternal discomfort that awaits both parents and children. To 
what end are wealth, health, and honor if we are all simply to end up as in-
substantial, flitting shades. The greatest human beings would not be covered 
by this definition, as Socrates points out in a question using the example of 
Achilles, son of the immortal goddess Thetis (292e8). Clearly, he would not 
bury her. In response to the refutation, Plato makes sure we will think about 
the inescapable bleakness of death, when he euphemistically tells Socrates to 
go to Hades. “Go to blessedness!” Hippias says. “The human being’s ques-
tions are not even respectful (euphēma)” (293a2–3). Not only is Hippias’s 
third definition too narrow—it does not cover stone, wood, human being, 
god, activity, learning—but once again it is beauty as something that hides 
something else rather than fitting it or bringing it out or making it conspicu-
ous. Hippias cannot even speak of our eventual residence in the bleak after-
life without using a euphemism (“blessedness”).
Hippias, then, is not like Theaetetus who pushes past every objection to 
try to find an answer. Hippias’s whole approach is euphemism. Nor, though, 
does Hippias attack Socrates or simply push him around like beautiful, bossy, 
lazy Meno. Instead, Hippias just gives some pretty answer. The beautiful for 
him could be characterized as the pretty, where the pretty is what is on the 
surface and is appealing because it hides something. The beautiful is not for 
him something that enables what it qualifies to shine forth, to be manifest 
or conspicuous, and at once to change or attain a different level. Similarly, 
Hippias’s answers hide something about himself. They hide the fact that he 
does not know, that he is ignorant. They hide it, and they prevent him from 
changing as a result. They prevent him from looking for the answer. Hippias 
does not admit to his vulnerability—in this case, his ignorance—and so he is 
not as a result of admitted vulnerability or ignorance plunged into the search 
for an answer. Hippias repeatedly says he has the answer or could get it if he 
were just alone to come up with it. Hippias, then, does not see the importance 
of the two—that is, of Socrates and him together, forming a pair that could 
change Hippias and bring something, in this case the beautiful, to light. He 
does not see the importance of publicly admitting his own vulnerability. In-
stead, he hides it by saying something pretty, something seemly in the lower 
sense of that term.
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Hippias, then, since for him beauty is only a surface covering, is not com-
fortable with anyone noticing his vulnerability or ignorance. Instead, he is all 
about power. He makes more money than the renowned intellects of the an-
cient world, he says early in the dialogue, because he has wisdom and power. 
When Socrates, in his second definition, suggests beauty is power, Hippias 
not surprisingly goes along emphatically with the idea (Sphodra, he says—
295e10). Socrates, having found a point of agreement with Hippias, then 
goes on to make one of his usual points about power. The beautiful, he says, 
cannot simply be power, but must be power for something good, since power 
for something that is not good is not beautiful but ugly. Power for something 
good, he says, is the beneficial (to ōphelimon, 296e5). Then he makes an unex-
pected point, that the beautiful as the beneficial is the cause of the good. The 
reader wonders about the sudden turn in the dialogue. Why is the beautiful 
the cause of the good? The reader of the Republic might think instead that 
for Socrates the good is the cause of the beautiful since the good is the cause 
of truth. One imagines, or hopes, that Hippias, too, is surprised at the claim.
Moreover, we know from other dialogues, such as the Meno and the Re-
public, that Socrates thinks that the greatest human power is knowledge or 
wisdom. He says that as well in this dialogue. The powerful is most beautiful, 
Socrates says, and so wisdom is the most beautiful of all (295e). Wisdom is 
knowledge of the good, as we can conclude from, for example, the develop-
ment in the Republic of the knowledge that is needed for virtue that takes 
us all the way up the divided line to the idea of the good. Hence, Socrates’s 
claim that the beautiful is the cause of the good implies that wisdom is the 
cause of the good. Once again, this seems to contradict the Republic where 
Socrates argues that the good is the cause of truth and knowledge. Socrates, 
then, must mean something different here, namely, that when we are wise, we 
become good, as indicated in the Republic as well as the Phaedrus. As noted in 
chapter 1, we learn from the Phaedrus that when we are wise by recollecting 
the form of the beautiful, we become good to our beloved. As noted in chap-
ter 2, from the Republic we learn that when we are wise by having knowledge 
of all time and all being all the way up the divided line to being and ideas, to 
all time and all being, and to the brightest of being, the form of the good in 
the Republic, we acquire virtue and will serve the city.
Infuriatingly, Hippias does not take Socrates’s bait. When Socrates says 
that the beautiful is the cause of the good, we can assume that he wants 
Hip pias to ask about the claim. Socrates’s counterintuitive claim shifts the 
subject from ontology to human beings. But Hippias will not show vulner-
ability by asking Socrates what in the world he means. Surely Hippias knows 
that beauty can cause evil, as any Athenian would know by thinking about 
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treacherous Alcibiades or Meno. Socrates goes off as a result instead into 
what appears to be a bad argument that since the beautiful is the cause of the 
good, the beautiful is not good. We want Hippias to ask or say, Socrates, don’t 
you see you have only shown that the beautiful is not the good, so that the 
beautiful could still be good? But Hippias, true to form, does not.
Hippias is not wise, then, because forms do not show up for him. The 
opening of the dialogue is heavily ironic, we can conclude, when Socrates 
starts off by addressing his interlocutor as “Hippias, the beautiful and wise” 
(281a1). Hippias’s beauty is a beautiful covering that does not allow for vul-
nerability, that is, for awareness of one thing’s need of being accompanied 
by another that can make what is present in the first shine forth, a shining 
forth that the first could not accomplish by itself. Hippias needs Socrates but 
does not know it, and covers his need with an anxious, but showy, prettiness. 
Socrates, on the other hand, needs a blunt Socrates who can keep him think-
ing about the good and the useful, which are crude, and a beauty-conscious 
Hippias who can get him to realize how important seeming is for beauty.
Socrates’s last significant attempt to make progress is his definition of 
beauty as the pleasure that accompanies sight and hearing (298a6–7). With 
it, he pushes toward the view that beauty has something to do with form, 
for he rejects the possibility that what is crucial to the definition of beauty 
is what is crucial in each part of the definition—pleasure that accompanies 
sight, pleasure that accompanies hearing. Instead, what is crucial for the defi-
nition of the beautiful is something else common (koinon) to the two parts 
and something that is missing from, for example, pleasure from sex (300a10). 
Socrates mentions form (298b4), but Hippias as usual does not take him up 
on the hint.
The hint is that the answer might be form itself (or might centrally in-
volve it). Specifically, Socrates brings in two examples of beautiful things 
from which we would not ordinarily say we derive pleasure through sight or 
hearing—namely, beautiful practices and laws—and asks whether they are 
beautiful through some other form than pleasure through sight and hear-
ing. Hippias concurs, twice, presumably because the beauty of human be-
ings; decorations, paintings, and sculpture; voices and music; and speeches 
and stories is different than the beauty of practices and laws. In fact, the last 
two examples on the list itself are different from the others. The beauty of 
speeches and stories, like the beauty of practices and laws, is different from 
the beauty of human beings; decorations, paintings, and sculpture; voices and 
music. Socrates is pushing for the idea that the beauty of material things is 
not something material. He pushes for that idea by gradually bringing in 
examples of beauty that are not material: the beauty of speeches, stories, prac-
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tices, and laws. The movement of the argument is reminiscent of Socrates’s 
claim in the Philebus that there is no such thing as bodily pleasure. The point 
there is that what we call bodily pleasure is pleasure experienced by the soul. 
The point here seems to be that the beauty even of material things is not 
material.
Hippias agrees with Socrates’s claim that the beauty of practices and laws 
is different than the other examples. We should not be surprised, since we 
know that it was the example of beautiful practices that led Socrates to ask 
Hippias what is the beautiful in the first place. Hippias in that early part of 
the dialogue swears by Zeus and declares that he has achieved a great reputa-
tion regarding beautiful practices, specifically by describing in detail what a 
youth ought to pursue, pursuits that are both beautiful and lawful (286a3–
b7). At this point, having gotten Hippias where he wants him, Socrates indi-
cates that what he is looking for is the perception that comes through hearing 
and sight (298d1–3). So it is not only that Socrates is looking for one form 
that covers (or is common to) all cases, but that the form he is looking for is 
form itself. He starts this movement of the argument by distinguishing the 
pleasures of food, drink, and sex, which have more to do with being filled and 
emptied, from the pleasure that accompanies sight and hearing, which have 
to do with discernment or perception of form.
Another hinted point that Hippias misses is that, in beauty, both together 
have something that each separately does not. Hippias ought to pick up on 
this point given the earlier discussion of the fitting (to prepon) where they 
agreed that gold, stone, or ivory are or are not beautiful depending on what 
they are with. Socrates’s point, of course, is not that the pleasure from hearing 
and the pleasure from sight have something in common that each does not 
but that two things can have something in common, beauty, that each does 
not have (303a2–3). Hippias also misses another suggested point in the same 
passage, namely, that it would be very irrational (pollē gar alogia, 303c3–6) 
if in the case of beauty, both together are something that each separately 
is not. Much like the Meno, the quest for an answer stalls here not because 
the interlocutor does not have the resources for an answer. Instead, it stalls 
because Hippias does not draw on the resource that they have, namely, the 
recollection from their previous discussion that two things together can have 
a beauty that each separately does not. Hippias has a good memory and is 
smart, but he does not seem very philosophic in the Socratic/Platonic sense. 
He does not seem to be able to draw an argument out of the discussion of an 
example. In other words, he has a good memory but does not excel at Socratic 
recollection. Like Meno, he has a good memory but cannot philosophize. The 
reason for it is different, though. Meno has a decidedly tyrannical personality, 
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perhaps due to his beauty and the power it gives him. He will not inquire, 
but demands that pleasing answers be given him. Hippias, on the other hand, 
has an impulse to cover over anything plain, ugly, or threatening. He cannot 
philosophize because he cannot linger over what is ordinary or ugly until the 
beauty within it becomes conspicuous.
The dialogue comes near to its end when Hippias expresses frustration 
with Socrates for engaging in unseemly arguments by making fine distinc-
tions or by chopping up “great and continuous bodies of being” into pieces. 
Interestingly, though, it is Hippias, not Socrates, who at least in argument is 
unable to comprehend wholes, for it is Hippias who adamantly denies that 
there are cases in which both together are different than each separately. If he 
were right about that, there would be no wholes, only heaps, since in a whole, 
a material quality becomes a part, rather than a mere quantity of matter, 
when it is together with other parts. There is in the case of wholes a kind of 
increase or, to use Socrates’s term, a whole that surpasses its parts.
What Socrates knows, then, when he says he seems to himself to know 
what the proverb means that says “the beautiful things are difficult” is that 
there is such a thing as the visibly surpassing or transcendent. He knows 
that in the realm of appearance both together are something other than each 
separately. Though this is, in one sense, irrational, he sees and knows that 
it is true. When both are together, there is something other than just both 
together. When both are together, something else arises, called beauty. It is 
irrational because indeterminate, not easily countable. Is beauty some third 
thing separate from the original two? No. It is in and through them. Is beauty 
nothing but each of the two? No. For separately, the two are not beauti-
ful. Both together should be two. Instead, they seem to be three. Following 
Socrates, we could call beauty, since it is something other that arises, the 
surpassing or transcendent. In the case of the beautiful, that something other 
that arises is form. Beauty is form that arises or comes to light for us when 
two things are together. Beauty, in other words, is the appearance or percep-
tion of form. Socrates, then, has knowledge and a difficulty since what he 
knows is itself difficult, namely, that in some cases, both together are different 
than each is on its own.
For Socrates in the Hippias Major, then, the beautiful has to do with the 
fundamental ambiguity of being. Being is double, for it consists of formed be-
ings. The good, as I have argued elsewhere, is the presence of form in beings. 
Hence, the good is, as Socrates says in the Republic, the cause of truth and 
knowledge—where truth is alētheia or the unhiddenness, showing through, 
or disclosure of form. Only if form is in a thing can there be truth since truth 
is the unhiddenness or disclosure of that form. The beautiful, too, is about 
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twos. Beauty results when one thing causes the form of another to appear. 
Beauty is close to truth where truth refers more to the process by which form 
becomes unhidden and beauty more to the result of that process, namely, the 
appearance of form or the surpassing. When two things are put together in a 
certain way, a form that was already present and realized in the first changes 
its manifest state: it shines forth and is seen. The good and the beautiful, then, 
are not outside of being for Plato. Instead, they are hyperbeings or second-
order beings—or, to use a different language, transcategorials.
The beyond being in Plato, then, is not the same as the beyond being in 
Levinas. For the beyond being in Plato, whether it is the beyond being of 
the good or the surpassing of the beautiful, has to do with form—with form, 
the immanence of form, and the shining forth or transcendence of form. The 
beyond being in Plato is in the realm of the light, form, and generality not, 
as it is in Levinas, in the realm of what is before or beyond the light because 
it has to do with the singular. This type of interpretation of Socrates’s beyond 
being fits more the overall Platonic problematic than Levinas’s interpretation 
does and, in addition, makes it possible to preserve the difference between 
Socrates’s and Levinas’s views of love and desire that section 2 of this chapter 
delineates.
We are left once again, then, with two types of vulnerability to the other, one 
a Levinasian open vulnerability, a vulnerability not to the form but to the 
singularity of the other, and the other a Socratic-Platonic vulnerability to the 
other’s form that involves responding to what things or persons are and relat-
ing to them based on what fits them as a result of what they are. Each type 
of vulnerability is important, I assert, because each is necessary both for our 
good dealing with ourselves and with other people. It is necessary and good 
both to respond to people based on what fits them and thus to play a role in 
enabling them to be what they are and, as well, to respond to them beyond or 
without reference to what they are at any particular time and by so doing to 
participate in enabling them to be or do something that is utterly new. Leav-
ing this gesture toward an argument for a more comprehensive notion of re-
lationships to the other aside, this chapter’s consideration of desire and need 
has shown us that both Plato and Levinas, in discussing desire, delineate an 
essential human vulnerability to the other while the chapter’s attention to the 
concept of creation and to the distinction between the eternal and the new 
indicates that the essential vulnerabilities on which their concepts of desire 
rest are significantly different in kind.23
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C H A P T E R  4
Knowledge
Crucial to Levinas’s thinking about relating to the other is the distinction he 
draws, in Totality and Infinity, between the interiority of learning understood as 
Socratic recollection and the transitivity of what he calls teaching or instruction: 
“The transitivity of teaching,” he says, “and not the interiority of reminiscence, 
manifests being” (TI 101/74). As a result, teaching, not maieutics, is the pre-
condition of knowledge where the precondition is “a pure ‘knowledge’ or ‘expe-
rience’ ” that, unlike the rest of knowledge or knowledge in an ordinary sense, 
brings me more than I am capable of, brings me an other beyond the capacity 
of the I. Teaching, Levinas says, “does not operate as maieutics.” Instead, the 
soul is “capable of containing more than it can draw from itself ” (TI 180/155).
Operative in the distinction between maieutics and teaching is Levinas’s 
view that in knowledge we wish to approach the known in all its otherness 
without marking it: “Knowledge or theory designates first a relation with be-
ing such that the knowing being lets the known being manifest itself while 
respecting its alterity and without marking it in any way whatever by this 
cognitive relation” (TI 42/12). But Socratic knowledge cannot achieve this 
goal since it fundamentally involves simply bringing out what is already pres-
ent. Socratic maieutics awakens what is already in me (TI 69/44). The So-
cratic master does not genuinely teach but “simply arouse[s] the reminiscence 
of former visions” (TI 86/58).
But is Levinas right about Socratic maieutics? Socrates does tell Theaete-
tus, in the dialogue by the same name, that he is a midwife of souls and 
that some of those who associate with him discover in themselves and bring 
forth many fine things (Tht. 150d2–8). At the same time, though, Socrates 
indicates that some offspring are true and others false (b9–c3) and that he is 
ready to deprive Theaetetus of the latter kind of offspring just as midwives 
sometimes deprive women of theirs. This complication in the metaphor of 
psychic midwifery suggests something less than the Levinasian claim that 
Socratic knowledge is the simple explication of what is already inside us. For 
its being in us is not sufficient for its being knowledge.
knowledge 99
It is for a different reason that Socrates suggests for knowledge both that 
we must search within and, at the same time, that what we discover in such 
a search may not be sufficient. In the Meno, where the topic is not maieutics 
but recollection, the point of Socrates’s exhorting the interlocutor to turn to 
himself is clear. Knowledge is not placed in you by another but requires real 
and zealous inquiry. Think, Socrates suggests there; don’t just absorb. That is 
what he means by searching within. Meno really is recalcitrant to genuine 
inquiry. He perceives it as slavish. He puts up roadblocks to its success such 
as the famous eristic argument (the Meno argument) that it is not possible 
to seek either what you do or do not know. There is no need to seek the for-
mer and no way to seek the latter since you wouldn’t know it if you found it. 
Socrates’s response to the argument is that in between complete knowledge 
and complete ignorance is a state of partial knowledge, metaphorically de-
scribed as knowing something but having forgotten it.
Theaetetus is quite a different personality than Meno, however. While 
Meno would render inquiry impossible, Theaetetus is eager in argument and 
too sanguine about its possibilities. (For example, he defines knowledge as 
perception though irrational magnitudes, about which he made discoveries, 
cannot be perceived.) As a result, one of Socrates’s main activities in the The-
aetetus is to show Theaetetus problems and engender in him some epistemo-
logical caution. The two dialogues are companion dialogues—after all, one is 
about virtue and the other about knowledge and, according to Socrates in an 
argument never successfully refuted in the Meno, virtue is knowledge—with 
one suggesting a need for boldness in inquiry and the other a need for cau-
tion. Both dialogues indicate, in their imagery, that the knowledge we seek 
both is and is not inside us. In the Meno, we have but have forgotten what we 
seek. In the Theaetetus, knowledge is the result of the move from merely pos-
sessing knowledge to actually having or holding it. Similarly, we can contrast 
birds that we have in a birdcage with those we take out and hold in our hands. 
To make the difference with Levinas complete, the image further suggests 
that some of the birds are true and others false knowledge, just as when we 
are pregnant, we in a sense do and do not have what we have conceived but, 
even after bringing forth, some of what is brought forth is true and the rest 
merely an image. The point suggested in the Theaetetus, then, is that there is 
a method of inquiry but it is not veridical or foolproof. The method is one of 
explicating what is both immanent and transcendent to thought, that is, of 
making the implicit explicit, but doing so may simply bring out wind eggs, 
that is, false opinions or suppositions.
If we are right to bring together all the conclusions about Platonic inquiry 
and recollection into one account here as I have done, including the claim 
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made in the Phaedrus that recollection is moving from many perceptions to 
the one idea implicit in them, then Levinas is wrong to say that maieutics 
brings me only what I contain. Instead, it brings me what I both do and do 
not contain. Knowledge for Plato is not of what is immanent, but of what is 
both transcendent and immanent. In addition, not every opinion immanent 
to my soul is knowledge, since some are false. What then is the real difference 
between Socrates and Levinas on the preconditions for knowledge?
An answer lies in what is absolutely other or absolutely foreign: “The ab-
solutely foreign alone can instruct us,” Levinas says, and only human be-
ings are absolutely foreign (TI 73/46). They cannot be captured in a concept, 
comprehended by a theme, located in a category. They are “refractory to every 
typology, to every genus, to every characterology, to every classification” (TI 
73/46). Our relation to the absolutely other is not disclosure but truth. Truth 
is “a modality of the relation between the same and the other” (TI 64/35), 
specifically, with the absolutely other: “a relation with the absolutely other 
[l ’absolument autre], or truth” (TI 29/xvii). Sometimes Levinas refers not to 
otherness but to exteriority and calls our relation to it respect: “the respect for 
this metaphysical exteriority,” he says, “constitutes truth” (TI 29/xvii). Truth 
is not disclosure because “to recognize truth to be disclosure [dévoilement] is 
to refer it to the horizon of him who discloses” (TI 64/36). For Levinas, then, 
in addition to an ordinary knowledge and truth, there is a pure knowledge 
understood as bringing me more than I contain as well as truth understood 
as relation with what is absolutely other. It is because of knowledge and truth 
understood this way that teaching, not maieutics, manifests being. Levinas’s 
point here, and his rhetorical approach, is to critique knowledge by showing 
that only the ethical can achieve what knowledge aims to achieve, thus justi-
fying his periodic description of ethical ideas in epistemological terms (truth 
for our relation to the other as such and teaching for what we receive from 
the other in such relations). If things are best understood or characterized in 
terms of their goal, then ethics can be construed in epistemological terms. 
For it is ethics that achieves the fundamental epistemo logical goals.
The same point can be made in a different way, however. Rather than con-
structing the ethical in epistemological terms in order to show the difference 
between ethics and knowledge in some ordinary or Platonic sense, some-
times Levinas simply contrasts the two, that is, he simply contrasts knowl-
edge and the ethical. A formative contrast for Levinas, then, is the contrast 
between maieutics and knowledge, on the one hand, and teaching and rev-
elation, on the other. Using this rhetorical strategy, knowledge denotes not 
the ethical constructed in epistemological or pure terms as Levinasian pure 
knowledge but instead simply denotes knowledge in some ordinary or Pla-
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tonic sense. At the same time, revelation in this strategy does have a pure 
Levinasian meaning. As a result, it does not mean disclosure or unveiling 
but has a Levinasian pure or absolute sense of “manifestation of the Other,” 
that is, “the manifestation of a face over and beyond form” (TI 66/37). The 
one who manifests himself “at each instant undoes the form he presents” (TI 
66/37). For Levinas, unlike Plato’s Socrates, form does not show but betrays 
the other, congeals him or her. Form is not adequate to the other since form 
“incessantly betray[s] its own manifestation, congeal[s] into a plastic form” 
(TI 66/37). Not revealed through form, the other instead is revealed through 
speech. “The interlocutor alone,” Levinas says, “is the term of pure experi-
ence” (TI 67/39).
In his discussion of knowledge and the ethical, then, we have a set of pure 
epistemological terms—ethical ideas constructed in epistemological terms—
including experience, knowledge, truth, and revelation. To round out the list, 
another term to consider is meaning. As Levinas gives each of the preced-
ing terms an absolute or pure sense, so he does with meaning. Experience, 
knowledge, truth, and revelation, in their absolute or pure sense, all have to 
do with something like reference. In the realm of absolute knowledge, what 
then would meaning or sense convey? “The way of undoing the form adequate 
to the Same so as to present oneself as other is to signify or have a meaning 
[un sens],” Levinas says (TI 66/37). The closest the other can come, in other 
words, to having what we would ordinarily call meaning is to have a particular 
way of undoing forms presented and showing herself independent of them. 
This brings us back to speaking since “to present oneself by signifying is to 
speak” (TI 66/37). In speaking, the other presents himself without giving 
himself: “to signify is not to give” (TI 66/37). To speak is to offer forms with-
out being identified with them. To experience, knowledge, truth, and revelation 
we must, then, add Levinas’s other absolute epistemological terms, mean-
ing or sense, signification and speech. All of these absolute or pure terms are 
needed if we are to think about how Plato and Levinas do and do not differ 
on knowledge.
In what follows, I will show that knowledge, for Plato, is not of what is im-
manent but of what is both immanent and transcendent and that as a result 
Platonic maieutics and recollection are more similar to Levinasian teaching 
than Levinas thinks since both respond to something beyond or transcend-
ing the self (section 1); and, after discussing and delineating the variety of 
absolute epistemological terms Levinas uses to talk about our relationship 
with what is utterly beyond us (section 2), I will show that the real difference 
in their epistemological standpoints is Levinas’s idea that we are taught only 
by what is absolutely foreign or absolutely other, that is, by an other who 
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utterly transcends and cannot be experienced as immanent (section 3). If 
I am correct about that difference, then once again we can conclude that, 
though both Plato and Levinas are philosophers of the other, their philoso-
phies of the other are of significantly different types.
1.
There are many questions we can ask about Platonic forms (even leaving aside 
not the least among them, the question whether we are fully justified in refer-
ring to them as the forms as if they were reified entities or things). We can ask, 
for example, what they are and also what is their relation to things. A com-
mon answer Plato’s Socrates gives to the first question is that a form or idea 
is a one over many. In the Meno, for example, Socrates says about virtues that 
“even if they are many and various, all of them have one and the same form 
due to which they are virtues” (Meno 72c6–8); in the Republic that “we are 
accustomed to posit some one particular form for each of the manys to which 
we apply the same name” (Rep. 10.596a6–7); and in the Parmenides, Par-
menides says, “when some many seem to you to be large, perhaps there seems 
to be some one idea that is the same when you look over them all, hence you 
believe that the large is one” (Prm. 132a2–4). In each of these examples, the 
form is an ontological principle, something by virtue of which things that are 
many are, in another respect, one. Forms are, as well, epistemological prin-
ciples or that by virtue of which we know things. In the divided line passage 
in the Republic, knowledge of the forms is the highest type of knowledge, 
called noēsis or intellectual intuition. Other types of knowledge are derivative 
of it. Dianoia, or thought, for example, depends for its own reasoning on the 
assumption or hypothesis of forms. Finally, in the Parmenides, after showing 
Socrates a number of problems in explicating forms, Parmenides suggests not 
only that forms are epistemological principles but also that they are dialogical 
or conversational principles. If a person does not distinguish forms for things, 
he says, “he will not even have anything to which to turn his thought,” and 
“he will utterly destroy the power of dialogue” (135b8, c1–2).
In taking this approach, Plato’s Socrates—or, with more historical accu-
racy, Plato—follows Heraclitus who, preceding Plato, posits a nonmaterial 
principle of things called the logos. It is an ontological principle since, accord-
ing to Heraclitus, “all things happen according to this logos,” and I use it to 
“distinguish each thing according to its nature and say how it is” (1). So that 
according to which things come to be what they are is also that according to 
which I say what they are. I use the logos to collect things together and select 
them out as different from other things. Plato would say I do this not in ac-
knowledge 103
cordance with their logos but in accordance with their form or idea, which 
is the character that things different in number have in common by virtue of 
which we appropriately call them by the same name.
In addition, according to Parmenides in the dialogue named after him, 
that according to which things are what they are and by virtue of which we 
know them as what they are is also that by virtue of which we can communi-
cate what they are one to another. The logos, Heraclitus says, is common but 
hidden: “the logos is common,” he says (2), but “nature likes to hide itself ” 
(123). We can understand the logos if we will really listen to it: “listening not 
to me but the logos” (50). We, to an extent, already know the logos: “The Lord 
whose oracle is at Delphi neither speaks nor hides but gives a sign” (247). We 
know it and don’t know it. It is hidden but indicated.
So, too, for Plato, we know it and do not know it. As the Phaedrus defini-
tion that we have looked at in previous chapters suggests, we perceive the 
form in many things, but do not understand those things according to form. 
When we do—when we move from many perceptions to what is one through 
reasoning—we are recollecting. What is implied in the Phaedrus definition of 
recollection is that the form is implicit in our perceptions and that recollec-
tion is making that form explicit.
Utilizing the Phaedrus definition alone is not adequate due to the other, 
different definition in the Meno. It may be compatible with the Phaedrus 
definition, but there is not enough explanation of it to be sure. But we may 
utilize the Republic’s discussion of knowledge on the divided line to make 
our case. The line is, as others have pointed out, a proportion suggesting an 
analogy. There’s more than one analogy to be drawn, though, since the middle 
sections of the proportion are equal. One is, as images are to things, so things 
are to forms. We do not know an image if we do not know the thing of which 
it is an image. Similarly, we do not know a thing unless we know the form the 
thing images. Imagination is seeing an image as an image. Trust, on the other 
hand, is simply seeing something of a certain kind: I see a tree. I see a person. 
I see a flower. I do not deduce a tree, a person, a flower. Trust is not a discur-
sive reasoning process. It is immediate. That is what makes it analogous to 
noēsis. It is, however, not utterly immediate. For implicit in my trusting seeing 
is the form of tree, the form of human being, the form of flower. Trust, then, 
plays the same role in the divided line that perception does in the definition 
of recollection in the Republic. It is a type of cognition that is immediate and 
has knowledge of a form implicit within it. Recollection, in the Phaedrus, or 
movement up the divided line, in the Republic, is a process of making the 
form explicit, or of moving from many perceptions to the form, that is one, 
through reasoning.
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A form or idea, then, is a one over many in more than one way. It is one 
form for many particulars or instances, as in one form of virtue for many 
instances of virtue. It is one form for many people who are thinking it. It is 
one form for a number of people who talk about it. A form is common to 
many. When we dialogue—when we communicate—we share among our-
selves that common form.
How, then, do transcendence and immanence come in? Does Socrates 
think forms or ideas are in things? Or beyond them? Immanent? Or tran-
scendent? The common view of Plato is that ideas for him are transcendent 
while they are immanent for Aristotle. In the Parmenides, however, Par-
menides points out to Socrates that if the idea is in one thing that is separate 
from another thing the idea is in, then the idea is separate from itself, which, 
if we employ ordinary uses of the terms in and separate, is absurd: “being 
one and the same, it will be present at once and as a whole in things that are 
many and separate, and thus it would itself be separate from itself ” (131b1–
2). However, in response to Socrates’s suggestion that idea could be like day 
that is in different places at the same time, he also argues that idea cannot 
be over things without the idea being sectioned, like a sail a part of which 
is over each of a number of people (131b7–9). He also claims regarding the 
specific idea of unity that “it is nowhere” since “it is neither in itself nor in 
another” (138a2–3). What are we to conclude from these claims? That ideas 
are neither in nor beyond things? Why not conclude, instead, that the rela-
tion between ideas and things is a unique relation, one that is somewhat like 
the relationship we call in and somewhat like the relationship we call beyond 
or over? It can be in many things without being separate from itself. And it 
can be beyond or over a number of things and still retain its whole nature. 
Then we could say the idea is both immanent and transcendent though not 
in the way the water is in the pail nor beyond or over in the sense that the 
sky is beyond or over the trees. This, presumably, is the point of Parmenides’s 
particular way of questioning Socrates—to push him to more adequately 
characterize ideas.
What would that mean in practice? It would mean that the form both is 
in a thing and transcends it since it also is in other things; it is both in me 
and in others with whom I communicate since I know it but they know it 
as well; it is in me but beyond me since when I know it what I am knowing 
is the form of something outside me. Even more, the form is transcendent 
in a sense we have seen in a previous chapter, namely, the form limits me. In 
answering the question, what is virtue, I cannot give just any answer, not cor-
rectly anyway, but am limited by the form itself. As we saw about the Meno, 
what is suggested there is that virtue is knowledge and knowledge is being 
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limited by and following the forms. We do not conduct our reason as the full 
title of Descartes’s Discourse on Method suggests. Instead, reason is a type of 
following or being limited by something—something of which we have an 
inkling, but which we do not know in all clarity. It is not so hidden that we 
have no guide, nor is it so evident that we need not make an effort to find it. 
Hence, our relation to forms is a mixture of effort and response, of doing and 
suffering. We must act, because what we seek is hidden. We must be respon-
sive since what we seek is partially known to us and known in such a way that 
our responsive relation to it may guide us to what we seek. Hence, as stated 
before, Socrates uses images that suggest what we seek is partially known—
known but forgotten in the Meno, in a birdcage but not in our hands in the 
Theaetetus. None of these images, however, suggests that what we know when 
we know is, simply, ourselves. In the Meno, for example, what we know are 
things—all things—which we knew before but forgot. In the Phaedrus, what 
we know is the beauty of the youth, which beauty simply knocks me on my 
back, a physical posture that suggests awe before the boy and before the form 
of beauty the boy makes manifest. The beauty we know is meant by Socrates 
to be transcendent. The process of our knowing it is an ascent up to the hy-
perouranian place—the place beyond the heavens—where the beautiful is 
described as sitting on a throne.
2.
What I am suggesting, as in previous chapters, is that there is greater kinship 
between Levinas and Plato than Levinas maintains. Neither endorses the 
modern idea of the self that can only return to itself. Supposing that what 
I have outlined in the previous section of this chapter is correct, then Le- 
vinas is wrong to say that knowledge, for Plato, is simply a return to the self. 
And Levinas does say it, numerous times. Let us pay attention to what he in 
fact says.
“Teaching,” Levinas says, “is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from 
the exterior and brings me more than I contain” (TI 51/22). Here is the idea 
familiar to us by now that in the maieutic process we do not leave the self. 
What is Levinas’s point in making this claim? About teaching, Levinas goes 
on to say, “In its non-violent transitivity, the very epiphany of the face is pro-
duced” (51/22). One point then is nonviolence. Teaching, through its transi-
tivity, is nonviolent. But so, as we have seen in chapter 1, is understanding, at 
least as Plato conceives it. Understanding of form is, for him, the very source 
of nonviolent relations, of relations that do not reduce to self-assertion, to 
outrage or assault, to a zero-sum game, to hybris. Levinas goes on to con-
106 knowledge
trast maieutics with the transitive action in which reason “is found to be in 
a position to receive” (51). As stated before, however, what is the helmsman 
falling on his back if not an image of the receptivity of intellectual intuition 
(nous)? We cannot properly give Levinas his place in the history of thought 
if we do not remember that the modern self closed in on itself is a departure 
from premodern ones that center around the self ’s fundamental receptivity 
to or dependence on what is. To the extent that they are proponents of re-
ceptivity, we can see Levinas and Plato as companions, both arguing for our 
fundamentally other-directed nature. In reading Levinas, it is important to 
remember that Bacon, with his rape metaphor for our understanding of na-
ture (forcing nature to give up her secrets) and Descartes, with his emphasis 
on mastery (mastery and possession of nature being for him the goal of sci-
ence or knowledge) see themselves, correctly, as introducing something new 
or different with their idea of the autonomous, masterful self.
Levinas does repeatedly conflate premodern and modern conceptions of 
the self when, for example, he accuses Plato of believing in a sovereign soul: 
in “rational thought,” Levinas says of Plato, “the sovereignty of the soul is 
manifest” (TI 114/86). The Platonic contemplative soul’s relation with its 
objects, according to Levinas, “confirms the same . . . in its sovereignty” (TI 
114/86). But what of the philosopher we have seen described in the Republic 
as having perceived all time and all being—all the way to the first beings, the 
forms, and the first among them, the form of the good? This philosopher, 
because of his experience of a goodness beyond him, is beyond injustice, be-
yond the desire to have more for himself. Like the lover in the Phaedrus, the 
philosopher who perceives all time and all being including the idea of the 
good then proceeds to serve others.
Levinas is convinced, though, that Socrates conceives of a self that can 
only return to itself: “The ideal of Socratic truth . . . rests on the essential 
self-sufficiency of the same, its identity in ipseity, its egoism. Philosophy is 
an egology” (TI 44/13). At this point, we could question this picture of So-
cratic truth, described in the Meno as a type of slavery or following and in 
the Phaedrus as falling on your back in awe. But there are more, and less 
metaphorical, passages than these—passages indicating that one of Socrates’s 
main points is the non-self-sufficiency of truth.
In the Gorgias, for example, one of Socrates’s main points is that speeches 
are not about speeches. This dialogue about rhetoric progresses from the 
easygoing and pleasant Gorgias to the enthused and not too dialectically 
skillful Polus to the utterly selfish Callicles, portrayed as the dark and dan-
gerous result of the views put forth first and more pleasantly by Gorgias. 
For Callicles, justice is for the strong to rule the weak and have more. How 
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does this utterly egocentric view unfold out of the views of Gorgias? The 
whole point of Socrates’s confrontation with Gorgias is to push him to show 
that speeches are about something—that they have content and are other-
directed, not simply turned in on themselves.
It is to emphasize this point—that speeches are other-directed, not self-
sufficient—that Plato has Socrates promote the question, what is rhetoric 
about. It is about speeches, Gorgias responds (Grg. 449e1). This amounts 
to saying that speeches are about speeches. This self-directedness is not ad-
equate to Socrates. Speeches about what subject, he wants to know. But all 
the other subjects—health and disease, good and bad bodily fitness, and so 
on—are taken. Doctors have the art of speaking about the former, trainers 
about the latter, and so on. Eventually, Gorgias claims, with a little nudg-
ing by Socrates, that rhetoricians persuade, in the courts, about what is just 
and what unjust (Grg. 454b5–7). But, Socrates points out, if so, why does 
Gorgias say that rhetoric is a neutral tool to which knowledge of justice has 
to be added—and for whose unjust instrumental use rhetoric should not be 
blamed? For if the rhetor knows justice, he will be just and no additional 
knowledge of justice need be added (Grg. 460b6–7). Gorgias cannot have it 
both ways, Socrates suggests. Either rhetoric is a neutral tool to which justice 
must be added, and then it is not clear what its subject matter is, or it is about 
justice, that is, it is knowledge of justice, in which case it is unclear how it can, 
in some cases, be unjust.
Socrates’s point is that speeches are about something other than them-
selves. There are options for what they might be about in the case of rhetoric. 
Gorgias, probably out of shame, picked justice. Socrates, to the contrary, sug-
gests later in the dialogue that rhetoric is about flattery. It is to justice what 
cookery is to medicine: it does not know about and produce some good but, 
instead, knows about and produces pleasure in the listener through flattery. 
Rhetoric, instead of producing a beneficial correction in a sick soul, makes 
the sick soul feel good through feeding it what pleases it.
Speeches have a subject matter, Socrates indicates. They do not simply 
turn in on themselves. They are guided, shaped, and limited by their subject 
matter. Gorgias does not seem to see—or does not want to admit—the po-
tentially unjust consequences of his view to the contrary, that is, his view that 
speeches are not about anything but are content- and value-neutral tools. 
Callicles makes the implications evident. Impervious to conventional views, 
he is an utter proponent of the view that the best life is one in which we are 
unrestrained and unshaped by any limit or guide. According to Callicles, jus-
tice is not a type of response or receptivity, but unrestrained rule. It is for the 
stronger to rule the weaker and have more (Grg. 483d5–6). In addition, virtue 
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and happiness, according to him, are luxury, unrestraint, and freedom (Grg. 
492c4–5). He rejects the idea even of moderation understood as self-rule and 
says, in response to Socrates’s suggestion of it, “How can a man be happy if 
he is a slave to anything?” (Grg. 491e5–6). According to Socrates respond-
ing to Callicles’s whole train of thought, the good man will speak looking 
toward something (Grg. 503d6–8). The best rhetors aim at improving their 
fellow citizens. They do not simply gratify themselves and look to their own 
interest (Grg. 502d10–503b5). The best speeches and speakers, then, do not 
look unrestrainedly to themselves but are limited by and attempt to produce 
what is good.
As, for Socrates, speeches are not simply about speeches but are of some-
thing, so, for Socrates, ideas are not mere thoughts. Socrates, as a young man, 
learns this from Parmenides. To solve the problem that we posit a form to 
account for many things that are great and so we must posit another form to 
account for the increased many that are great (the things plus the form, ad 
infinitum), Socrates suggests that a form might simply be a thought in our 
soul (Prm. 132b3–6). Parmenides, in good Parmenidean fashion, asks him 
whether a thought is of nothing or of something. It’s impossible for it to be 
of nothing, Socrates says. It must be of something—and, he says prompted 
by Parmenides, it is of something that is not something that is not. Specifi-
cally, Parmenides suggests and Socrates concurs, it is of something thought 
thinks of as some one character or look (idea) for many, and the character or 
look is the form. As the historical Parmenides states that “the same thing is 
for thinking as for being,”1 so here Plato’s Parmenides teaches Socrates that 
a thought is not an independent entity in the soul—as an idea will, later, 
be for Descartes—but instead is fundamentally other-directed. Specifically, 
thoughts are of ideas. Ideas are not mere thoughts.
Similarly, love—even the gods’ love—is other-directed according to Soc-
rates, not turned in on itself. Love is directed toward an other that has ap-
parent value. Love itself does not determine value. Euthyphro thinks his 
prosecution of his father for murder is holy because the gods have engaged in 
similar actions and what is loved by the gods is holy. But, Socrates famously 
asks, is it holy because the gods love it? Or do the gods love it because it is 
holy? (9e11–12) The latter of course is his answer. It is the nature or being of 
something that determines its value, in this case, its holiness, and love is and 
should be in response to that value. Love does not determine value. Value 
determines love. Love is other-directed.
Speeches, thoughts, and love. All are other-directed. All are shaped, lim-
ited, determined by what they are not. This is one of the main types of point 
made by Plato’s Socrates. What they are limited by are the ideas. Rhetorical 
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speeches should be about justice. Love of a certain type should be of the holy. 
Repeated similar thoughts are of some one form. Truth, then—whether the 
truth of speeches, of thoughts, or of love—does not result from a turn to the 
self. It results from a turn to and beholding of what is.
3.
My reading of Levinas’s claims about the Platonic return to the self, though, 
so far has been one-sided, disclosing only similarities in the two philosophers’ 
views and not differences. Their views are similar in that both in Platonic 
recollection and in Levinasian teaching, we respond to something beyond 
or transcending the self. What are the differences? In what language does 
Levinas delineate them?
We can begin by looking in a different light at passages we have already 
seen. Levinas, as we have seen, says that teaching does not operate as ma-
ieutics but, instead, the soul is “capable of containing more than it can draw 
from itself ” (TI 180/155). I have argued that the soul, for Plato, too, is recep-
tive of something outside itself—that it is shaped, limited, and determined by 
something outside itself, namely, being. But Levinas wants to say more than 
that. He wants to say that the soul can be directed to something that it can 
never contain, to something that will always escape it. How to say this? For, if 
we are in relation to something, haven’t we in some sense contained it? And, 
if we have not contained it, how are we in relation to it? This is the linguistic 
problem Levinas faces in discussing the non- or precognitive relation we 
have to the other—the other who is unique or singular or new and, thus, in 
an absolute sense, other.
He takes different linguistic paths to solve this problem. The problem, 
again, is how to speak of a relation to what we cannot contain, cannot hold, 
cannot grasp, cannot limit, cannot comprehend. One way he deals with the 
problem is to speak of the other placing in me the idea of infinity: “It [teach-
ing] does not operate as maieutics, but continues the placing in me of the idea 
of infinity” (TI 180/155). What is infinite, of course, is what lacks boundaries 
or limits. How, then, can it be in me? In fact, the infinite is not in me. What 
is in me is the idea specifically of what cannot, because boundless, be in me. 
He goes on: “The idea of infinity implies a soul capable of containing more 
than it can draw from itself ” (TI 180/155). What I am in relation to actually 
is exterior to me: “It [the idea of infinity] designates an interior being that is 
capable of a relation with the exterior, and does not take its own interiority 
for the totality of being” (TI 180/155). The other is not really in me, is not 
really contained in me. The other is outside me—irremediably so. I have in 
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me, in other words, the idea of something that cannot be in me, cannot be 
contained by me, cannot be drawn from me, is separate from me. Separation, 
he says, is “a break with participation” (TI 180/155). What then is our rela-
tion to it like? It is, he says, “a relation extending over the irremediable abyss 
of this separation” (TI 180/155).
He goes on to say something that elucidates the real difference between 
Levinas and Plato: “Separation not being reducible to a simple counterpart 
of relation, the relationship with the Other does not have the same status as 
the relations given to objectifying thought, where the distinction of terms 
also reflects their union” (TI 180/155–56). But this is just what we do get in 
Plato. Even though being is beyond me, for Plato, it is for him also in some 
sense in me—it shapes me, for example, or determines me. For Levinas, the 
other remains absolute in the relation: “The terms remain absolute despite 
the relation in which they find themselves” (TI 180/156).
We may, thus, call the terms Levinas uses for delineating the relation to 
that which remains irremediably other “absolute terms.” The other, for Levi-
nas, transcends me—not in the way that forms transcend me in Plato (since 
forms both transcend me and are in me), but in an absolute transcendence, 
a transcendence that never becomes immanence. The other “appears but ab-
sents itself from the apparition” (TI 181/156). The other appears, in other 
words, in an absolute appearance, not in the way that forms appear. When 
I am taught, my soul opens—but not in the way my soul opens to take in 
form. Instead, “the soul opens,” Levinas says, “in the marvel of teaching” (TI 
181/156). There is an absolute openness, a directedness to what can never be 
reached or encompassed. The other who gives a sign, the other who in an ab-
solute sense appears, cannot be signified: “The signifier, he who gives a sign, 
is not signified” (TI 182/157).
My relation to the other is “a relation with a being that maintains its total 
exteriority with respect to him who thinks it” (TI 50/20–21). Though Levi-
nas speaks of the “infinite in the finite, the more in the less” (TI 50/ 21), he 
does not mean by that something in me that I can encompass, thematize, 
contain. For these are accomplished by the idea of infinity. Instead, he makes 
clear, my relationship to the other who is exterior to me is conversation. In 
conversation, the other overflows idea: “To approach the Other in conver-
sation is to welcome his expression, in which at each instant he overflows 
the idea a thought would carry away from it” (TI 51/22). If I welcome the 
other’s expression, I “receive from the other beyond the capacity of the I,” I 
am taught. That is, “I receive something more than I contain” (TI 51/22). 
The soul, for Levinas then, is directed toward something it cannot contain, 
toward something that always escapes it, namely, the other.
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These two passages indicate, though, that there are in fact two ways that 
Levinas utilizes linguistic resources to delineate the relation we have to that 
which escapes us. One is to say that though I relate to the other, the other is 
absolved from the relation. Another is to say that in my relation to the other 
I am in a position truly to receive. In other words, there are two basic ways 
Levinas uses language to speak of the relation we have to the other: one is 
to say the other is separate from me; the other is to say I receive the other. 
Regarding the latter, Socrates is criticized for receiving nothing, since maieu-
tics brings me only what I already contain while Levinasian teaching brings 
me what I do not already contain, and since I do not contain it already, I in 
fact receive it. Socratic sovereign reason “knows only itself ” (TI 43/14) and 
receives nothing. On the contrary, Levinas says, the other is strange to me, 
irreducible to me (TI 43/13). In my relation to him or her, then, I can truly 
receive, I can “receive from the other beyond the capacity of the I” (TI 51/22).
The reason for these two seemingly contradictory ways of describing my 
relation to the wholly other is that there is no mediation. There is no third 
term used to connect or mediate the other two: no concept, no sensation, no 
being (TI 42/13). Since there is no term that connects me to the other, the 
other is separate from me. Or, to conceive it differently, since there is no term 
between me and the other, I truly receive the other. The other, to presage 
terms more clearly delineated in Otherwise Than Being, is far and near—or, 
we might say in the context of Totality and Infinity—my relation to the other 
is either absolute separation or absolute receptivity. This rhetorical strategy is 
similar to Plato’s strategy of constructing the forms as both in and beyond 
the things that share in them where in and beyond are given an unusual sense.
That to which I have a relation of absolute separation or absolute receptiv-
ity is, for Levinas, the absolutely other or the absolutely foreign. Only such a 
person can teach us: “The absolutely foreign alone can instruct us. And it is 
only man who could be absolutely foreign to me” (TI 73/46). Here, too, we 
have two absolutes, for teaching indicates not ordinary but absolute teaching 
in which what I learn is something I cannot integrate, cannot comprehend or 
contain, namely, the other who is, absolutely, foreign. The terms are teaching 
for absolute receptivity and absolutely foreign for absolute separation.
I do receive, in others words. Despite the idea of asymmetrical responsibil-
ity that in Otherwise Than Being is so central, in my relation to the other, ab-
solutely other, I do receive something. There is, in other words, a directedness 
to the other. Such a directedness really does exist and really is accomplished, 
though not in the ordinary or Husserlian sense fulfilled. I do have an inten-
tionality toward the other, but it is an unfulfilled intention, an intention that 
moves toward but never reaches its object. Levinas calls it, as we have seen, 
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“an intentionality of a wholly different type” (TI 23/xii) or an “ ‘intentional-
ity’ of transcendence” (TI 49/20) and maintains that describing it is the very 
goal of Totality and Infinity: “But it is a ‘vision’ without an image, bereft of 
the synoptic and totalizing objectifying virtues of vision, a relation or an 
intentionality of a wholly different type—which this work seeks to describe” 
(TI 23/xii).
“Teaching is not reducible to maieutics; it comes from the exterior and 
brings me more than I contain. In its non-violent transitivity the very epiph-
any of the face is produced” (TI 51/22). We have heard this statement before. 
Teaching brings me something. That is what it means to call it transitivity. 
The absolute terms in this statement, which we have seen before, are brings 
me something for absolute receptivity and from the exterior for absolute separa-
tion, or transitivity for absolute receptivity and more than I contain for abso-
lute separation.
We are considering that which makes the receptivity in Socratic recollec-
tion and the receptivity in Levinasian teaching different, namely, the other. 
The other is absolute, according to Levinas, because he or she refuses con-
cepts: “the refusal of the concept is not only one of the aspects of its being,” 
Levinas says, “but its whole content; it is interiority” (TI 118/90). Similarly, 
in Toward the Other, Levinas says, “The Other as Other is not only an alter 
ego: the Other is what I myself am not. The Other is this, not because of the 
Other’s character, or physiognomy, or psychology, but because of the Other’s 
very alterity” (ToO 83/75). The other’s very alterity. The otherness of the other 
is not a content we can grasp. Instead, it is resistance to content. It is other-
ness itself.
The point in this is that I have a relation to the other—an absolute or pure 
relation of receiving the other without marking him or her—without the re-
lation cancelling out the fact that I am separate, absolutely separate, from the 
other: “The relation with the Other does not nullify separation. It does not 
arise within a totality nor does it establish a totality, integrating me and the 
other” (TI 251/229). Absolute otherness, unlike qualitative otherness, can-
not be integrated. It has no content: “alterity does not determine the other 
in a formal sense, as where the alterity of B with respect to A results simply 
from the identity of B, distinct from the identity of A. Here the alterity of 
the other does not result from its identity, but constitutes it; the other is the 
Other” (TI 251/229). Alterity is not the otherness of different qualities: “The 
alterity of the Other does not depend on any quality that could distinguish 
him from me, for a distinction of this nature would precisely imply between 
us that community of genus which already nullifies alterity” (TI 194/168). 
My relation to the other is different from the Platonic relation to form or 
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content because the absolute otherness of the absolute other is “absolute dif-
ference, inconceivable in terms of formal logic” (TI 195/168).
4.
If the difference between Socratic maieutics and Levinasian teaching is not 
receptiveness or directedness to something outside the self but is instead the 
type of directedness, with maieutics leading to receptiveness to concept or 
form and teaching leading to directedness to that which we can never fully 
contain, then how can we characterize the result? The result, in the case of 
Plato, is knowledge—but knowledge cannot be the result for Levinas since 
otherness is resistance to form, concept, idea. The result, instead, is revelation.
Revelation, for Levinas, is another absolute or pure term. By revelation, 
Levinas does not mean the unveiling of what is hidden. He certainly does 
not mean insight into what is clear and distinct, as with Descartes. But nei-
ther does he mean the gradual coming to light of form that is obscure but 
dimly lit. If I am right, Plato does mean that. For Plato, the acquisition of 
knowledge is the movement from trust (I see a tree) to discursive reason (this 
is a tree) and then the intellectual insight that is explicitly presupposed by 
discursive reason (the idea of tree). Or it is the movement from many percep-
tions (many cases of “I see a tree”) to what is gathered together into one by 
reasoning (the idea of tree).
For Levinas, such a movement is called, in order to make a connection to 
Heidegger, disclosure. Revelation is not disclosure, according to Levinas. In-
stead, the experience I have when I am taught by the other is an absolute ex-
perience: “The absolute experience is not disclosure but revelation: a coinciding of 
the expressed with him who expresses, which is the privileged manifestation 
of the Other, the manifestation of a face over and beyond form” (TI 66/37). 
Form does not reveal but betrays, congeals, or alienates the other. The other as 
such has no form—the other resists form—and so what we are taught when 
the other teaches us is not form but is the very one who expresses. In revela-
tion, what is expressed is nothing other than the very one who expresses. In 
revelation, what is expressed is the other. When we are taught, we do not 
comprehend or know that other, but we are directed to him or her—directed 
to them across the forms that he or she presents, forms that he or she undoes, 
stays separate from, resists: “The life of expression consists in undoing the 
form in which the existent, exposed as a theme, is thereby dissimulated” (TI 
66/37).
Revelation is not the revelation of an object: “Revelation, by relation to 
objectifying cognition, constitutes a veritable inversion” (TI 67/39).2 The rela-
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tion to the other who teaches me—a relation that takes place in language—is 
not an objectification: “language does not consist in invoking him as a being 
represented and thought. But this is why language institutes a relation irre-
ducible to the subject-object relation: the revelation of the other” (TI 73/45).
Platonic maieutics and knowledge and Levinas’s teaching and revelation, 
then, are more similar than Levinas thinks since both involve the learner’s 
responsiveness or receptivity to the other outside herself while they are, at 
the same time, significantly different: in maieutics and recollection I direct 
myself to something both transcendent and immanent, namely, form—form 
that is hidden but indicated; when I am taught by an other, I direct myself to 
what can never be immanent, can never be comprehended, can never be an 
object for me, namely, the other—the other absolutely foreign. I cannot know 
the other because whatever I know about the other is content the other offers 
me, forms the other presents to me; what I know is not the other who offers 
something to me, the other who presents something to me. I cannot know 
the who. Knowledge is of the what. With regard to their epistemological 
standpoints, then, the difference between Plato’s and Levinas’s philosophies 
of the other is the difference between what is hidden and what is foreign.
 PART II
  Otherwise Than Being
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C H A P T E R  5
Time and the Self
Perhaps, though, the contrast between Levinas and Plato is surpassed in Oth-
erwise Than Being. Certainly, it is not thematic in the latter work as it is in 
the former. Moreover, there are a host of differences between the two works. 
Is the contrast I have been drawing eliminated in Levinas’s more mature 
writing? If so, the points I have made would be primarily of historical or 
biographical interest. We need, then, to change focus in the next two chap-
ters—from Plato/Levinas comparisons to the relation between Levinas’s two 
major works. Then, in our final chapter, we will compare Plato and Levinas 
one last time.
1.
I maintain that the kind of contrast I have sketched between Plato and Levi-
nas is there in Otherwise Than Being but that it is drawn in metaphysical 
terms not as a contrast between two thinkers. Rather than contrasting Plato’s 
recollection with Levinas’s teaching, Otherwise Than Being makes a similar 
point by speaking of that of which there is no reminiscence, no recollection. 
Specifically, it speaks of “a temporality beyond reminiscence” in a diachrony 
(OB 30/39), of temporality that refuses “to be assembled into a representa-
tion” and is an anarchy (OB 51/66). Anarchy, diachrony—these are Levinas’s 
terms for thinking of a time in which there is no reminiscence, represen-
tation, rediscovery, recall, reuniting, recapture, retention; in which there is 
no “recuperation in which nothing is lost” (OB 28–29/36). It is under the 
heading of two types of temporality, one in which what is lost is recovered 
or recuperated and one in which what is lost is irrecuperable, that something 
similar to the Plato/Levinas distinction is expressed in Otherwise Than Being.
The important role of time is a central difference between Levinas’s first 
and second major works. The title of the second of the two works, Otherwise 
Than Being or Beyond Essence, suggests that. It suggests that Levinas intends 
to spell out the spatial language he uses in Totality and Infinity, suggested by 
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the term Beyond, in terms of temporal activity or what he calls temporaliza-
tion, suggested by the adverb Otherwise. Following Bergson and Heidegger, 
Levinas hears a temporal quality to the term being. He wants, but says he 
does not venture, to write being as essance, a form that indicates the tempo-
ralizing of being, rather than using the usual, static form, essence (OB xlvii/
ix).1 Even though he follows the two philosophers in hearing such a temporal 
resonance of being, his own main point is that more is needed for a critique 
of presence than just that. What is needed is something otherwise than be-
ing where otherwise (autrement) is not an adjective but an adverb (“not to be 
otherwise but otherwise than being,” OB 3/3). What is needed is a way that is 
not being—a way of showing up or being present that is not showing up or 
being present at all. According to Levinas, human beings—whether ourselves 
or others—have the way that is other than being. What is that way? When 
we find it, we will find a central metaphysical similarity between Totality and 
Infinity and Otherwise Than Being and see the continuity between Levinas’s 
earlier and later views.
First, though, it is important to note the obvious differences between the 
two works. One of the most striking is that in the later of the two, Levinas 
speaks not of the welcoming of the other by the same but of the other in the 
same. That, together with the adverbial quality of the other in Otherwise Than 
Being, could lead one to think that the second work is in part a critique of 
the overontologizing of the other in the first—especially if you add to that 
the fact that, in the second of the two works, Levinas uses numerous new 
terms to capture his insights, terms such as hostage, substitution, for-the-other, 
proximity.
On the other hand, the fact that there is a problem in Levinas’s formula-
tions in Otherwise Than Being need not indicate a simple problem-correction 
model for the difference between the two books. Instead, what if there are 
inescapable problems in talking about our relations to others? What if, to use 
Levinas’s language, Hebrew cannot be made effortlessly and unproblemati-
cally to speak Greek? In reading Levinas, the extraordinary, and extraordi-
narily rich, terminology can become routinized over time, and we can forget 
how much of it functions to give us the experience, in a deep, metaphysical 
way, of something at least striking and puzzling if not problematic.
For example, in Totality and Infinity, when Levinas wants to say that the 
other shows up but does not show up—that is, that the other does something 
that takes the place of or is in some way parallel to showing up but does not 
show up—he uses the term epiphany.2 So the other does not really show up, 
is not really present to us or in the light. The other is not really a phenom-
enon. Instead, the other is an epiphenomenon. When he wants there to say, 
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to the contrary, that we do take in or receive the other in a certain, deep way, 
he uses the term revelation and uses it as a term of contrast with disclosure, a 
term with resonances of Heidegger’s teachings about nature. The term revela-
tion itself does not indicate any such contrast, though, since to re-veal is to 
unveil, the very sort of thing Levinas does not mean for the term to convey. 
Linguistically, the two terms have roughly the same meaning, of coming out 
of obscurity to awareness. Nonetheless, by making revelation a contrast term 
to disclosure, Levinas intends to denote something we are aware of without 
the mediacy of anything else. Otherwise Than Being has its own puzzles. In it 
he says the other is in me, denudes me, takes my substance from me, disrupts 
me—but there is still me. I lose myself or substitute myself, but somehow 
I am still there. My point is that in Totality and Infinity, the central expo-
sitional difficulty is that the other is made too separate from me while in 
Otherwise Than Being the other is made too close to me. In the former, the 
other is made more than it is, while in the latter I am made less, to the point 
almost of vanishing. If so, then it is not the case that the latter work simply 
corrects the problems in the former. Instead, it simply substitutes one set of 
problems for another.
It is not unheard of, however, for a philosopher to utilize puzzling for-
mulations to talk about fundamental metaphysics, specifically to talk about 
a fundamental term that is sui generis. Both Plato and Aristotle do so, for 
example. According to Aristotle, Plato utilizes the term indeterminate dyad 
to speak about intimate unity (Met. 13.7).3 An indeterminate dyad is some-
thing two but not quite two—not quite two, not quite one. In a culture in 
which numbers all were counting numbers, this could be an extraordinary 
idea, though for Plato scholars it has become sedimented and not surprising 
over time. Similarly, Aristotle uses the term somehow frequently in speaking 
about metaphysics.4 Centrally, he says that there is nothing more unified than 
the unity between form and matter where matter is potentiality and form 
actuality and, in an entity composed of form and matter, potentiality and 
actuality are somehow one—somehow one, in other words, and somehow 
not one (Met. 8.6 1045b20–21).5 He also uses the unusual coinage, the what 
was being or what is being where the was or is actually is not a past tense but 
is an imperfect and suggests what something is imperfectly being or is on the 
way to being. That, of course, when we desediment it, is puzzling. It is and is 
not being something? Well, yes, Aristotle does want to say that. The matter 
is being a certain form—right now, in my body, all the time. And being has a 
temporal resonance. The matter is being a certain form. In order to describe 
an intimate unity, specifically, the intimate unity of any hylomorphic entity, 
Aristotle must say such things, though we have become used to them and 
120 time and the self
have to reawaken our awareness of them despite translations that obscure 
them (such as the translation of to ti ēn einai as essence, which makes form 
and the relation between form and matter more static than they actually are 
for Aristotle). After all, the relation between form and matter is for Aristotle 
a paradigm of activity (energeia) where form is the activity of matter and, he 
says metaphorically at one place, matter according to its own nature desires 
and stretches out for form (Phys. 1.9 192a18–19, 22).6 All these terms are 
attempts to indicate something sui generis that cannot fully be captured in 
any other terms. In an intimate unity, an indeterminate dyad, for example, 
one entity in a sense is the other—so Aristotle says it is being the other, or it 
somehow is the other, or it desires the other. We paper over Aristotle’s views 
when we reduce these ideas to essence or simply to potentiality.
Similarly, it seems to me the expositional problem for Levinas is to explain 
or designate something that is like an intimate unity, namely, the relation I 
have to another human being that, for Levinas, if not quite the same as an 
intimate unity, is something like one since it is unmediated—for, if it were 
mediated, it would fail ultimately to relate. If a concept stands in between me 
and another, then I am not really relating to the other, but bringing the other 
into my horizon (reducing the other to the same, as Levinas says). So either 
I say the other is beyond me, and it sounds as though I am talking about a 
relation to a separate being and thus overontologizing, or I say I substitute 
myself for the other and nearly vanish in the substitution, making me less 
than I am. Levinas’s challenge is to speak of an unusual sui generis relation. 
He attempts to meet the challenge, as we saw in the preceding chapter, by 
speaking of the relation as being like our ordinary understanding of what it 
is for something to be beyond, or like the ordinary meaning of something 
being within. Neither approach is strictly speaking correct—that is, neither 
is literally true—but each reveals something of the unique relation denoted.
2.
But what is that unique relation? What is the unique relation between myself 
and another person, between what Levinas calls the same and the other? What 
is the self for Levinas? And how does it relate? I have said that the funda-
mental metaphysical idea of Totality and Infinity is of a self that emerges in 
or offers a variety of forms while at the same time resisting those forms, the 
self that is essentially in relation while at the same time absolving itself of 
relation. It is this central metaphysical idea that accounts for Levinas’s collec-
tion of unusual terms such as epiphany or substitution. The other is manifest 
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in forms but is not identical to them (epiphany). I take in the other but still 
remain me (substitution).
We often hear that, in Otherwise Than Being, the self—the singular or 
unique being—is the one who is responsible. This, of course, is correct, but 
only part of the story and, because it is only part of the story, may make it 
seem that the singular self as described in Totality and Infinity and the sin-
gular self as described in Otherwise Than Being are more different than they 
actually are. Specifically, it might suggest the following, misleading contrast: 
in Totality and Infinity, the self resists forms and relation while in Otherwise 
Than Being, the self is fundamentally in relation. To see instead a similarity 
between the two accounts, we must consider what it means to be responsible 
according to Levinas. Among other things, it means to be, essentially, for an-
other; it means that the self is fundamentally outside itself; and it means this 
in a temporal sense. I mean to suggest by this explanation that the account of 
the ethical self for Levinas must not be separated from an account simply of 
the self. To be a self, for Levinas, is to be outside oneself directed to another 
being—and that, fundamentally, is what responsibility is. This is Levinas’s 
critique of the early modern idea of the subject. In the section of Otherwise 
Than Being on the one, that is, on the unique or singular self, Levinas identifies 
uniqueness (unicité ) with “the non-coinciding with oneself, the non-repose 
in oneself, restlessness” (OB 56/72).7 It is essential (if that is the right term) 
to the singular self that it be for another—that is what it is to be (so to speak) 
a singular self. To bring out this idea, Levinas famously uses the language 
of pain and exposure. I am outside myself, I am restless, I am exposed, I am 
denuded. At the beginning of the section on the one, he says, “The exposure 
to the other is not something added to the one to bring it from the inward 
to the outside,” that is, it is not that there is a self that exposes itself and as 
a result is moved from its comfortable inside to something outside. Instead, 
part of what it is to be one is to be exposed, as he goes on: “Exposedness is 
the one-in-responsibility and thus the one in its uniqueness” (OB 56/72). So 
exposedness is uniqueness.
First, it is important to pause over this very idea—a somewhat shocking 
idea. Exposedness is uniqueness! Often, instead, we think that falling back on 
yourself, being yourself, being in yourself, is uniqueness. Levinas here denies 
it: uniqueness is “the reverse of certainty that falls back on itself.” Instead, 
uniqueness is a restless directedness (in time) toward another. And we may 
call this restless directedness toward another responsibility, or to spell the 
point out, the one in responsibility, that is, the one that is one by restlessly 
directing itself to another, that is, by being responsible.
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But why? Is exposure uniqueness? It seems like a ludicrous idea. What 
in the world can Levinas mean? He says, to complete the quotation above, 
“Exposedness is the one-in-responsibility and thus the one in its unique-
ness, stripped of all protection that would multiply it.” Another surprising 
statement. It means that only what is stripped of all protection, all meaning, 
all concepts, all form, is one. When put that way, the claim makes sense. 
Any protection, that is, any particular way of being in relation to another, 
any particular, conceptualizable way of being at all, makes something plural. 
Anything formal, conceptualizable, determinately meaningful is plural. As 
Aristotle suggests, when he says that there is no knowledge of the singular 
(Met. 3.6 1003a12–17) (and, we might say, when we discuss the singular we 
are not in the realm of Athens/Aristotle but of Jerusalem/Levinas), whatever 
is formal or conceptualizable is not singular but general and, thus, multipli-
able. But Levinas says more than this. He says that the singular is restless, 
that is, that what is singular is not just devoid of concepts but a directedness 
toward another. This is its peculiar way of signifying. It signifies from nonco-
incidence, from nonrepose, from restlessness. It is this way of being, this rest-
less being toward another that is devoid of and not guided by concepts, that 
Levinas describes as otherwise than being. Thus he goes on: “The ‘otherwise 
than being’ is not a play, it is the relaxation more serious than being.” There 
is no play in this kind of relaxation, this relaxation of all determinateness, 
of all determinate direction of one’s own to be for the other. There is only 
vulnerability. No playing out this way of being for and that way of being for. 
Uniqueness (unicité ) is an utter being for, an utter being open to, an utter 
vulnerability—and so it is serious to the highest degree. Being—that process 
of becoming one or another of one’s various possibilities—fundamentally is 
a kind of play. There is no play—there is no such play—in that way of being 
called otherwise than being.
With this exegesis behind us, let us summarize: what it is to be a unique 
or singular self in Otherwise Than Being is to be, fundamentally and utterly 
openly, directed to another but not just to one particular other or to any 
other conceived in one or another particular way. But this means that what 
it is to be a unique or singular self is to be essentially in relation while at the 
same time absolving oneself of the relations, the very understanding of the 
self that we saw in Totality and Infinity. The accounts of the self in the two 
books, then, are not as different as casual references to them might indicate 
(“resistance to the totality,” “responsibility to the other”). This is made clear 
for us when Levinas says, directly, “The absolute exteriority of the exterior 
being is not purely and simply lost as a result of its manifestation; it ‘absolves’ 
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itself from the relation in which it presents itself ” (OB 50/21). The self is 
manifest—the self is in relation—but the self absolves itself from the relation 
through which it is manifest. Hence the self cannot be captured in a concept 
or summed up by the ascription of a number of forms.
3.
What then are the differences between the two books? One difference is that 
in Otherwise Than Being responsibility is stressed while Totality and Infinity 
stresses desire. These are, it seems to me, two sides of one coin. Desire—
metaphysical desire, Levinas sometimes calls it—is directedness toward the 
other conceived of spatially as over there or beyond. I desire that other who 
is beyond all categories—I direct myself to that other who escapes all deter-
mination—when I am ethical. The emphasis in Totality and Infinity is on the 
other. And the other is conceived of, metaphorically, as beyond. In Otherwise 
Than Being, the focus is on the self—on what that directedness of the self 
without guiding conceptualization, determination, desire, intention, hope, 
aim, intention is like for the self. It is a scooping out of the self, we could say. 
A coring out of it. A denucleation, Levinas says sometimes in Otherwise Than 
Being.8 In Totality and Infinity, Levinas stresses the receiving of the other 
that nondeterminately directed desire suggests.9 In Otherwise Than Being, he 
emphasizes the loss of self (as ordinarily understood) that nondeterminate 
directedness implies. The two books look at the same things from different 
perspectives. Why does nondeterminate directedness lead to a kind of primal 
receiving of the other? Because, without any category to mediate my relation 
to the other, I really receive him or her. Why does nondeterminate directed-
ness lead to a loss of the self as ordinarily understood? Because, without any 
category to mediate my relation to the other, all the possible concrete content 
of the self has been eliminated—I am denucleated, denuded, stripped bare.
The Otherwise Than Being understanding of the self and its relation to 
other that I have described is found not just in one section but throughout 
the book. For example, toward the beginning, Levinas refers to man as “a 
unicity withdrawing from essence”:
A unicity that has no site, without the ideal identity a being 
derives from the kerygma that identifies the innumerable aspects 
of its manifestation, without the identity of the ego that coincides 
with itself (du moi coïncidant avec soi), a unicity withdrawing from 
essence—man (OB 8/10).10
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Unicity has no site. The me is outside itself and “does not find any rest in itself 
either, unquiet, no coinciding with itself ” (OB 8/9–10). Once again, Levinas 
gives us the triad of unicity, being outside the self for another, and lack of 
form, ideality, concept, category.
What we found extraordinary, that our singularity results from our funda-
mental directedness to another—that exposedness is uniqueness—Levinas, 
of course, knows is extraordinary, knows violates our ordinary logic: “Despite-
me, for-another . . . is the sense of the ‘oneself ’ (soi-même), that accusative that 
derives from no nominative; it is the very fact of finding oneself while los-
ing oneself ” (OB 11/14). We find ourselves by losing ourselves. Exposedness 
is uniqueness. The paradoxical assertions proliferate. Levinas refers to “the 
against oneself that is in the self ” (OB 51/66); to the self being “too tight in 
its skin, in itself already outside of itself ” (OB 104/132). He claims that the 
“self is out of phase with itself ” (OB 115/147); that “to be oneself as in the 
trace of one’s exile is to be as a pure withdrawal from oneself ” (OB 138/176); 
that “to be torn from oneself despite oneself has meaning only as a being 
torn from the complacency in oneself characteristic of enjoyment, snatch-
ing the bread from one’s mouth” (OB 74/93); that the self is “a defecting or 
defeat of the ego’s [du Moi] identity” (OB 15/18); that “the psyche in the soul 
is the other in me, a malady of identity, both accused and self, the same for 
the other, the same by the other” (OB 69/86); that “I, the same, am torn up 
from my beginning in myself, my equality with myself ” (OB 144/184). He 
is aware, too, that the paradoxical remarks do not reflect ordinary logic. He 
says that “signification is the contradictory trope of the-one-for-the-other” 
(OB 100/126). He says that the psyche’s relation to the other is beyond the 
logic of same and other: “The psyche signifies the claiming of the same by the 
other, or inspiration, beyond the logic of the same and the other, of their in-
surmountable adversity” (OB 141/180). The self, for Levinas, does not follow 
the logic of same and other in which same cannot be other and other cannot 
be same—in which, as he puts it, same and other experience an “insurmount-
able adversity.” Instead, for Levinas, to be a psyche is to be a same that is 
other—while remaining same.
But in all this discussion, found throughout Otherwise Than Being, of the 
self that is itself by being for another—the self that finds itself by losing it-
self—one main point is that the self does not become that to which it is in 
relation. It is essential that the self be in relation—that it be for another—but 
the self is the self that is in relation. It is not a self that is (or, is essentially) 
that to which it relates, or fuses with that to which it relates, and so on. “I 
am not a transubstantiation, a changing from one substance into another, I 
do not shut myself up in another identity, I do not rest in a new avatar. As 
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signification, proximity, saying, separation, I do not fuse with anything” (OB 
14/17). To fuse with the other would be to shut myself up in a new identity. 
The self that loses itself does not simply find itself again. There is a process, 
a continual process, of being for another—for different others. Levinas calls 
that process recurrence: “I am a term irreducible to the relation, and yet in a 
recurrence which empties me of all consistency” (OB 82/104). In fact, for 
Levinas, the process of being for other without becoming the other is the 
self. Levinas calls the self recurrence by contraction: “this recurrence by con-
traction,” Levinas says, “is the self ” (OB 108/138). Once again, then, the self 
in Otherwise Than Being is the same as the self that in Totality and Identity is 
described as essentially in relation while absolving itself from relation. The 
self in Otherwise Than Being is the self that relates to an other but then con-
tracts and returns to itself as the starting point from which it relates, again 
and again—that is, recurrently—to other others.
This points to why being for the other, as we have seen, is signification. 
What does Levinas mean by this claim? “The subject is for another; its own 
being turns into for another, its being dies away turning into signification,” 
Levinas says (OB 52/67). The question points to the question, how do we 
reach signification? Our attempts fail, and we only reach the signified—being 
for this, being for that. But each of those is a particular signification, charac-
terized in its particularity not by signification itself but by what is signified. 
But someone who is vulnerable, affected (or, as Levinas says, elected), open to 
recurrently being for recurrent and different others reaches pure signification. 
For that person’s being dies down in the constant and recurrent openness. He 
or she is not for any one other in particular, but is open or vulnerable to all. 
Hence, that person’s own being—her being one thing or another thing—dies 
down. What is left is not any particular signified but what precedes it, namely, 
signification itself.
4.
Before concluding this argument that the central metaphysical idea of Oth-
erwise Than Being is the same as the central metaphysical idea of Totality 
and Infinity (discussed in previous chapters), it will be useful to show the 
location of that idea in the overall ideas of Otherwise Than Being. Though the 
two books develop in different ways, the basic metaphysical location of the 
idea is the same in each work. As in Totality and Infinity, so also in Otherwise 
Than Being, discussion of the self that essentially (so to speak) relates to an 
other is part of a general discussion of sensibility and corporeality. Accord-
ing to Levinas in the latter work, for the self, something comes before sight, 
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vision at a distance, intentionality, knowledge—and even before directed-
ness to an end by Heideggerian dasein that is always already immersed in a 
field of instrumental connections.11 What comes before is sensibility, under-
stood in a certain way. For Levinas, what comes first is a taking in of what is 
without. The self is not closed, as is the self on a Cartesian conception, but 
fundamentally in relation. This is common to Levinas as well as to Husserl 
and Heidegger. But there is a difference. Before we conceptualize, according 
to Levinas, before we give meaning to objects, before we are immersed and 
use instruments to achieve an end, we are contented. That is, we are given 
content. At the deepest level, we are an openness to . . . to whatever, and that 
whatever becomes, for a time, our very substance, our very contents. This, 
for Levinas, is what is fundamental to subjectivity as bread (and other ba-
sic food) is fundamental to our corporeality. At the most fundamental level, 
our subjectivity is not being—where being is always a being this or a being 
that. Something precedes being, and when we experience that something, 
the experience is an experience of a rupture of our being, of a breakup of our 
essence, an experience of our vulnerability: “This breakup of identity, this 
changing of being into signification, that is, into substitution, is the subject’s 
subjectivity, or its subjection to everything, its susceptibility, its vulnerability, 
that is, its sensibility” (OB 14/17).
Before we give meaning to contents, in the Husserlian sense, we are con-
tented. It is not the case that sensation “participates in the meaningful only 
inasmuch as it is animated by intentionality” (OB 65/82). There is meaning or 
sense prior to that, a prior type of meaning or sense that Levinas calls signifi-
cation. Husserl uses this type of sense but does not mention it, does not bring 
it in as a kind of sense: “Husserl imperceptibly introduces into his description 
of intention an element that is different from pure thematization: intuition 
fills (that is, contents or satisfies) or deceives an aim aiming emptily at its 
object” (OB 66/83). Being filled is not a species of cognizing or knowing: “A 
thermal, gustative or olfactory sensation is not primarily a cognition of a pain, 
a savor, or an odor” (OB 65/81). As Heidegger argued that using a hammer is 
different than cognizing a hammer, so Levinas argues that savoring bread is 
not the same as cognizing its gustatory properties. Instead, it is a being filled, 
a being contented. Desire, then, or hunger, is not “a simple consciousness of ” 
(OB 66/82). We can call that desire or hunger intentionality, as I above have 
called it meaning or sense—but only if we mean a different type of intention-
ality, or meaning or sense, not intentionality, meaning, or sense in an ordinary 
Husserlian usage: “intention in a sense radically different from theoretical 
aim” (OB 66/83). Levinas will alternate between saying it is not intentionality 
and saying it is intention of a radical sort.
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The example, and then metaphor, often used for this sensibility is hunger, 
for this radically intentional (or non- or precognitive) desire, and bread, for 
what fills it. There is a specifically Jewish background to this, deriving from the 
biblical references to bread for the hungry. Ethics, for Levinas, disrupts me, 
disrupts any me that has a being—a going on being—or a content. Ethics is 
being for the other, or responsibility, that directedness toward or susceptibility 
to any other that empties me out. Levinas refers to it, metaphorically, as giving 
bread to the hungry: “To give,” Levinas says, “to-be-for-another, despite one-
self, but in interrupting the for-oneself, is to take the bread out of one’s own 
mouth, to nourish the hunger of another with one’s own fasting” (OB 56/72).
The fasting to which he refers most is multivalent, referring to the fasting 
involved in giving bread or sustenance that you have to another who needs 
it; referring to ethics in general as a type of giving, the type involved in all 
being for another; and, most likely, referring to the fasting that takes place for 
a Jew on Yom Kippur, the annual holiday in which the passage from Isaiah 
referring to giving your bread to the hungry is recited. For Levinas, all ethical 
activity, all responsibility, is like giving your own bread to the hungry: “It [the 
one for the other] is the passivity of being-for-another, which is possible only 
in the form of giving the very bread I eat” (OB 72/91). For Levinas, sensibil-
ity is enjoyment (jouissance) and its frustration, as he says referring to the 
traditional Yom Kippur morning haftarah reading (that is, reading from the 
prophets and the writings) that, in fact, is read on a day when those who hear 
it themselves would be fasting:
The immediacy of the sensible is the immediacy of enjoyment and 
its frustration. It is the gift painfully torn up, and in the tearing 
up, immediately spoiling this very enjoyment. It is not a gift of the 
heart, but of the bread from one’s mouth, of one’s own mouthful of 
bread. It is the openness, not only of one’s pocketbook, but of the 
doors of one’s home, a “sharing of your bread with the famished,” a 
“welcoming of the wretched into your house” (Isa. 58) (OB 74/94).
Here is the part of the traditional haftarah reading to which Levinas re-
fers. In it, God says that all the formal ways of being ethical, of doing what 
is right—even fasting—are nothing without giving of yourself to others. I 
quote the passage in full since it will be significant in what follows (here and 
in the remaining chapters):
[God says:] Cry with a full throat, do not hold back,
let your voice resound like a shofar:
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declare to My people their transgression,
and to the House of Jacob their sin.
Yes, they seek Me daily,
as though eager to learn My ways,
as if they were a people that does what is right,
and has not forsaken the way of its God.
When we fast, you say,
why do you pay no heed?
Why, when we afflict ourselves,
do You take no notice?
Because on your fast day you pursue your own affairs,
while you oppress all your workers!
Because your fasting leads only to strife and discord,
while you strike with cruel fist!
—Such a way of fasting on this day
shall not help you to be heard on high.
Is this the fast I have chosen?
A day of self-affliction?
Bowing your head like a reed,
and covering yourself with sackcloth and ashes?
Is this what you call a fast,
a day acceptable to the Lord?
Is a formal, ritual fast acceptable to the Lord? The Lord goes on to answer his 
own rhetorical question:
Is not this the fast that I have chosen:
to unlock the shackles of injustice,
to loosen the ropes of the yoke,
to let the oppressed go free,
and to tear every yoke apart?
Surely it is to share your bread with the hungry,
and to bring the homeless poor into your house;
when you see the naked, to cover them,
never withdrawing yourself from your own kin.
Then shall your light break forth like the dawn,
and your healing shall quickly blossom;
your Righteous One will walk before you,
the glory of the Lord will be your rear guard.
Then when you call,
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the Lord will answer;
when you cry, God will say, Here I am.
If you remove lawlessness from your midst,
the pointing finger, the malicious word;
if you give yourself to the hungry,
and satisfy the needs of the afflicted;
then your light shall shine in the darkness,
and your night become bright as noon;
the Lord will guide you always,
filling your throat in parched lands,
and renewing your body’s strength;
you shall be like a garden overflowing with water,
like a spring that never fails.
Some of you shall rebuild the ancient ruins,
rebuilding the foundations of ages past.
You shall be called Repairer of the breach.
Restorer of streets to dwell in.
What is acceptable, then, is giving. But, as he goes on to indicate, it is not that 
formal ritual is unacceptable. What is unacceptable is using ritual or ritual 
time to attain one’s own interest:
If you keep from trampling the Sabbath,
from pursuing your own affairs on My holy day;
if you call the Sabbath a delight,
the holy day of the Lord honored;
if you honor it,
abstaining from your [old] ways,
from carrying on your own affairs or speaking of them—
then you shall delight in the Lord.
I will cause you to ride upon the heights of the earth,
and I will feed you with the portion of Jacob your father
—The Lord has spoken (Isa. 58:1–14).12
Even fasting, then, is not what is required, not what we are called on to do, if 
it loses its initial meaning of giving of oneself: “Because on your fast day you 
pursue your own affairs, while you oppress all your workers!” the Lord says. 
“Such a way of fasting on this day will not help you to be heard on high.” 
Even the Sabbath is not what God wants if, on it, we are more concerned 
with ourselves than with others including God. We must give, the passage 
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says. We must not pursue our own affairs. We must free those constrained by 
injustice. We must share our own bread, open our own home, cover the na-
ked, remove lawlessness, satisfy the needy. If we do all those things, then, even 
though empty because we have given of ourselves, we will be full to overflow-
ing, like a garden with overflowing water, a spring that never fails: “you shall 
be like a garden overflowing with water, like a spring that never fails.”
The passage perfectly parallels Levinas’s own views not only on ethics but 
also on knowledge as described in the section called “The Reduction.” There 
Levinas refers to affirmation and retraction, thematization and reduction, the 
said and the saying. The philosopher’s effort is to reduce the said back to the 
saying—but without ever completely eliminating the said, the thematization, 
the affirmation, the book, the proposition, and so forth. At one point, he sug-
gests that fixation on any one said is idolatry: it is necessary, he says, “that the 
saying call for philosophy in order that the light that occurs not congeal into 
essence what is beyond essence, and that the hypostasis of an eon not be set 
up as an idol” (OB 44/56). Similarly in the Isaiah 58 passage quoted above, 
ritual serving God can, when fixed on the form itself not on the form aiming 
at the goal of serving the other or God, become idolatry as can any action 
or expression. Form, whether ritualistic, ethical, epistemological, is fine, and 
even inescapable, so long as it serves our being for the other rather than serv-
ing an effort to fuse with or fix—to fuse with or fix ritual, action, statement, 
concept. For Levinas, a common theme runs through religion (which for him 
is any nontotalizing bond with another), ethics, and knowledge. Fusion and 
congealment are idolatry, whether in ritual, in our relation to others, or in 
our efforts at knowing. We must, in all these spheres, offer forms—religious 
forms, forms of the other, conceptual forms—followed by “loosening this 
grip of being” (OB 44/56). This, according to Levinas, is the very effort of the 
philosopher. It is also, as we have seen, the very effort or nature of the self, the 
self that relates to the other through forms and then absolves itself of those 
forms and begins anew. Religion, ethics, knowledge, the self—all, for Levi-
nas, have the same metaphysical, quasi-dialectical, and dynamic structure.
We are locating Levinas’s discussion of his central metaphysical idea in his 
discussion of sensibility. We have seen its location there, and we have seen 
one of the principal metaphors for it—giving bread to the hungry. We have 
also seen how his discussions of ethics, religion, epistemology, and psychol-
ogy all have the same structure. What, though, is the relation, in Otherwise 
Than Being, between sensibility and knowledge? Does Levinas develop the 
two ideas as he does in Totality and Infinity?
For Levinas, in chapter 2 of Otherwise Than Being, truth is exhibition of 
being (23/29), but, as we have seen in that chapter, being congeals in the said 
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(OB 44/56). In chapter 3, Levinas understands the difficulty in a different, 
but related, way. There is an inadequacy in being’s exposition, he says, an 
inadequacy of being with itself. Specifically, in truth, there is a partition of 
being, a partition in which part stands for or is an image of whole. He ex-
plains this by delineating a hierarchy from sensibility to knowledge, specifi-
cally from sensible image and sensible intuition to knowing. Sensible image, 
Levinas says, is image “immediately welcomed without undergoing modifi-
cations” (OB 61/77). Even here with passive reception—passivity, immediacy, 
sensible concretion—and no modification, there is still a problem from the 
standpoint of truth. For the image conveys only part of the whole, and thus 
cannot be allowed to remain in its fixity. If it did remain fixed, truth would 
be incomplete or one-sided. Instead, for truth we must have more. The image 
must symbolize or reflect the whole.
Sensible intuition, Levinas’s next stage, “is already sensibility becoming an 
idea” (OB 61/77). It is the sensible already oriented toward what is beyond 
it. It is this as that, for example, seeing this as red. It is not a concept, but it 
is the sensible conceptualized. Knowing is the next stage. Knowing “is iden-
tification which understands or claims this as that” (OB 61/78). Not merely 
perceiving this as that but understanding or claiming that this is that. As this is 
that, knowing breaks with passivity. Knowing, Levinas says, “does not remain 
in the pure passivity of the sensible” (OB 61/78). Moreover, it is in fact always 
symbolic. All knowing is symbolic, though we may not ordinarily think of it 
in that way. It is symbolic because in knowing there is a said and a said is like 
part to whole or part as a symbol of whole.
We will come back to Levinas’s views on knowledge in more detail later. 
For our purposes now, what is important is the difference between sensibil-
ity and knowledge. What is the difference? It is crucial, first of all, that for 
Levinas there is a difference—crucial to his own views and crucial as well to 
his critique of Husserl and Heidegger. All knowing is preceded by sensibility. 
Hence, spirit cannot be summed up under the heading of knowledge. The 
difference is that sensibility, identified with saying, is “a pure for-another, a 
pure giving of signs, making oneself a sign, expression of self, sincerity, pas-
sivity” (OB 62/78).
Sensibility is, according to Levinas, “enjoyment and wounding” (OB 
63/80). These can be summed up, he says, as proximity where proximity “does 
not belong to the movement of cognition” (OB 63/79). Sensation, Levinas 
says, “is not reducible to the clarity or the idea derived out of it.” Instead, “It 
is vulnerability—enjoyment and suffering—whose status is not reducible to 
the fact of being put before a spectator subject” (OB 63/80).13 So, once again, 
what is central here, as in Totality and Infinity, is human vulnerability. The 
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vulnerability that is sensibility always opens out to cognition while, at the 
same time, it is different than cognition. Sensation is passive; knowledge is 
active.
In Totality and Infinity, the move from sensibility or affectivity to knowl-
edge is followed by a relation to what cannot be sensed or known, namely, 
to the alterity or transcendence of the other. That relationship takes place in 
language and goes by a variety of names: the face to face relation, for example, 
or the ethical relationship (TI 194–95/168–69). How is it different from sen-
sibility and knowing? Unlike knowing, our relationship to a personal other 
is passive not active. In addition, unlike both sensation and knowing, our 
relation to the personal other is not precisely relation to content. In “visual or 
tactile sensation,” Levinas says, “the identity of the I envelopes the alterity of 
the object, which becomes precisely a content” (TI 194/168). In other words, 
sensible relation to an other reduces the other to content while the face to 
face or ethical relationship to an other relates to the other as other. This is the 
work of language, specifically, of language as speaking to, not speaking of, the 
other. The other may present himself as a theme, but
his presence is not reabsorbed in his status as a theme. The word 
that bears on the Other as a theme seems to contain the Other. 
But already it is said to the Other who, as inter locutor, has quit the 
theme that encompassed him, and upsurges inevitably behind the 
said (TI 195/169).
The relation to the other in Totality and Infinity has, then, the same relational 
structure we have discussed previously in Otherwise Than Being. There is a 
moment of content or theme and a moment that dissolves the content or 
theme. The passage just quoted suggests that the dissolving moment is the 
very speaking to—that is, speaking to an interlocutor—itself. To speak to 
another assumes the content or theme we already associate with the other—
content or theme expressed in a said—may be surpassed. Something else 
may surge up. If not, why would we bother to speak? The other, for Levinas, 
is “a being not entering into, but overflowing, the sphere of the same” (TI 
195/169–70).
How, though, is this alternation between content or theme and dissolution 
different than the similar alternation we might have in knowledge? As we 
have seen, there is an alternation between affirmation and retraction, thema-
tization and reduction, the said and the saying. The difference, as we have dis-
cussed in chapter 3, is in two kinds of indefiniteness, the indefinite that can 
be disclosed (such as a forest of which we only see a part) and the infinite that 
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can never be disclosed. The other is infinite, beyond my grasp, beyond me. 
The idea of infinity, Levinas says, “does not come from our a priori depths—it 
is consequently experience par excellence” (TI 196/170)
Following the general differences between Levinas’s two major works that 
I have sketched above, it is not surprising that in Otherwise Than Being, the 
relation to the personal other, called proximity, obsession, the face to face, is 
more often described in terms of its shocking impact on me than in terms of 
surplus, surge, or overflow that I receive or experience as it is more frequently 
in such passages as the one quoted above from the earlier work. The other 
traumatizes me. “The blow of the affection makes an impact, traumatically, in 
a past more profound than all that I can reassemble by memory,” Levinas says 
(OB 88/111). “The subjective,” he goes on, “does not only undergo, it suffers” 
(OB 88/111). The neighbor, he says, “strikes me” (OB 88/112). Still, Levinas 
indicates that he has not abandoned the idea of surplus or overflow when he 
refers to an increasing debit. Yes, the infinite other is for me debit, but the 
debit increases, its dynamic increase is glory: “This debit which increases is 
infinity as an infinition of the infinite, as glory” (OB 93/119).14 In relating to 
the other, my resources are emptied out. For only in this way do I relate to the 
other as such. But the alternation of relating to the other in a theme selected 
by me and the subsequent retraction of the theme that retraction empties 
me out is endless—an endless process. We will look further at this dizzying 
emptying-out process in chapter 7.
The overall structure of the self and of human relations in Levinas’s two 
major works, then, is the same. Each assumes a self that emerges in but is 
not reducible to forms and each compares our relation to the personal other 
with sensibility and knowledge. Like sensibility and in contrast to knowl-
edge, relation to a personal other is passive. Unlike knowledge, the ethical 
relation is not conceptual. Though it includes a moment of conceptualization, 
a moment of approach to what appears and can be disclosed, my relation 
to an other recurrently dissolves concepts and appearances since the other 
can never be disclosed but is announced by and beyond what is disclosed. 
Moreover, though the two works emphasize different themes, in each the 
other both is traumatic to me and, from another standpoint, ever occurring 
increase.
Finally, how does this conception of the self relate to the conception of 
time expressed in Otherwise Than Being? We began this chapter by saying 
that Otherwise Than Being, rather than contrasting Plato’s recollection with 
Levinas’s teaching, makes a similar point by speaking of that of which there 
is no reminiscence, no recollection, no representation, rediscovery, recall, re-
uniting, recapture, or retention. Instead of synchronic time, in which what 
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is past can be collected, presented, captured, or taken hold of again, time 
is diachronic. Why? Because synchronic time implies the retention in the 
present of what was in the past. In synchronic time, what was is retained, 
collected together, or united with what is present. But the self, in its rela tion 
with an other, does not fuse with anything that it can then fuse with again. 
The self is for the other without becoming the other. The self is for the other 
without any concepts or themes to guide it in its relation to the other. As a 
result, there is nothing to capture, nothing to re-present. The self ’s temporal-
ity as a result is diachronic since there is nothing remembered that could be 
retained and be in the present. There can be relation to an other in the past, 
but there can be no recollection of it.15 Hence, we may speak of a temporality 
“without reminiscence,” that is, of a diachrony (OB 30/39). Similarly, there is 
no concept or theme involved in my relation to an other and so temporality 
cannot “be assembled into a representation” by way of a concept or theme 
once present that can be present again. Hence, we may speak of temporal an-
archy (OB 51/66). The past thus understood is, in a sense, more past than any 
past (that is, more past than what is past in synchronic time) since it cannot 
be retained or recaptured in my thought or memory. Whatever is otherwise 
than being—whatever is in relation without concepts to guide it—cannot be 
captured in time.
With this, we can conclude discussion of how the difference between Plato 
and Levinas carries over into Otherwise Than Being metaphysically rather 
than intertextually. We learn in Otherwise Than Being that what we can 
know, we can retain or recollect and know again, now; while what cannot 
be known—what is without concept, theme, or presence—cannot ever be 
retained, remembered, or recollected. Synchrony is to diachrony in Otherwise 
Than Being as Plato is to Levinas in Totality and Infinity. We will discuss 
knowledge—along with violence, freedom, and creation—in greater detail in 
the next chapter.
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C H A P T E R  6
Violence, Freedom, Creation, Knowledge
What about the main concepts treated in our discussion of Totality and Infin-
ity? Do they make an important appearance in Otherwise Than Being? How 
are they handled? Are they handled in such a way that the themes I have 
brought out in my discussion of the earlier book carry through into the later?
Answering these questions in this chapter will advance this book’s themes 
in two ways. First, since the Plato/Levinas distinctions I have drawn are de-
rived from Totality and Infinity, showing that the concepts on which the 
distinctions rest play an important role in Otherwise Than Being extends the 
preceding chapter’s argument that the Plato/Levinas distinction continues 
to be applicable to the later book (sections 1 through 4). Second, once that 
is shown, it is possible to solidify and amplify the account of how Plato and 
Levinas differ on knowledge—on what knowledge is and on how it is related 
to the ethical (section 5). Knowledge is passive or receptive for Plato while it 
is active for Levinas. As a result, for Plato the ethical is a type of knowledge, 
while for Levinas it is a non- or precognitive movement toward the other; 
moreover, in Plato’s ethics there is a central ontological concept, variously 
described as the idea of the good or of the beautiful while, as we will see in 
our final chapter, Levinas’s ethics gestures toward something beyond ontol-
ogy and without concept, the glory of the infinite.
1.
Let us begin with violence. If anything, the language of violence in Otherwise 
Than Being is even stronger and more evident than the similar language in 
Totality and Infinity. Responsibility, the key term for ethics in Otherwise Than 
Being, is understood in the later work in terms of exposure, wound, outrage, 
suffering, trauma, subjection, contraction, breakup, fission, denucleation, ex-
cision, dispossession, immolation, being gnawed away, biting in on oneself, 
oppression, persecution, being a hostage, bearing the weight of the universe, 
bearing the weight of the other—just to name a few.
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For example, in the key, central section entitled “Substitution,” Levinas 
refers to the oneself ’s responsibility as “exposure to wounds and outrages” and 
says the goal of responsibility is for the oneself “to offer itself, to suffer and 
to give” (OB 105/134). He also understands the self there, as we have seen, 
as recurrent contraction: “this recurrence by contraction,” he maintains, “is 
the self ” (OB 108/138). He often uses language regarding the self or ipseity, 
though, that is even stronger, even more violent: “The recurrence of ipseity, 
the incarnation, far from thickening and tumefying the soul, oppresses it and 
contracts it and exposes it naked to the other” (OB 109/138). He describes 
the passivity of the responsible self as “the passivity of a trauma,” “a deafening 
trauma,” and “the passivity of being persecuted” (OB 111/141). “A subject,” 
he says simply, “is a hostage” (OB 112/142).
In a related but different vein, he speaks of the recurrently contracting self 
as “identity gnawing away at itself ” (OB 114/145) and, similarly, of the self 
in responsibility as “involved in the gnawing away at oneself ” (OB 121/155). 
The psyche, he maintains, signifies “an undoing of the substantial nucleus 
of the ego that is formed in the same, a fission of the mysterious nucleus of 
inwardness of the subject” (OB 141/180). “Subjectivity understood as self,” 
for him, is excision, dispossession, contraction, self-immolation; it is “the ex-
ciding and dispossession, the contraction, in which the ego does not appear, 
but immolates itself ” (OB 118/151). The self is “forgetful of itself ” but, even 
more, “forgetful in biting in upon itself ” (OB 115/147). As a result, the self 
that gnaws away at itself, that undoes its own nucleus or immolates itself, 
“impassively under[goes] the weight of the other” and is “under the weight of 
the universe” (OB 118/151, 116/147).
Here, as in both the Phaedrus and Totality and Infinity, the language of 
violence is used to convey something that is not, literally, violent, namely, a 
type of beneficial vulnerability to the other. In the Phaedrus, as we saw, love 
is always disruptive. It knocks you out. Being in love is like falling on your 
back. But, despite this, love relations need not be assaultive. Instead, in love, 
you serve the other and the love you experience opens you to the very idea of 
beauty. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas’s term for the disruption we experi-
ence in love, and in all direct relations to the other, is essential violence—a 
rupture of my going on being that, at the same time, gives me something 
I do not already contain. Essential violence is a breaking open that opens 
a new dimension. For Levinas, as we have seen, the self is not harmed but 
effectuated by its vulnerability to an other: fraternity constitutes ipseity (TI 
279–80/257).
So also here. The coring out of the ego that is, ultimately, a way of being for 
an other is, at the same time, not alienation but inspiration where inspiration 
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has its root meaning of breathing in a spirit or something divine. Levinas says 
about the self, “Its responsibility for the other . . . does not signify a submis-
sion to the non-ego; it means an openness in which being’s ego is surpassed 
in inspiration” (OB 115/146). “I exist through the other and for the other,” 
he says in a similar vein, “but without this being alienation: I am inspired. 
This inspiration is the psyche” (OB 114/146). The psyche, in other words, 
undoes the ego and lets something divine in: “The psyche can signify this 
alterity in the same without alienation in the form of incarnation, as being-
in-one’s-skin, having-the-other-in-one’s-skin” (OB 114–15/146). Moreover, 
it is when the ego is cored out that I am most my self. “The oneself,” Levinas 
says, “has to be conceived outside of all substantial coinciding of self with 
self ” (OB 114/145). “The word I,” he says in a biblical allusion, “means here I 
am, answering for everything and everyone” (OB 114/145).
Recurrent being for different others is, then, identity: “Recurrence be-
comes identity in breaking up the limits of identity” (OB 114/145). Being for 
an other is being a self: “The self is on the hither side of rest; it is the impos-
sibility to come back from all things and concern oneself only with oneself. 
It is to hold on to oneself while gnawing away at oneself ” (OB 114/146). To 
repeat a phrase from above: “I exist through the other and for the other” (OB 
114/146). In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas’s name for the disruption that 
gives me my identity and, at the same time, lets the divine in is good violence 
(OB 43/56). Responsibility, he says, “is an interruption of essence, a disinter-
estedness imposed with a good violence” (OB 43/56). The violence of being 
for other is not ordinary, harmful violence but, instead, good violence for two 
reasons: first, in this type of violence, I am or become myself; second, this 
good violence lets in the other.
So the point in chapter 1, that the language of violence used to delineate 
the self in its good relation to other is a common feature of both Plato’s and 
Levinas’s thought, does carry through to Otherwise Than Being and the con-
ceptualization of the self found in it. There is a type of vulnerability to other 
that is not a threat, that does not diminish me, even though it does dramati-
cally disrupt me. And, as in Totality and Infinity, it is an open vulnerability—
not a vulnerability to form or being, as in Plato, but an open vulnerability 
since for Levinas, the job of the philosopher is not to take in form or connect 
to being, but to loosen the grip of form or being. Moreover, the nonthreaten-
ing openness or vulnerability that Levinas in Otherwise Than Being calls good 
violence is, like love in Plato’s Phaedrus, divine. As Plato’s Socrates calls love 
a type of divine madness since it is a way of relating to the divine, so Levinas 
calls our relation to the other good violence or inspiration since, in contracting 
the self, the divine comes to pass in us.
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2.
What about freedom? We have seen in our discussion of the Republic and 
other dialogues and of Totality and Infinity that both Plato and Levinas may 
seem not to favor freedom, since each of them emphasizes a kind of being 
ruled or being for another, while in fact they do favor a surprising kind of 
freedom that comes from being in response. For Plato, as we see in the Meno, 
to be virtuous is to be limited by form but, as we see in the Republic, limita-
tion by form is a type of liberation. Similarly, for Levinas, the other calls my 
freedom in question but, at the same time, my relation to him or her is tem-
porary and I remain free in it.
Similarly in Otherwise Than Being, our freedom is an unusual kind. Refer-
ring to the passivity found in substitution, Levinas calls it “a different freedom 
from that of an initiative” (OB 115/146). Why is substitution, that particular 
form of being for an other that breaks up our own identity, freedom? How is 
being in response in this particular way not a form of being limited, broken, 
or unfree? Levinas’s answer is “Through substitution for others, the oneself 
escapes relations” or, even more, “In this most passive passivity, the self liber-
ates itself ethically from every other and from itself ” (OB 115/146). Levinas 
means by these statements that only through ever-recurring and constantly 
changing relation to others called substitution do we free our self from any 
particular way of being ourselves and from any particular relation to particu-
lar others as well. Substitution is an ever-recurring breaking open of oneself 
and one’s current way of being to be for another and then a breaking open 
of that relation to be for another, and another, and another, and so on. It is 
only this loosening up, this unfixing of what currently is, that is freedom. 
This view, expressed first in Levinas’s On Escape, is consistent throughout 
Levinas’s work. For Levinas, ethics is the most freeing activity there is—
well, not activity but passivity, we must say, since ethics for him is recurrent, 
open response, a being in response not a doing in the ordinary sense at all. 
Nonetheless, for Levinas, ethics is the most freeing. When, out of the blue, 
we break up what we are, and what we are doing, to do or be for the other 
who is before us, we are more free, less constrained, less fixed, less chained 
to ourselves—and to any other—than in anything else that goes on in our 
lives.
3.
What about creation in Otherwise Than Being? Does it play the same role 
there as in Totality and Infinity? In chapter 3, I argued that though the Pla-
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tonic Socrates identifies love and desire with need while Levinas contrasts 
desire and need, their differences on desire and need are not as great as they 
seem since Socrates introduces need for the same reason that Levinas rejects 
it, namely, to highlight human vulnerability; that each sees love as a sign of 
human vulnerability, that is, of the central other-directedness of human be-
ings and of human subjectivity or soul; and that the real, nonterminological, 
difference in the two concepts of desire results instead from the presence or 
absence in them of a concept of creation ex nihilo. Each thinker believes love 
starts with self-concern but then changes and is directed to the other: for 
Socrates, love first is a desire to have the good for oneself forever but then 
becomes a desire to generate and reproduce and, by doing so, to produce im-
mortality; for Levinas, love in one respect is mere need while in another it 
is fecund desire and exists infinitely, beyond death. The difference between 
the two thinkers instead, I argued, is in what love’s generativity or fecun-
dity is like: Socrates connects immortality with eternity; Levinas connects 
what is beyond death to the upsurge of something new. In other words, both 
think that love is directed to something outside oneself and that love defeats 
death, but they differ in that Socrates thinks lovers together share in and 
produce something immortal (immortal forms; a child who shares human 
form; a beloved who, through education, shares in the forms of the good 
and the beautiful) and Levinas thinks the productivity or fecundity of love is 
the facilitation of the arising of something not eternal, but new—that is, of 
something that has not in any sense been before, namely, the other. For Plato, 
in other words, the new other is a reproduction of eternal form, and thus not 
essentially new, while for Levinas, the other as such is something genuinely 
new—not an example of a form, an instance of a type, a particular of a uni-
versal, but instead something singular or new.
In Otherwise Than Being, Levinas carries the contrast with Plato forward. 
He associates the idea of creation both with the Jewish religious themes of 
the book and with the idea of absolute passivity that is another of the book’s 
central themes. Absolute passivity, he says, is contributed by the idea of cre-
ation. Creation, he maintains, should not be understood in ontological terms 
since it is not a function of preexisting and indestructible matter. Speaking 
about ontology, he says, “It is not by chance that Plato teaches us that mat-
ter is eternal, and that for Aristotle matter is a cause; such is the truth for 
the order of things.” Connecting this idea to passivity, he goes on: “Western 
philosophy, which perhaps is reification itself, remains faithful to the order of 
things and does not know the absolute passivity, beneath the level of activity 
and passivity, which is contributed by the idea of creation.” Continuing, he 
sums up his critique: “Philosophers have always wished to think of creation 
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in ontological terms, that is, in function of a preexisting and indestructible 
matter” (OB 110/140).
Creation, in other words, is not like our ordinary making out of preexist-
ing matter—a table out of wood, for example, or a pot out of clay. That con-
ception of making—the one that in Totality and Infinity Levinas associates 
with Plato—involves the idea of form and the potential for form. When I 
make something, on this kind of account, I actualize the forms that are po-
tential in the particular matter I have selected to utilize. The matter, then, is 
not utterly passive. It has its own activity and limits. It acts to constrain what 
I can do with it. I must be responsive to the matter in this kind of making, 
for the matter is active in certain ways. It acts to facilitate and limit my own 
activities on it.
In creation, to the contrary, what is acted on is utterly passive, with no ac-
tivity whatsoever. In the process, the created being plays no active role at all, 
and the creator is neither facilitated nor constrained by that which he or she 
creates. On this account, what is created cannot in any way be responsive. The 
creation precedes any possibility of response, facilitation, limitation. Some-
times, as above, Levinas speaks of a passivity that precedes or is “beneath the 
level of activity and passivity.” Other times, he refers to a passivity that cannot 
revert into an assumption (OB 113/145). What Levinas intends to convey by 
these terms is a passivity that has no form to it at all. When I make a table 
out of wood, the wood is passive; it is acted upon. However, the wood has 
form that gives it some activity, the activity of limiting and facilitating what 
can be done with it. When God created heaven and earth out of nothing, the 
created things were utterly passive. They neither facilitated nor constrained 
God’s (pure) activity. Thus, Levinas says, “in the concept of creation ex nihilo, 
if it is not a pure nonsense, there is the concept of a passivity that does not 
revert into an assumption. The self as a creature is conceived in a passivity 
more passive still than the passivity of matter” (OB 113–14/145).
The self, then, is called into being without contributing anything to that 
call and is, as a result, utterly indebted to that call, since contributing noth-
ing. Here, we should read Levinas as utilizing the biblical concept of creation 
to characterize the relation of self and other. He is not simply invoking the 
Hebrew Bible or simply promoting the idea of the creation of the universe 
out of nothing in six days. Instead, he is suggesting that I am created by the 
other without my having anything to do with it. This is evident when Levi-
nas associates the idea of creation and the idea of obeying before hearing. 
“We will do and we will hear,” the Hebrews say at Sinai, reversing the usual 
or Greek order of the activities. Ordinarily, we would think it is necessary 
to hear something first, and understand it, before we do it. Instead, doing 
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comes first and is not a function of understanding. For Levinas, response to 
the other is not a function of understanding. We do not respond to the other 
because he is of a certain type or involved in certain types of activities. We 
respond to the other as such. We respond to the other in an utterly passive 
way of response that is not facilitated or limited by any conceptual or for-
mal content. And why do we do so? Because we are creatures, ourselves cre-
ated beings. The other, as we have seen, contents me, or is my content. I am, 
“essentially,” the other—and another, and another, and another. I contribute 
nothing, and thus am indebted. My relation to the other is debit—though the 
debit is a continually or infinitely increasing one, and one that from another 
perspective is inspiration or glory since the emptiness or openness is not only 
continually recreated but also continually “filled.” “But in creation,” Levinas 
says, “what is called to being answers to a call that could not have reached it 
since, brought out of nothingness, it obeyed before hearing the order” (OB 
113/145). He goes on, here again in the section on “Substitution,” to refer to 
other ideas from the Hebrew Bible that suggest ultimate passivity both in 
responsibility or ethics and simply in the structure of the self: “The word I 
means here I am, answering for everything and everyone,” he says, referring a 
repeated common response to direct address in the Hebrew Bible. “Here I am 
(hineni)” suggests the pure making oneself available that the phrase’s lack of 
real content suggests. I am always here, so what does the phrase mean? Levi-
nas is fascinated by such phrases of pure response not guided by any concepts, 
for example, also “bonjour” (OB 143/183). But, as he goes on to say, though I 
am utterly passive, utterly for an other, I am not alienated, but inspired, or, as 
he puts it differently, my debit is glory. “I exist through the other and for the 
other, but without this being alienation: I am inspired” (OB 114/146). Later, 
he connects the here I am, sincerity, and bonjour with glory. Sincerity is as 
simple as hello (OB 143/183) and is connected, in its passivity, with the glory 
of the infinite: “Glory,” Levinas says, “is but the other face of the passivity of 
the subject” (OB 144/184). Passivity and inspiration, like debit and glory, are 
for Levinas simply two sides of one coin. Creation, then, plays a similar role 
in Otherwise Than Being as in Totality and Infinity and, in addition, points 
us toward the glory of the infinite. We will discuss the glory of the infinite 
further in the next chapter.
4.
Finally, we come to knowledge. Of the four concepts treated in this chapter, 
it is the one least treated in Totality and Infinity and most—and most excit-
ingly—expanded on in Otherwise Than Being. As with other topics in the 
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latter book, so also with knowledge, the emphasis is on the self, in contrast 
to the emphasis, in Totality and Infinity, on the other. As absolute desire, the 
moral figure of Totality and Infinity, is about the self while responsibility, 
the moral figure of Otherwise Than Being, is about the other, so also absolute 
receptivity, the epistemological figure of Totality and Infinity, is about the 
self, while interruption of self or of essence, the epistemological figure of 
Otherwise Than Being, is about the other. The interruption referred to is the 
interruption of essence that, as we have seen before, is good violence: “an inter-
ruption of essence, a disinterestedness imposed with a good violence” (OB 
43/56). As I desire something for myself but am responsible to the other, so 
I also receive something for myself but am interrupted by the other. The lat-
ter two formulations are two formulations of one phenomenon, namely, the 
phenomenon of relating to the known without marking it: I receive the other, 
but it is absolute reception; my set of marks—categories, descriptions, stand-
points, and so forth—give way to the other. They loosen up or uncongeal.
In chapter 4, I argued that for both Plato and Levinas, knowledge is di-
rectedness to what is other, not a return to the self. In this way, their views of 
knowledge are the same. At the same time, I argued, their views of knowledge 
differ in that, for Plato, the known is both immanent to and transcendent of 
the self while, for Levinas, the known utterly transcends the self. In Totality 
and Infinity, I detailed, the utter transcendence in Levinasian pure knowing 
is described as absolute receptivity. In Otherwise Than Being, as I will now 
delineate, utter transcendence is characterized instead in terms of interrup-
tion or violence.
The interruption or violence in question is achieved through what Levinas 
calls the reduction: the reduction of the said back to the saying. We reduce the 
said to the saying, he says, so that what is beyond essence does not congeal 
into essence or, put differently, so that hypostasis does not become idolatry. 
The job of the philosopher, Levinas says astonishingly enough, is to loosen 
the grip of being—or, to be more complete, first to show being and then to 
loosen its grip—again and again and again. And why do we do this? Because 
only absolute knowing is absolute receptivity. Ordinary knowing is active. It 
marks what it knows. As a result, all ordinary knowing is idolatry—is taking 
a perspective to be the thing itself, taking a part that I have selected to be the 
whole from which it comes, taking ideology to be truth.
This stunning idea of a ceaseless positing and taking back is an astonishing 
new way of thinking about what philosophers ought to do. It is animated not 
by relativism, but by Levinas’s epistemological humility, as I shall call it. Our 
aim, in knowing, is to approach the known without marking it. But we can-
not achieve our aim fully and must be content instead with a back-and-forth 
process of speaking the other, and respeaking, and respeaking, without end. 
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The point is that our responsibility to the other whom we would know, whom 
we would approach without marking, is only achieved by speaking—by what 
Levinas calls the saying (le dire)—but speaking inevitably marks the other, 
depriving the other of singularity. Speaking results, Levinas says, in the said 
(le disant).
Our attempt to achieve our aim inevitably fails of complete achievement 
but the attempt can only take place in such an activity that must in part fail: 
“But is it necessary,” Levinas rhetorically asks, “and is it possible that the say-
ing on the hither side be thematized, that is, manifest itself, that it enter into 
a proposition and into a book? It is necessary,” he answers (OB 43/56). Here, 
thematization, manifestation, proposition, and book all are ways of describ-
ing the said. Our attempt to go beyond the said to the other must take place 
through the said. The said is necessary. But why? Because the said contains 
a saying—a directedness to the other as other. By itself, the saying does not 
mark—but, of course, the saying never is by itself. Hence the need for the to-
and-fro process we are invited now to call philosophy. Levinas describes the 
saying as responsibility: “The surprising saying which is a responsibility for 
another is against ‘the winds and tides’ of being, is an interruption of essence, 
a disinterestedness imposed with a good violence” (OB 43/56). He goes on 
to describe the back-and-forth process of philosophy further. I shall quote 
him at some length, to show how the process of philosophy—philosophy as a 
back-and-forth process—works. Referring to the saying, Levinas says,
It must spread out and assemble itself into essence, posit itself, be 
hypo stasized, become an eon in consciousness and knowledge, let 
itself be seen, undergo the ascendency [l ’emprise] of being. Ethics 
itself, in its saying which is a responsibility requires this hold 
[emprise]. But it is also necessary that the saying call for philosophy 
in order that the light that occurs not congeal into essence what is 
beyond essence, and that the hypostasis of an eon not be set up as 
an idol. Philosophy makes this astonishing adventure—showing 
and re count ing as an essence—intelligible, by loosening this grip 
[emprise] of being (OB 44/56).
Saying cannot, in other words, accomplish its goal. It becomes a mark, a fixa-
tion: essence, position, hypostasis, eon, light, being. Philosophy must loosen 
the hold of being, must unfix what is fixed, as Levinas goes on:
A philosopher’s effort, and his unnatural position, consists, while 
showing the hither side, in immediately reducing the eon which 
triumphs in the said and in the monstrations, and, despite the 
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reduction, retaining an echo of the reduced said in the form of 
ambiguity, of diachronic expression. For the saying is both an 
affirmation and a retraction of the said (OB 44/56).
A new type of philosophy is required, then. One that knows and reflects its 
own limitations. One that includes assertion and retraction or, in more nu-
anced fashion, that features types of assertion that contain their own retrac-
tion or point to their own limitations: intentional ambiguity, diachrony.
If philosophy from its inception has been fundamentally motivated by 
recognition of the difference between nature and convention, Levinas here 
requires of philosophy that it apply its own founding recognition to itself. 
As philosophy results from the desire to disentangle the known from the 
knower, Levinas requires of philosophers that they accept and, even more, 
take steps to deal with, the fact that our knowledge of nature is never free of 
convention, that the known is always marked by the knower. For us, there is 
no nature without convention, no known without marks of the knower, no 
truth without theme. We reflect this by gesturing from one theme to another, 
diachronically. The reduction is such gesturing:
As the truth of what does not enter into a theme, it [the reduction] 
is produced out of time or in two times without entering into either 
of them, as an endless critique, or skepticism, which in a spiraling 
movement makes possible the boldness of philosophy, destroying 
the conjunction into which its saying and its said continually enter 
(OB 44/57).
Thus, Levinas delineates a new, bold philosophy, not satisfied with conven-
tion but also not satisfied with itself, a spiraling movement of critique and 
self-critique without end. The movement is back and forth but, even more, 
it is spiral. For, after the first, each saying is a resaying and there is no return 
to a beginning—a pure beginning, an absolute archē, unmarked being, nature 
conceived without convention: “being is inseparable from its meaning!” Levi-
nas says in good phenomenological fashion. He goes on: “it is spoken. It is in 
the logos” (OB 45/58).
5.
Where does this leave us in our reflections on Plato and Levinas on knowl-
edge? What is the problem, really, that leads Levinas to say that philosophy 
must be spiral, must be endless critique, critique without ultimate resolution 
violence, freedom, creation, knowledge 145
as opposed to critique with a terminus? The two questions are connected. 
For Levinas, as we have seen in chapter 5, knowing is active not passive since 
knowing is always understanding or claiming that this is that: knowing “is 
identification which understands or claims this as that” (OB 61/78). Knowing, 
then, is not passive but active: it “does not remain in the pure passivity of the 
sensible” (OB 61/78). All knowing is preceded by a moment of pure passivity, 
the purely passive reception of sensible image, of sensible image “immedi-
ately welcomed without undergoing modifications” (OB 61/77). Knowing, 
in other words, is preceded by a moment of passive reception—of passivity, 
immediacy, or sensible concretion. Such sensible image, though, quickly be-
comes sensible intuition or sensibility becoming idea, this as that, and sen-
sible image quickly is followed by knowledge, this is that. Knowledge, thus, is 
active, not passive. It is, in other words, in good part about us, our standpoint, 
our theme, our take, our ascendency, our hold. Though there is a moment in 
knowing that is passive—and so spirit is not identical with knowing—that 
moment is inseparable from idea and thus from activity (OB 61/77–78). For 
Levinas, then, the locus of passivity—of open, human response to what is 
other—is sensibility, not knowledge, while for Plato, as we have seen, it is in 
knowledge that pure responsiveness is found. Ascent to the forms and to the 
highest of the forms is figured as falling on your back or as a type of slavery.
This, then, delineates a major difference between Plato and Levinas, a dif-
ference Levinas increasingly characterizes in Otherwise Than Being by express-
ing passivity in terms that derive from and reflect the concerns and categories 
of the Hebrew Bible and those that reflect activity and knowing in terms 
that derive from Greek thought. For Levinas, knowing is active and, thus, 
risks idolatry. Idolatry, I would say, is taking as perfect what is not perfect. In 
knowing, taken as a static act, we claim to comprehend, we take ourselves as 
comprehensive or perfect. In knowing, we take our limited perspective to be 
what is, to be the whole, to be the truth. But it is not the truth. It is, instead, 
symbolic, since the said is like part to whole or part as symbol of whole.
We can compare Plato and Levinas by looking at the passage in Plato’s 
corpus that is the most similar to Levinas’s reflections on sensible image, 
sensible intuition, and knowledge. It is the well-known divided line section 
of the Republic (Rep. 6.509d1–511e5). In it, the highest knowing—which is 
the type of knowing needed for virtue—is passive or receptive, rather than 
active. It is a simple knowing—a simple beholding—rather than a discursive 
process of seeing this as that or taking this to be that.
In the divided line passage, Socrates outlines levels of knowing by arrang-
ing each type of knowing on a line cut in a specific proportion of segments: 
“take a line cut in two unequal segments,” he says, “and go on and cut each 
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segment in the same ratio” (509d6–8). Corresponding to the levels of know-
ing arranged on one side of the line are levels of being arranged on the other. 
Because of the particular proportion in which the line is cut—the two seg-
ments of the line are cut in the same ratio in which the whole line has been 
cut—the two middle segments are equal and, as a result, the lowest segment 
has to either of the middle segments the same ratio that either of the middle 
segments has to the highest segment.1 The proportion is important because 
Socrates uses the mathematical proportion to draw an analogy. In Greek, 
analogia means both analogy and proportion. Crucial for our purposes in the 
analogy is the fact that knowledge on the lower level of each of the two main 
segments is double (of this as that) while knowledge on the higher level of 
each of the two main segments is simple (of this).
The lowest level of knowing is imagination (eikasia). Socrates’s examples 
of images are shadows and appearances (specifically, appearances produced 
in water or in close-grained, smooth, bright things), and so on. Imagination 
in this context is not fancy but is seeing an image as an image—for example, 
seeing the image of a tree on water as the image of a tree. The next level up 
is trust (pistis), which is a simple, nondiscursive kind of seeing. Socrates’s ex-
amples of what we trust are animals, growing things, artifacts, and so on. An 
example of trust, then, would be simply seeing a tree—not seeing something 
as a tree or judging it to be a tree, but simply seeing a tree. Together, imagina-
tion and trust constitute seeing in general.
The next two levels, which together constitute intellection or knowing 
in general, are thought (dianoia) and intellectual intuition (nous). Socrates’s 
examples of the objects of thought are those utilized by people who do cal-
culation and geometry, namely, odd and even in calculation, and figures and 
forms of angles in geometry. Thought, in other words, knows the mathemati-
cals, roughly divided into the number and shape. Finally, the highest level 
of knowing is intellectual intuition (nous). Its objects are forms (eidē, 510b8, 
510d5, 511a3, 511c1–2).
Ontologically, the central analogy Socrates wants to draw is between 
things and images. Given the proportion he utilizes, the implication is that 
as images are to the things that are their originals so things are to forms. For 
example, a tree has to the form of tree the same relation that an image of a 
tree has to a tree: things are like images of the forms. Similarly, thinking is 
like imagination. For, just as to know an image one must know the original of 
which it is the image and, even more, know the image through the original, 
so also to know a thing one must know the form of the thing and, even more, 
know the thing through the form (as we saw in chapter 1, knowing things 
according to their forms is what Socrates, in the Phaedrus, calls recollection).
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Socrates’s example of knowing a thing through its form is knowing a tri-
angle or square you draw through the form of triangle or the form of square. 
Socrates says, “They make the arguments for the sake of the square itself and 
the diagonal itself,” by which he means the form of square or the form of 
diagonal, “not for the sake of the diagonal they draw, and similarly with the 
others” (510d). A soul, he says, “uses as images those very things of which 
images are made by the things below” (511a). In other words, in higher-order 
thinking, we treat things as images, that is, we understand things through or 
according to their forms. His example is a geometer who, for example, uses a 
visible square to think about square itself, that is, about the form of square, or 
what we might call squareness.
Similarly, as imagination is to trust, so thought is to intellectual intuition. 
Intellectual intuition—nous—is unmediated or nondiscursive knowing, that 
is, the simple taking in of form. Similarly, then, trust is a simple—unmedi-
ated, nondiscursive—seeing. Because trust is nondiscursive, one might think 
it is passive, but it is not. Just as imagination has an obvious discursive quality 
and a double structure (seeing the colors and shapes on the water as a tree), 
if things are like images of the forms then, following the analogy, our trust 
in the case of seeing a tree must also have implicit discursiveness based on 
an implicit double structure: nondiscursive seeing of a tree (an example of 
trust) implies the possibility of making explicit what is implicit in it (and in 
all trust), namely, that this is a tree (that this is a what). Such discursive tak-
ing this as a tree is thought (dianoia) that, as the analogy suggests, is in fact 
discursive in the same way as imagination is discursive, namely, by reflecting 
and drawing out or articulating an implicit double structure: thought sees this 
thing in front of us as a tree.
Following the analogy and the examples, we can understand Plato to be 
spelling out our ordinary, trusting relation to things in the world (seeing a 
tree, seeing a human being, etc.) in terms of two aspects involved in it: a 
mathematical component (this tree, singular; or these trees, plural) and an 
eidetic component (this tree, or these trees), reflecting the two highest levels 
of the divided line. One tree, the tree, these trees—all these indicate the math-
ematical, or the that. One tree, the tree, these trees—all these indicate the 
eidetic or the what. For Socrates in the Republic, the ascent from imagination 
and trust to discursive thought and intellectual intuition is the ascent from 
opinion and sensation to knowledge, from convention to the truth, from 
marking what is to approaching it without marking it.
That is why Socrates refers to a form as unhypothesized (“an unhypothe-
sized beginning,” 510b6–7). A hypothesis is a putting (thesis) under (hypo). In 
a hypothesis, something is put under something else or, more specifically in 
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this case, something is supposed by or utilized in our knowing of something 
else. Knowledge of trees is supposed by seeing an image of tree; you cannot 
see shapes and colors on water as a tree if you do not know trees. Knowledge 
of the form of tree, similarly, is supposed by our knowledge of trees; you can-
not see this thing as a tree without knowing what it is to be a tree, namely, the 
form of tree. When we imagine a tree on water, we see a certain colored shape 
on water as a tree. When we know a tree, we see a certain thing as a tree.
Both trust and knowledge of forms, however, are simple. They are not 
seeing something as something, but simply seeing something. In the case of 
trust, the simplicity is somewhat illusory or a matter of degree. In the case 
of a form, the simplicity is real. I simply see the form. I simply take in the 
form. I do not bring anything to it. In other words—and most importantly 
for the purposes of our comparison with Levinas—for Socrates, the ascent 
from sensation to knowledge is the ascent from activity to passivity or re-
sponsiveness to what is. The highest type of knowing—nous or intellectual 
intuition—is the most passive. It is the type of knowing in which we bring 
the least to our knowing, the one in which we least mark what we know. It is 
a simple beholding of what is.
In addition, the ascent from sensation to knowledge is the ascent to the 
ethical. This is crucial for this book’s main task, namely, comparison of Plato 
and Levinas. For both Plato and Levinas, to be ethical is to be vulnerable 
or open in a certain way. For Levinas, that vulnerability or openness is pre- 
or noncognitive, a directedness toward something gloriously beyond our at-
tempts to limit it and take it in. For Plato, as we are seeing in this section, that 
vulnerability is a simple beholding and being affected by what is, more spe-
cifically, by the highest (“brightest”) of what is, the idea of the good. When 
I intellectually intuit all time and all being all the way up to the brightest 
part of being, the idea of the good, I am fundamentally affected, according to 
Socrates. Specifically, I love that by which I have been affected, the good, and 
now orient all my life and activities in relation to it. This is the more complete 
working out of the claim made (and never refuted) in Plato’s Meno, namely, 
that virtue is knowledge or, to be more precise, a kind of knowledge: “wisdom 
(phronēsis) is virtue” (Meno 89a3). But wisdom is knowledge of what? the 
reader of the Meno asks, noting Socrates’s immediate qualification: “either 
entirely or a certain part” (89a4). Of the idea of the good, the Republic an-
swers. Ultimately, in the Republic, virtue is not harmony of the parts of the 
soul. That, instead, is civic virtue, a second-order virtue possessed by those 
who do not make the ascent to complete knowing. For those who do make 
the ascent, virtue simply is knowledge. That is, once I have seen all time and 
all being including the brightest part of being, the idea of the good, then I 
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simply will do what is good. The good I intuit affects me, changes my whole 
pattern of affectivity. It has the effect of turning me around, and I then follow 
it by being good and just. Let me substantiate these claims by a reading of 
the relevant texts.
As mentioned in chapter 2, Socrates’s argument that virtue is knowledge 
is that virtue is good; there is nothing good that is not knowledge or wis-
dom; therefore, virtue is knowledge or wisdom. Socrates says, “do we say this 
hypothesis remains for us, that virtue is good?” Meno responds, “Certainly” 
(87d2–3). Socrates continues, “If then there is anything good that is other 
and separate from knowledge, virtue might well not be a type of knowledge, 
but if there is nothing good that knowledge does not comprehend, would we 
be right to suspect that it is a type of knowledge?” Meno responds, “These 
things are so.” (87d4–8).
It is a counterintuitive but simple argument. It gets its strength from the 
arguments Socrates uses to show that other seeming external goods—health, 
strength, beauty, and wealth—are good only when they are guided by internal 
goods toward correct use, and that seeming internal goods, certain qualities 
of soul, are only good if they are knowledge or wisdom. Socrates says re-
garding external goods such as health, strength, beauty, and wealth, “Isn’t it 
the case that, whenever correct use guides them, they benefit us, and when it 
does not guide them, they harm us?” (88a3–4). For example, overvaluation of 
beauty can lead to deception of self and other (as in the case of beautiful Al-
cibiades who, as Socrates well knew, misled many and, as well, was misled by 
them). Unguided strength can lead to harm of self and others (as in the case of 
powerful Athens that, as Socrates in the dialogues often suggests, frequently 
uses its strength for improper ends destructive of other cities and of itself ).
External goods are guided well, Socrates then indicates, by goods of the 
soul. He lists them: “moderation, justice, courage, quick thought, memory, 
befitting greatness, and all such things” (88a6–b1). Such qualities of the soul, 
he goes on to indicate, only are good qualities of the soul if in fact they are 
knowledge, and so he mentions in that light “ ‘courage’ when it is not wisdom 
(phronēsis) but a kind of recklessness” (88b3–4). “Courage” that is not wis-
dom is not courage at all but a kind of recklessness, Socrates implies, thereby 
making his argument complete. Virtue is knowledge—or, better, wisdom—
because virtue is good and there is nothing good that is not knowledge; ex-
ternal goods are not good unless guided well; they are guided well only by 
good qualities of soul; and good qualities of soul are good only if they are 
knowledge.
Nonetheless, readers might think the question what is virtue remains un-
answered in the Meno since at a certain point in the dramatic and argu-
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mentative unfolding of the dialogue, Socrates questions his own argument’s 
conclusion. He asks, “Therefore, true opinion is not at all a worse guide to 
correct action than wisdom?” (97b9–10). After all, true opinion in fact is true. 
So maybe knowledge is not needed for virtue. The question is, dramatically, 
one of the most important moments in the dialogue. It is the moment that 
Socrates finally seems to have an impact on Meno, the moment when he 
finally seems to be able to get Meno—who does not say what he believes but 
what Gorgias, his teacher, says—actually to inquire and to wonder. “So that I 
wonder, Socrates,” Meno says, “these things being so, why knowledge is much 
more worthy of honor than correct opinion, and how they are different one 
from the other” (97c11–d3). We know, of course, that philosophy begins in 
wonder.
Meno’s soul hangs in the balance. If virtue in fact is knowledge, Meno’s 
own virtue is at stake because at this point he finally seems to want to make 
an effort to achieve knowledge. He finally seems to want to inquire. Socrates, 
at this point in the dialogue, has Meno just where he wants him, not thwart-
ing inquiry, but finally engaging in it, not spouting opinions he derives from 
others, but actually asking a question and, even more, a question about the 
very value of knowledge in comparison with that of mere true opinion.
Socrates responds to Meno’s uncharacteristic open inquisitiveness at this 
point in the dialogue by telling him that true opinions are like statues of Dae-
dalus, statues so lifelike that if you do not chain them down, they run away. 
True opinions, if you do not chain them down by reasoning about why they 
are true, run away from the soul.2 Virtue, we might then say, is not just good, 
but it is a relatively settled good, because knowledge, unlike true opinion, is 
relatively settled since one who has knowledge knows the reason for his or 
her views. Virtue is knowledge rather than mere true opinion because one 
who only has opinion can be easily swayed by others or by circumstances. 
Opinion is, in a sense, put in your soul, while knowledge is something you 
yourself must establish through reasoning—you must tie it down, but once 
you do, it tends to remain. Socrates’s innocent question, about the relative 
value of true opinion and knowledge, leads to the most important question, 
both for the argument of the dialogue and for the drama, namely, what is 
virtue? Socrates’s question pushes Meno to see that knowledge is what he 
needs if he is to acquire virtue, as his opening and persisting questions in the 
dialogue indicate he very much wants to do—not, presumably, to acquire vir-
tue in the sense of morality, but to acquire virtue understood as the strength 
of soul that any up-and-coming young Greek man would want to be known 
for and to have.
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Of course, it turns out that this crucial dramatic moment does not rep-
resent a lasting change in Meno—Meno who we know, historically, became 
quite a vicious human being after the dramatic date of the dialogue.3 Meno 
will not consistently inquire. He will not consistently follow an argument. 
Earlier in the dialogue, for example, Meno persists in asking Socrates to an-
swer his question how virtue is acquired even though Socrates has argued 
that we cannot answer that question until we know what virtue is: “Socrates, 
I would be most pleased to investigate and hear the answer to what I asked 
first, whether to go after it as teachable or by nature or as something that 
comes to human beings in some other way” (86c7–d2). He also, for another 
example, earlier in the dialogue asks Socrates to teach him that all learning 
is recollection—“Can you teach me that this is so?” he asks (81e5)—even 
though what he wants Socrates to teach him is that there is no teaching, only 
recollection. For a third example, right after that, Socrates says he will loosen 
his rule and let Meno rule him. The way he lets Meno rule is by bringing in 
a hypothesis that includes, as a part, virtue is teachable: “If, at least, virtue is a 
type of knowledge,” Socrates says, “then it is clear that it would be teachable?” 
Meno replies, “For how could it not be so?” forgetting Socrates’s previous 
claim that there is no teaching, only recollection (87c5–7). Meno just does 
not want to recollect. He just does not want to inquire.
We might initially be inclined to say that Socrates had an impact on Meno, 
though, and that he changes and becomes inquisitive since after the three ex-
amples, as we saw, Meno does ask questions, such as the one we looked at, 
namely, why is knowledge valued more highly than true opinion for virtue. 
The other question Meno asks in that dramatically most important section of 
the dialogue is “whether in fact there are any good men” (96d2–3). Socrates 
puts together everything he needs to answer Meno’s questions: good men 
are those who have virtue, and virtue, because it is knowledge, is acquired by 
reasoning about why opinions are true. Nonetheless, later in the dialogue, 
after the point of Meno’s induced inquisitiveness, openness, or vulnerability, 
when Socrates brings in arguments with premises they have already refuted 
and rejected, Meno nonetheless accepts them rather than asking about them. 
Socrates seems to bring them in intentionally, to see if Meno has progressed. 
For example, he says at one point, that they thought “it was wisdom if it 
could be taught” (98d12). Has Meno simply forgotten Socrates’s claim that 
there is no learning or teaching, only recollection? Again, Meno agrees to the 
claim that “since virtue is not teachable, it no longer seems to be knowledge” 
(99a7–8). Socrates seems to be giving Meno time and repeated opportunity 
to remember the story—unforgettable to us—and accompanying argument 
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that there is only recollection, no teaching and learning. It just appears im-
possible to get Meno consistently to recollect, consistently to inquire, or, to 
put it bluntly, consistently to think for himself rather than absorbing what he 
hears from authoritative others, whether they be Gorgias or Socrates.
For our purposes in this chapter, however, Meno’s seemingly unchange-
able character is not of the greatest importance, while the lack of refutation, 
in the dialogue, of Socrates’s argument that virtue is knowledge is more cen-
tral. Virtue is knowledge or wisdom, and not true opinion, because knowl-
edge or wisdom remains in the soul since when we have knowledge, we know 
why our opinions are true. It is only when he relaxes his rule somewhat that 
Socrates could seem to think otherwise, and he gives Meno ample oppor-
tunity to bring Socrates back to his claim that virtue is not teachable but, 
instead, is recollected.
Virtue is what kind of knowledge, though? Socrates’s vacillation in the 
Meno between the term for knowledge, epistēmē, and for wisdom, phronēsis, 
suggests Socrates is aware the question needs an answer.4 So does the fact 
that quick thought, eumathia, like courage, is on Socrates’s list of goods of the 
soul that are not really good unless they are in fact wisdom. Virtue is not just 
smartness or intelligence, if we may think of eumathia that way. It is wisdom 
or phronēsis, Socrates suggests. As to what wisdom or phronēsis is that makes 
it different than mere smartness or intelligence, there the Meno leaves us in 
the dark.
The issue is, however, taken up in the Republic. According to Socrates, the 
most complete education ends with turning around from consideration of 
what is coming into being and to know being and the brightest part of being, 
namely, the idea of the good. To achieve that education, one’s soul “must be 
turned around from what is coming into being with the whole soul until it is 
able to endure looking at being and the brightest part of being.” What is the 
brightest part of being? Socrates goes on: “And we say that this is the good, 
don’t we?” (Rep. 7.518c6–d1)
It is knowledge of this, all time and all being including the brightest part 
of being, that is virtue. He sometimes calls it not knowledge, epistēmē, but 
wisdom, phronēsis. “Therefore,” Socrates says, “the other so-called virtues of 
a soul are perhaps somewhat nearer to those of the body. For they are not in 
fact present beforehand and are produced later by habits and practices, while 
the virtue of exercising wisdom (tou phronēsai) is in fact something more di-
vine than anything, it seems; it never loses its power” (518d9–e4). The other 
so-called virtues he is talking about are virtues as understood in the parts-of-
the-soul account of virtue in book 4. It is easy for a reader of the Republic to 
think that Socrates’s final account of virtue in the dialogue is the one based 
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on the tripartite soul. There are, however, a number of indications in the dia-
logue that this is not the case.
First, when Socrates gives that account of the virtues, he states clearly 
that it, and the account of the soul it rests on, are provisional. Regarding his 
way of proceeding in thinking about the soul in book 4, Socrates says, “know 
well, Glaucon, that in my opinion, we will never get a precise grasp of it using 
procedures such as those we are now using in the argument. There is another 
longer and further road leading to it” (4.435c9–d). The longer, further road 
is one that leaves convention and heads toward being and its brightest part, 
the idea of the good. Virtues of the soul understood as tripartite are a type 
of persisting lawful opinion. Courage, for example, on that account, is “the 
preservation of lawful opinion produced through education about what is 
fearful and what is not” (4.429c7–8).
Another sign that the parts-of-the soul account of virtue is not Socrates’s 
final account is that the rational part of the soul is called “to logistikon” (the 
calculative) rather than something like wisdom. The three parts are to logis-
tikon (the calculative), thymos (spiritedness), and epithymia (desire) (4.439c9–
441c3). Calculation is only the first level of Socrates’s list of studies that 
ascend up to the best and most complete studies (7.521c1–526c10), so we 
can take an account of the soul that identifies reason with it to be at best 
provisional.
Another sign is that, in the story in book 10 of human beings’ afterlife 
choice of a future life, Socrates says that the one who in his life practiced 
virtue “by habit without philosophy” in the afterlife will choose “the greatest 
tyranny” (10.619c7–d1, b8). The point of a number of these passages is the 
same as the chaining-down-true-opinion passage in the Meno, namely, that 
the only true way to achieve virtue is through recollecting, inquiring, think-
ing for yourself, since only through doing so do you achieve the lasting true 
opinion that is found in wisdom. Only wisdom will remain. Virtue under-
stood as true opinion, to the contrary, will depart when external constraints 
are removed.
Finally, to complete this argument that virtue for Socrates is wisdom un-
derstood as the knowledge of all being including the brightest part of be-
ing, namely, the idea of the good, it is important to refute an obvious point 
against my claim, namely, that there is another three-part account of the 
soul after the discussion of virtue as knowledge of the good or wisdom in 
book 6, namely, the account, in book 9, of the soul as a complex beast com-
posed of three beasts—a human being, a lion, and a many-headed beast with 
tame and savage heads in a ring. The three beasts are designated as learning-
loving and wisdom-loving (philosophon); victory-loving and honor-loving; 
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and money-loving and gain-loving (9.581a3–c5). Right away, however, we 
note a difference in how the three are characterized in comparison with book 
4’s parts-of-the-soul account, namely, that the rational part or beast is as-
sociated with wisdom, not just calculation, and, even more, it is described as 
wisdom-loving, thus showing that, in it, passion and reason are combined or 
connected. In the tripartite soul of book 4, reason—understood as calcula-
tion—is separate from passion and at best can only control it. For example, 
“moderation is a certain type of order and control of certain pleasures and 
desires” according to Socrates (4.430e6–7). Reason is strategic and conven-
tional and it controls emotion, whereas in book 9 reason is of the good and is 
not separate from but an object of passion or love.
What accounts for this difference is the context of the second three-part 
account. It occurs after the discussion of the education that goes all the way 
out of becoming and convention into being including the good. And it occurs 
in a section that has had to do with decline—for example, the decline of the 
regimes. The suggestion, then, is that the three-animal soul is a soul that has 
glimpsed or seen some of being and the good, but has not advanced—or has 
not lastingly advanced—to the height of knowledge that is wisdom, that is, 
knowledge of the good. It is influenced by it enough as not to be an entirely 
habit- or convention-driven soul, but not enough to be fully suffused with it 
and simply follow it. If so, then, the argument is complete that virtue, accord-
ing to the Republic, is wisdom where wisdom is understood as knowledge of 
being all the way up to knowledge of the brightest part of being, namely, the 
good.
Once I have that knowledge, I simply am good. Nothing else has a strong 
enough appeal to me to cause me to act otherwise. Bodily pleasure and 
money pale in comparison to the good, so I am moderate. Illiberality and 
petty speech do not appeal by comparison to one who is reaching out for 
all of being. Life itself does not seem great in comparison with all time and 
all being so such a one is courageous. And a person with all these virtues— 
moderation, liberality, and courage—will be just. In other words, once I have 
seen all time and all being all the way up to the brightest part of being, the 
idea of the good, everything else pales in comparison so that I simply am 
motivated by the idea of the good (6.485c2–486b12).
For Socrates, then, the ascent from sensation to that particular type of 
knowledge called wisdom and understood as knowledge of all time and all 
being including the idea of the good is an ascent from activity to passivity 
or receptivity, that is, from marking things to seeing them without marking 
them. The ascent from sensation to wisdom is, in addition, the ascent to the 
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ethical. The good I intuit affects me, changes my whole pattern of affectivity. 
It has the effect of turning me around, and I then follow it and do what is 
good and just.
Moreover, the claim is not an isolated one in Plato’s dialogues. For exam-
ple, as we have seen regarding the Phaedrus, when I ascend to the idea of the 
beautiful—to the hyperouranian place beyond the heavens where it is seated 
on a beautiful throne—I fall on my back in awe and, upon my return to 
earth, want to love the beloved and serve him. For Plato, then, I maintain, the 
ultimate in passivity or being affected is knowledge. Hence, the high value 
he places on it. When I know the highest beings I am affected to engage in 
the highest or best activities in relation to myself and to others. To know 
the good is to be good and just. Even in the Meno, where the argument is 
truncated since it does not include an argument for what type of knowledge 
is virtue, virtue understood as knowledge is following, or even slavery, as we 
have seen. That is, virtue understood as knowledge is passive or responsive, 
not active.
Hence, the great difference between Plato and Levinas. For Levinas, to 
know is to affect, not to be affected, and thus it is not ethical. The ethical is 
what precedes knowing, it is that moment of being affected, of responding 
to the other. For him, knowledge is not responding but doing, not reaching 
but marking that which I would reach. Sensibility, on the other hand, is the 
moment in my relation to others in which I am affected. Plato is to Levinas 
as Athens to Jerusalem because Plato places affectivity in knowledge while 
Levinas places it in non- or precognitive sensibility.5
Another way to think about the two philosophers’ differences on knowl-
edge is by way of the concept of will. The concept of will does not play a role 
in Plato’s ethical views. This is a corollary of some of the interpretive claims 
in the previous chapters’ discussions of various dialogues. Virtue, for Plato, is 
a disposition to be affected in a certain way. Specifically, it is a disposition to 
be affected by the good or the beautiful, and the being affected takes place in 
knowledge (specifically, knowledge of the good).
Plato’s central ethical claim, aretē epistēmē estin (virtue is knowledge), itself 
indicates that will is not central for him—especially because, as we have seen, 
that knowledge is responsive rather than active. There just is no concept of 
will in Plato. Ethics, for him, centers on our response to what is and the best 
of what is, the idea of the good. Some might think that thymos (spiritedness) 
in the Republic, or the thymotic dark horse of the soul in the Phaedrus, is a 
candidate synonym for will, but it is not. Thymos is a passion. It is associ-
ated with anger and often accompanied by love of honor or shame (Phdr. 
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253d3–6). It forms a pair, together with epithymia (desire) or eros (love), of 
principal passions for Plato, one a connective passion, the other a separating 
one, as symbolized in the Phaedrus by the fact that one horse goes forward 
to jump on the beloved while the other pulls the chariot back in order to say 
no to such a union or in the Republic by the fact that desire and eros lead to 
a violation and surpassing of the ideal birth number that would keep the city 
orderly by limiting the number of citizens while spiritedness makes a clear 
distinction between friend and enemy and welcomes the former while keep-
ing the latter out. For Plato’s Socrates, then, there are two principal passions, 
and they are related to the connection/separ ation theme that runs through 
the Platonic corpus constituting its secondary metaphysical theme (after the 
first-order theme of ideas): How do forms connect to things? How are they 
separate from them? How are parts connected in a whole? How are they 
separate? Thymos is a separating passion—separating friend and enemy in the 
Republic—and eros a connecting one. Of course, in a fully developed ethical 
soul, the psychological tendency is neither a simple tendency away (separa-
tion) nor a simple tendency toward (connection), not a simple no or a simple 
yes, but a tendency toward what is good and away from what is bad: once we 
comprehend the good, we move toward it and away from its opposite.
Levinas, to the contrary, sees an element of will in knowledge. Speaking 
of intentionality, he says, “The recurrence of persecution in the oneself is thus 
irreducible to intentionality in which, even in its neutrality as a contempla-
tive movement, the will is affirmed” (OB 111/142). Levinasian affectivity is 
not intentionality, the statement indicates, because intentionality even in its 
most contemplative form or movement involves will: What do I contem-
plate? From where? How much of it? In relation to what? The responsive-
ness of contemplation is never separate from a voluntaristic component. Pure 
affectivity—here figured as persecution—is not contemplation, but some-
thing less active, more completely responsive, even a vulnerability. For Levi-
nas, contemplation involves will. For Plato’s Socrates, contemplative types of 
knowing are the highest kind—the kind that knows ideas—and are, thus, the 
most responsive as well. It is in this, really, that the most important difference 
between Plato and Levinas on knowledge resides—the difference between 
knowledge construed to be passive and knowledge construed to be active.
For Levinas, even the most contemplative intentionality is a form of auto-
affection—not a being affected by the other, but auto-affection:
In [intentionality] the fabric of the same, self-possession in a 
present, is never broken. When affected the ego is in the end 
affected only by itself, freely. Subjectivity taken as intentionality 
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is founded on auto-affection as an auto-revelation, source of an 
impersonal discourse (OB 111/142).
In intentionality, I affect myself. For intentionality does not imply, simply, 
that consciousness is consciousness of an object, but that consciousness is 
consciousness of an object by way of a meaning—and that meaning is de-
termined by me. In bringing meaning to an object, I am affected by myself. 
Levinas goes on:
The recurrence of the self in responsibility for others, a persecuting 
obsession, goes against intentionality, such that responsibility 
for others could never mean altruistic will, instinct of natural 
benevolence or love. It is in the passivity of obsession, or incarnated 
passivity, that an identity individuates itself as unique, without 
recourse to any system of references, in the impossibility of evading 
the assignation to the other without blame (OB 111–12/142).
It is in the ethical, specifically in responsibility, that I am most responsive, 
not in intentionality. Ethics does not center on knowledge, Levinas indicates, 
but it also does not center on will. Responsibility is not even an altruistic 
will. Responsibility is passivity—incarnated passivity, since it is in sensibility, 
not knowledge, that I am most passive, and sensitivity is bodily. So, if Plato 
is to Levinas as Athens to Jerusalem or Greek to Hebrew, it is due to a very 
specific construction of Jerusalem or of Hebrew. It is not the Jerusalem or 
Hebrew of the Cain and Abel story in which we hear that “Sin couches at the 
door” and “Its urge is toward you, Yet you can be its master” (Gen. 4:7). For 
Levinas, virtue is not knowledge, but it is not mastery or will either, the most 
common contrast term to knowledge in ethics. Instead, ethics for Levinas is 
vulnerability and responsiveness—specifically, non- or precognitive respon-
siveness to the other. Ethics for him is not mastery of the desire of sin but 
“Here I am,” which Levinas construes to imply a funda mental vulnerability 
indicated by the fact that, both in Hebrew (hineni) and in French (me voici), 
I is in the accusative. Ethics is not something I do but something I suffer. 
In ethics, for Levinas, I suffer the other.
This concludes our demonstration that the main concepts undergirding this 
book’s Plato/Levinas comparison continue to play a role in Levinas’s sec-
ond major work and that a central difference between Plato and Levinas on 
the human vulnerability that constitutes the ethical is Plato’s view that it is 
wisdom or knowledge of the good that constitutes the ethical and Levinas’s 
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view that no kind of knowledge constitutes the ethical since all knowledge 
marks what it knows and carries the mark of the one who does the knowing. 
Instead, for Levinas, as we shall see in the next and final chapter, the ethical 
is openness or vulnerability to something gloriously beyond ontology and 
knowledge, namely, the infinite.
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C H A P T E R  7
Glory and Shine
In this final chapter, we return to comparison of Levinas and Plato, begin-
ning with Levinas in order to complete our discussion of the contributions 
Otherwise Than Being makes to this book’s topics, and concluding with a re-
turn to Plato. For Levinas and Plato, there is an extraordinary quality to the 
ethical. For Plato, it is the shine of the beautiful and the good—with the 
good described, as we have seen, as what shines most and the beautiful as 
what shines forth most. The shine of the beautiful is part of the grace of our 
existence, but part of its peril, as well. Beauty can draw us to the best and 
highest things, and it is accessible to all, but it can also keep us from what 
is best if it keeps us from seeing our deficiencies and our need to remedy 
them. Similarly, glory, through its immanence, gives us a bit or a trace of 
the infinite but must be treated with care as well, since any time we think 
we have grasped an other whole we are overestimating ourselves and falling 
into epistemological idolatry by taking an imperfect account to be a perfect 
one. Beauty is different than the infinite, of course, because beauty falls in the 
realm of the ontological, on my account, while the infinite does not. Each, 
though, is conceived as the most accessible good and, as such, problematic 
because of our inevitable tendency to overidentify ourselves with goods in 
which we can share.
I will begin by discussing interpretive problems that come up about giv-
ing some emphasis to the glory of the infinite, given that Levinas does not 
give it central placement in his work. I will resolve the problems by showing 
affinities between Levinas’s work and Jewish liturgy, Talmud, and Midrash. 
In doing so, I am not arguing for the reduction of Levinas’s work to Jewish 
religious doctrine nor that his work is derived from Jewish religion or text. 
Instead, I am showing affinities that his work has with that religion, text, and 
liturgy—religion, text, and liturgy with which Levinas is increasingly familiar 
as the years pass. There is, I will argue, an affinity between Levinas’s sidelining 
of glory and the de-emphasis of immanence in Jewish thought and practice. 
To show that will require turning our attention to that thought and practice 
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and some of its most glorious components. The beautiful in Plato, however, 
will not be downplayed as a result since its remarkable shine will be discussed 
in detail in this chapter as well.
1.
“Holy, holy, holy! The lord of Hosts! His glory fills all the earth!” (Isa. 6:3).1 
This passage from the Prophets—found also in the common Jewish liturgy 
recited on the Sabbath and festivals—indicates the contrast commonly drawn 
between holiness (kedushah) and glory (kavod). What is holy is separate while 
glory is present on earth. In origin, kavod (glory) means weight and comes 
from the intransitive verb kaved, to have weight or be heavy. During the 
service, those praying perform the distinction between holiness and glory by 
going up on their toes three times, once for each repetition of the word holy 
(kadosh), and coming back down in time to affirm, in the last word of the 
prayer, God’s glory: Kadosh, kadosh, kadosh adonai tzevaot, melo chol haaretz 
kevodo.
For a Jew, though, glory, as the worldly presence of God, is both important 
and problematic: important because God is present in some way and we wish 
to be in or have God’s presence; problematic because of the risk of idolatry. It 
is too stark to say that for a Jew, God is only separate. After all, according to 
the Psalms, the heavens declare God’s glory: “The heavens declare the glory 
of God [kevod-el], the sky proclaims His handiwork” (Ps. 19:2–3). Created 
things, in other words, speak about or testify to God’s glory, and, in that way, 
God is present. But the problematic character of the presence is indicated in 
the fact that the speech is of an unusual sort, as the next lines indicate: “Day 
to day makes utterance, night to night speaks out. There is no utterance, there 
are no words, their sound is not heard” (19:4).2 Translators are not sure what 
to make of this passage. The heavens declare and proclaim, day utters and 
night speaks, but their sound is not heard? The point seems to be that there 
is utterance or speech that in some sense is not utterance, is not words, and 
is not heard. One translator, to bring out the contradictory character of the 
lines, turns it the other way, to indicate that there is no speech or words but 
there still is voice: “Without speech and without words, nevertheless their 
voice is heard.”3 Robert Alter translates the line this way, “There is no ut-
terance and there are no words, their voice is never heard” and comments, 
“The heavens speak, but it is a wordless language.”4 Whichever we choose, 
the point is that there is a declaration of glory by the heavens, the sky, by 
each day and each night, and most especially here (as the verse will go on) 
by the sun, in a type of speech that, in some way, is not speech. God’s glory 
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can be expressed, but the expression goes only so far. It is not quite articulate. 
Perhaps, then, it is not an accident that a following verse, also part of the 
Sabbath liturgy, connects wisdom with simplicity: “The teaching of the Lord 
is perfect, renewing life; the decrees of the Lord are enduring, making the 
simple wise” (19:8). What wisdom do we get from the Lord? Wisdom that 
can be received by the simple.
In a similar vein, liturgical practice concerning the Shema—the central 
prayer in Jewish liturgy—reflects the relative positions of the holy and glory 
and indicates concern with problematic ways of articulating God’s glory or 
presence. In reciting the Shema, the first line, “Hear Israel, the Lord is our 
god, the Lord alone” (Deut. 6:4), is immediately followed by “Blessed is the 
name of his glorious kingdom forever and ever” (patterned after Ps. 72:19). 
The first of the two lines is read out, loud and emphatically, while the second 
is read quietly, under the breath, or, in some congregations, silently. God is 
present—on earth, in the heavens, sun and sky and all things over which God 
has influence, kingship or reign—but, as we say so, we must be careful of say-
ing so straight out or articulately. Every day, then, a Jew speaks, but does not 
speak, God’s glory, that is, God’s presence in the world. Every day, he or she is 
made performatively aware of the importance and danger of affirming God’s 
presence on earth or, to put it differently, of articulating God’s glory.
Of course, there are other passages in the prayer service, including many 
psalms in praise of God’s glory, that do not include these warnings. But the 
two gestures, in prayers that are liturgically central and frequent, indicate a 
teaching, namely, that there is something dangerous about asserting God’s 
presence or articulating God’s glory, namely, the risk of idolatry, that is, the 
risk of taking something, whether the sun in the heavens or the rock on the 
ground that is made into an altar, to be the special location of the holy, the 
one and only place in which God abides, or, in short, to take something spe-
cific to be God.
Because the issue of our relationship to the glory of God cannot be set-
tled—because we can never finally opt to reject the idea of God’s presence 
nor to claim full awareness or articulation of the presence—articulate speech 
about God is problematic. In a passage that immediately follows one quoted 
by Levinas to which we shall soon turn, God speaks to a prophet, one who 
says to God, “Here I am; send me” (Isa. 6:8), and says, “Go, say to that people: 
‘Hear, indeed, but do not understand. See, indeed, but do not grasp.’ Dull 
that people’s mind, stop its ears, and seal its eyes—lest, seeing with its eyes 
and hearing with its ears, it also grasp with its mind, and repent and save 
itself ” (Isa. 6:9–10). Not surprisingly, translators and commentators once 
again are puzzled, since God is telling the prophet to keep the people from 
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understand ing God and repenting. What if the point, though, is that the re-
pentance God wants is not the one that comes from articulate mental grasp-
ing. What is important is beyond or before that. Or, put differently, what is 
important is something simpler than that. So, in another passage found in 
the liturgy, we read:
The earth is the Lord’s and all that it holds,
 the world and its inhabitants.
For he founded it upon the ocean,
 set it on the nether-streams.
Who may ascend the mountain of the Lord?
 Who may stand in His holy place?—
He who has clean hands and a pure heart,
 who has not taken a false oath by My life or sworn deceitfully.
He shall carry away a blessing from the Lord,
 a just reward from God, his deliverer.
Such is the circle of those who turn to Him,
 Jacob, who seek Your face (Ps. 24:1–6).5
Who can experience God’s presence? Not the wise or clever, but one who is 
clean of hands and pure of heart. Not articulate mental grasping, but a kind 
of moral purity or simplicity, are what God requires. Similarly, in a well-
known passage in Micah, in response to the question, “With what shall I ap-
proach the Lord, do homage to God on high?” (Mic. 6:6), God responds, “He 
has told you, O man, what is good, and what the Lord requires of you: Only 
to do justice, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with your God” (6:8).6 
What is required of you is not complicated, and does not require complicated 
specific acts or rituals difficult to understand. No, you already understand. 
You already know. Now, do it. Be just, merciful, and humble.
The passages cited suggest, on the interpretation I have chosen here to 
take, that God’s presence is intellectually elusive and that, as a result, what 
is needed in relation to him is not complex intellectual connectedness, but 
something else, specifically, a kind of purity or simplicity.
But could this interpretation be way off? Is not God present in the He-
brew Bible? Isn’t he manifest at Sinai, and then in the tabernacle (mishkan)? 
In fact, it is not clear that he is. At Sinai, when Moses went up the second 
time to get the tablets, he asked to see God’s presence, and God denied him 
that full presence. God tells Moses instead that he will get only a trace of 
God’s presence (his back), not the full presence, not God’s face. Moses said 
to God:
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“Oh, let me behold Your Glory!” And He answered, “I will make 
all My goodness pass before you, and I will proclaim before you 
the name lord, and the grace that I grant and the compassion that 
I show. But,” He said, “you cannot see My face, for man may not 
see Me and live.” And the lord said, “see, there is a place near Me. 
Station yourself on the rock and, as My Glory passes by, I will put 
you in a cleft of the rock and shield you with My hand until I have 
passed by. Then I will take My hand away and you will see My back; 
but My face must not be seen” (Ex. 33:18–23).
God does what he promises. Instead of giving Moses God’s full presence, 
God proclaims his goodness. Instead of seeing God’s presence, Moses hears 
God’s own self-description, the statement of God’s good characteristics, 
sometimes referred to by Jewish exegetes as the thirteen attributes of God, a 
list of attributes regularly recited on Yom Kippur and recited by some in their 
daily prayers:
The lord! the lord! a God compassionate and gracious, slow to 
anger, abounding in kindness and faithfulness, extending kindness 
to the thousandth generation, forgiving iniquity, transgression, and 
sin; yet He does not remit all punishment but visits the iniquity of 
the fathers upon the children and children’s children upon the third 
and fourth generations (Ex. 34:5–7).
Most of the attributes God mentions are in the general area of compas-
sion (grace, kindness, faithfulness, and forgiveness) and not of justice. That is 
notable for our purposes because the passage indicates that when we relate 
to that God whom we are unable to see, that is, whose presence or glory we 
are unable fully to have and only to glimpse, what we experience instead, 
primarily, are good characteristics God has that are themselves not forms of 
articulate knowledge, such as compassion, kindness, and forgiveness. One 
who is compassionate, kind, or forgiving overlooks what he or she knows 
about the other person. I do not fully experience God’s presence, then, and 
when God exercises his most predominant characteristics, God does not fully 
experience mine, either. In compassion and forgiveness, God looks past what, 
presumably, he knows.
As it goes on, the story of the second reception of the tablets provides 
more evidence for the problematic quality of God’s presence. When Moses 
comes down to the people after receiving them, his skin is shining, and they 
cannot look at him. He veils and unveils his face so that he can speak first 
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with God, unveiled, and then, veiled, with the people—veiled so they can 
look at him. Even the residual presence of the Lord is too much for them:
So Moses came down from Mount Sinai. And as Moses came 
down from the mountain bearing the two tablets of the Pact, 
Moses was not aware that the skin of his face was radiant, since 
he had spoken with Him. Aaron and all the Israelites saw that the 
skin of Moses’ face was radiant; and they shrank from coming near 
him. But Moses called to them, and Aaron and all the chieftains 
in the assembly returned to him, and Moses spoke to them. 
Afterwards all the Israelites came near, and he instructed them 
concerning all that the lord had imparted to him on Mount Sinai. 
And when Moses had finished speaking with them, he put a veil 
over his face.
 Whenever Moses went in before the lord to speak with Him, 
he would leave the veil off until he came out; and when he came 
out and told the Israelites what he had been commanded, the 
Israelites would see how radiant the skin of Moses’ face was. Moses 
would then put the veil back over his face until he went in to speak 
with Him (Ex. 34:29–35).
Moses’s skin was shining with God’s presence. It radiated out to the people. 
But it was too much for them fully to take in or see.
Surely, though, God is present in the tabernacle, the mishkan, that the 
people take with them as they travel through the wilderness. The very word 
mishkan is related to the word that later is commonly used for God’s imma-
nent presence, shechinah. Careful attention to the passages regarding God’s 
relationship to the tabernacle suggests once again a complication of the 
simple idea of immanent presence. When God tells the people to make the 
tabernacle, he says, “And let them make me a sanctuary (mikdash) that I may 
dwell among them” (Ex. 25:8). He does not say, “Let them build me a sanctu-
ary that I may dwell in it.” Instead, if they build God a sanctuary, then he will 
dwell among them, that is, be present to them—and be present to them no 
matter where they are. Two things are going on in this passage about God’s 
presence. First, God will be present among them now wherever they go. God 
is not just the God who, in the complex way we just discussed, was present 
at Sinai, but is the God who will be present among them wherever they go. 
There is no one place of God’s presence, but God can be present wherever 
they go. Second, this presence does not result from the fact that God is pres-
ent in some one thing, the sanctuary. Instead, he tells the people to make the 
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sanctuary so that he will be present among them. God isn’t in the sanctuary. 
Instead, the sanctuary makes it possible for the people to access God’s pres-
ence. So it is that God describes in detail what that sanctuary or tabernacle 
should be like, and asks the people to bring him gifts for it: “Tell the Israelite 
people to bring Me gifts; you shall accept gifts from every person whose 
heart so moves him” (Ex. 25:2). The gifts are gold, silver, copper, linen, wood, 
oil, and so forth. All these things—the mobile tabernacle, the beautiful ma-
terials, the construal of those materials as being gifts to God (who, after all, 
does not need anything)—indicate not a place in which God is particularly 
present, but a structure that enables people to be aware of God’s presence 
where that awareness itself is the tabernacle, the mishkan, the place in which 
God resides. For what God instructs is for them to build a sanctuary so that 
he may dwell among them. God, then, can be present to us or in us whenever 
we direct our hearts to him. He can be present in a variety of material things 
if only we turn our hearts to him through them.
But perhaps I go too far. Are not some things more suitable to God than 
others—more suitable to God’s presence? The story of Jacob and Beth El 
suggests to the contrary that the range of suitable things is broad. While on 
his way from Beer-sheba to Haran, Jacob stops in Luz to spend the night: 
“He came upon a certain place and stopped there for the night, for the sun 
had set. Taking one of the stones of that place, he put it under his head and lay 
down in that place” (Gen. 28:11). While there, he has his well-known dream 
of angels going up and down a ladder. In the dream, God promises Jacob the 
land and tells him that God is and will be with him. After that, he becomes 
aware of God’s presence and changes the name of the place: “Jacob awoke 
from his sleep and said, ‘Surely the Lord is present in this place, and I did 
not know it!’ Shaken, he said, ‘How awesome is this place! This is none other 
than the abode of God, and that is the gateway to heaven’ ” (Gen. 28:16–17). 
After that, Jacob turns the stone his head had rested on into an altar to God 
and renames the place “House of God” (Bethel): “Early in the morning, Jacob 
took the stone that he had put under his head, set it up as a pillar and poured 
oil on the top of it. He named that site Bethel; but previously the name of the 
city had been Luz” (Gen. 28:18–19). Even a stone can become an altar, we 
may conclude, if the stone facilitates our becoming aware of God’s presence. 
It is just a stone. There is nothing special about it. God was there before, but 
Jacob did not know it. The previous example, of the sanctuary, indicated that 
we should not think that God is present in the beautiful materials but that 
they facilitate our being aware of God, and so the example of the stone indi-
cates that even a simple stone can facilitate our awareness of God’s presence. 
For on that stone, Jacob becomes aware of God. There is no one place of the 
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holy, in other words. Places become holy, become filled with God’s presence, 
when they are utilized by us to have the presence of God within.
The line of interpretation I am taking is only one possible line, and in Jew-
ish traditions there are others. It is, however, a central line of interpretation 
starting at least in the period of the early rabbis when the view of the relation 
to the temple changes. When that view changes, a certain way of interpreting 
biblical passages comes to the fore that reflects the change. With the rabbis, 
in what is sometimes called the “rabbinic revolution,” it is no longer the case 
that the temple in Jerusalem is considered to be the special locus of the holy, 
nor that hereditary priests have a special relation to the holy, nor that sacrifice 
is required to have a good relation with the holy. Instead, when two come to-
gether to study Torah, the shechinah (the immanent presence of God) is with 
them, and such study or deeds of loving kindness (gemilut chasadim) take the 
place of sacrifice. Similarly, rabbis, who simply are teachers, take the place of 
a hereditary priesthood.
For example, in the Pirkei Avot, a tractate of the Talmud, we learn that the 
shechinah is with those who discuss Torah, with those who study Torah, and 
with those who eat together if they discuss Torah:
Rabbi Chanina ben Teradyon said, If two sit together and exchange 
no words of Torah, then they are like an assembly of scoffers, for it 
is written, “Nor did he sit in the assembly of the scoffers.” [Ps. 1:1] 
However, [when] two sit together and do exchange words of Torah, 
then the divine presence [shechinah] dwells with them, even as it 
is written, “Then those who feared Adonai [God] spoke the one to 
the other, and Adonai listened and heard and for those who feared 
Adonai and who thought of God, a book of remembrance was 
inscribed.” [Mal. 3.16] This verse applies to two [people]. How may 
I learn from Scripture that were one person to sit and study Torah, 
the Holy One would grant a proper reward? From the verse that 
states, “Though one sit alone and be still, yet will he receive [the 
reward]” [Lam. 3:28] (PA 3:2).7
Rabbi Shimon would say, If three have eaten at one table and have 
not spoken words of Torah, it is as if they had eaten sacrifices 
offered to the dead. [Compare Ps. 106:28.] Even Scripture says, 
“All their tables are filled with filth and vomit without the divine 
presence.” [Isa. 28:8] However, three who have eaten at one table 
and have spoken words of Torah, Scripture states, “He said to me, 
this table is in the presence of God” (PA 3:4).8
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Similarly, in the Avot de Rabbi Natan, we learn that mercy or deeds of lov-
ing kindness replace sacrifice and mitigate the need for the temple:
Once as Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai was coming forth from 
Jerusalem, Rabbi Joshua followed after him and beheld the Temple 
in ruins. “Woe unto us,” Rabbi Joshua cried, “that this, the place 
where the iniquities of Israel were atoned for, is laid waste!” “My 
son,” Rabban Johanan said to him, “be not grieved. We have 
another atonement as effective as this. And what is it? It is acts of 
loving-kindness, as it is said, ‘For I desire mercy and not sacrifice’ ” 
[Hos. 6:6] (ARN 6).
Similarly, that there is no one special place of the holy, such as the temple, 
is made clear in numerous passages. For example:
you find wherever Israel was exiled, the shechinah, as it were, went 
into exile with them. When they went into exile to Egypt, the 
shechinah went into exile with them. When they were exiled to 
Babylon, the shechinah went into exile with them. When they were 
exiled to Elam, the shechinah went into exile with them. When they 
were exiled to Edom, the shechinah went into exile with them. And 
when they return in the future, the shechinah, as it were, will return 
with them (Mech., 1.14).9
But when will the presence be with them? As we have seen, it will be with 
them when they turn their hearts to God, when they study or talk about 
Torah, and when they are merciful or do deeds of loving kindness. We al-
ways have the possibility of God’s presence no matter where we are, every 
one of us:
When the Holy One, blessed be He, spoke to Moses concerning 
the tabernacle, he said: “Lord of the Universe! Will the Israelites be 
able to construct it?” He replied: “Even a single Israelite will be able 
to make it” (Ex. R. 33:8).
A mishkan is a place where God dwells. No matter what we have or where 
we are, we can build a mishkan for we ourselves can be a mishkan, and any-
thing else that is a mishkan is one only because we use it to turn ourselves 
toward God. God does not dwell in the sanctuary. Instead, when we build a 
sanctuary to God, God dwells among us:
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It says (25.8), “Let them make Me a sanctuary that I may dwell 
among (or within) them”—in them, the people, not in it, the 
sanctuary. Each person is to build God a Tabernacle in his/her own 
heart for God to dwell in.10
All these passages—and others as well—suggest that, according to one 
Jewish interpretive tradition, the holy is separate or, speaking differently, 
present but mobile and elusive. The holy is present, as glory or immanent 
presence, but only as a mobile presence that cannot be fixed, cannot fully 
be grasped, and, to the extent that it can be taken in at all, is glimpsed by us 
when we relate in a simple or pure way to the plurality of what is.
2.
Two questions come to mind about the chapter subsection entitled “The 
Glory of the Infinite” (OB 140–52/179–94). First, why is a section so im-
portant given such an insignificant place in the work? Not only is it not in 
the center, as one might think it rightly ought to be, but it is close to the end 
of the work, when much of the work of the book is concluded, as if it were 
almost an afterthought. It is such an exciting and ecstatic way of approaching 
the other, but given its placement, one could almost miss it. Second, how can 
Levinas make the glory of the infinite so important? If the holy is transcen-
dence and glory is immanence, does not the glory of the infinite suggest the 
very sacred that Levinas rejects on behalf of the holy?
Perhaps, though, Levinas’s approach to glory and the holy is not so unique, 
and instead has strong affinities with the particular Jewish approach to glory 
and the holy just described. Perhaps, in other words, Levinas’s strong anti-
idolatry teaching reflects a strong Jewish tradition in a period in which Levi-
nas was becoming more and more familiar with, and involved in, Jewish 
interpretive and scholarly traditions himself. The myriad references to Isaiah 
in Otherwise Than Being testify to this familiarity.11 If so, the placement of 
“The Glory of the Infinite” within Otherwise Than Being would not be radical 
or unique at all, but almost orthodox. Just as we go up to the heights for the 
holy and then down to earth for glory, just as we speak out the Shema but 
bless God’s glory under our breath, so we come down from the central sec-
tions of Otherwise Than Being to the chapter subsection that seems almost an 
afterthought in which we encounter the glory of infinite.
This pattern of placement, though, is not unique in Levinas’s writings. In 
“Loving the Torah More Than God” (1955), a piece not about our relation to 
the other in general, as in Otherwise Than Being, but more specifically about 
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our relation to God, Levinas follows a similar pattern, with detailed discus-
sion of adult religion as religion in the face of the absence of God, followed 
by a brief mention of the idea that, once one has gone through a process of 
taking in and accepting God’s absence, we can then, finally, ask for a little bit 
of God’s presence.
The essay is a response to Zvi Kolitz’s “Yosl Rakover Talks to God,” a 
fictional account of a last testament written, and put in a bottle for poster-
ity, by a man named Yosl Rakover whose family members had died and who 
was himself about to die in the final days of the Warsaw ghetto uprising. His 
wife was dead. Two of his children died with her in the forest, two others 
searching for food outside the ghetto walls (the Nazis drilled holes in one’s 
head, while the other lost her mind), another from tuberculosis on the day of 
his bar mitzvah, and one in the Rosh Hashanah roundup of children. Yosl, 
despite all the injustice visited on him and his family, retains his belief rather 
than becoming an atheist—his belief no longer in a God who gives him “gifts 
without end,” but “in a God who has hidden his face from the world and de-
livered mankind over to its own savage urges and instincts” (“Yosl Rakover,” 
9). Even in his own case, he expects no miracle and does not “beg of him, my 
Lord, that he should take pity on me” (10–11). “I have followed Him,” Yosl 
says, “even when he pushed me away. I have obeyed His commandments, 
even when he scourged me for it” (23).
Yosl, then, retains his belief in a God who is not manifest, though his 
nonmanifestation is not due to sins on our part (“For greater and better 
men than I are convinced that it is no longer a question of punishment for 
sins and transgressions,” 9). Moreover, his belief is in a God who, though he 
does not make himself manifest by making justice reign in the world, is con-
nected to us through his words in the Torah, words of law and command-
ment. Defiantly, Yosl says he loves the Torah more than God: “I love Him. 
But I love His Torah more. Even if I were disappointed in Him, I would 
still cherish His Torah. God commands religion, but His Torah commands 
a way of life—and the more we die for this way of life, the more immortal 
it is!” (18)
For Levinas, Yosl’s religion is a religion for adults, with a God who is “not 
some kindergarten deity who distributed prizes, applied penalties, or forgave 
faults and in His goodness treated men as eternal children” (LT 81/190). 
Levinas interprets Yosl’s obedience to commandment despite the nonmani-
festation of God in terms of his own notion of fundamental human responsi-
bility: “Because if Yosl exists in his utter solitude, it is so that he can feel all of 
God’s responsibilities resting on his shoulders” (81/190). Suffering, Levinas 
says, “reveals a God who renounces any manifestation of Himself that would 
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give succor, and calls on man in his maturity to recognize his full responsibil-
ity” (82–83/191). He understands Yosl’s relation to God through Torah, not 
through another manifestation, as a relation between two minds: “a relation 
of minds mediated by instruction, through the Torah” (84/192). “It is,” he 
goes on, “precisely the Word itself, not incarnate, that assures us of the living 
God among us” (84/192). It is this relationship through speech, Levinas’s fa-
miliar idea of the importance of speaking to, that protects us from the “mad-
ness that comes from direct contact with the Sacred without the mediating 
power of reason” (84/192), reason that hears law: “God manifests Himself not 
by incarnation but in the Law” (85/192).
Finally, Levinas points out that Yosl, once he has accepted God’s non-
manifestation except through Torah and law, reproaches God to manifest 
himself a little, reproaches the veiled God to unveil himself and show his 
face. Levinas asserts, “Only he who has recognized the veiled face of God can 
demand that it be unveiled” (86/193). Yosl, he points out, says to God, “You 
should not pull the rope too tight, because it might, heaven forbid, yet snap” 
(19/193). “You have made our life such an unending and unbearable struggle 
that the weaklings among us were compelled to try to elude it” (19–20). In 
other words, once we have accepted that God is not manifest, and avoided the 
problem of thinking we can have the full presence of God on earth, then we 
can ask for some of God’s presence. Once we have been on our toes enough, 
we can come back down to earth; once we have witnessed God’s separateness, 
then and only then can we affirm God’s glory.
The placement of “The Glory of the Infinite,” then, is not surprising. It 
is echoed by Levinas’s treatment of the manifestation of God in “Loving 
the Torah More Than God”—which itself interprets the treatment of it in 
“Yosl Rakover Talks to God”—and it echoes the strain of Jewish tradition 
discussed in the previous section of this chapter. Presence may be asked for 
and affirmed only if and when God’s separation has been accepted and the 
connection to him has been found through just and responsible dealings with 
others. It is important to note that in the passage from Isaiah 58—the Yom 
Kippur haftarah portion discussed in the preceding chapter—God says that 
when you are just and merciful to others, then he will say, “Here I am.” It is 
important to consider the passage again with that theme in mind:
Is not this the fast that I have chosen:
to unlock the shackles of injustice,
to loosen the ropes of the yoke,
to let the oppressed go free,
and to tear every yoke apart?
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Surely it is to share your bread with the hungry,
and to bring the homeless poor into your house;
when you see the naked, to cover them,
never withdrawing yourself from your own kin.
Then shall your light break forth like the dawn,
and your healing shall quickly blossom;
your Righteous One will walk before you,
the glory of the Lord will be your rear guard
Then when you call,
the Lord will answer;
when you cry, God will say, Here I am.
In other words, when we are just and merciful, then and only then, can we 
have some of God’s glory, some of God’s presence. This passage is, of course, 
extraordinary in a Levinasian context since, in it, it is God who says, “Here I 
am.” Levinas is orthodox, then, not radical, in the way that he postpones and 
downplays, and then allows for, some glory.
3.
What, then, is glory for Levinas? It is, some would say, quoting Levinas, “im-
manent transcendence.” But it is important to keep in mind that for Levinas, 
the transcendence of the other is an absolute transcendence, a transcendence 
that cannot be converted into immanence. “The order that orders me to the 
other,” Levinas says at the beginning of the section on the glory of the infi-
nite, “does not show itself to me, save through the trace of its reclusion, as a 
face of a neighbor” (OB 140/179). Moreover:
Before this anarchy, this beginninglessness, the assembling of being 
fails. Its essence is undone in signification, in saying beyond being 
and time, in the diachrony of transcendence. This transcendence is 
not convertible into immanence (OB 140/179).
If the biblical passages I have cited are any guide, however, it is when we 
are just or responsible that God is in some way present: it is when you give 
your bread to the hungry and take the poor into your home that God says, 
“Here I am.” Moreover, as we have seen in scattered references throughout 
this book, Levinas does use terms like surplus (TI 27/xv, 97/70), marvel (TI 
27/xv, 181/156, 292/269), and teaching (TI 171/146, 197/191), all of which 
suggest something we get, a presence for or in us.
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How does this work? First of all, for Levinas, glory results from respon-
sibility understood as a kind of passivity, specifically, a passivity beyond all 
passivity in a noncognitive responsiveness to the other. When we allow our-
selves to be affected by the other, there is glory. When we are noncognitively 
vulnerable to the other, there is glory. One term for responsibility conceived 
in this way is proximity, specifically, proximity conceived as debit, not credit. 
I am near the other by a kind of breakup or rupture of everything that is, 
specifically, me. In an earlier reference to glory, Levinas says,
The more I answer the more I am responsible; the more I approach 
the neighbor with which I am encharged the further away I am. 
This debit which increases is infinity as an infinition of the infinite, 
as glory (OB 93/119).
Glory, then, is a process—a process Levinas calls infinition. I tend to ap-
proach the other as a theme. I want to synchronize myself with the other, but 
I cannot. The approach to the other, Levinas says, “is a non-synchronizable 
diachrony, which representation and thematization dissimulate by trans-
forming the trace into a sign of a departure, and then reducing the ambiguity 
of the face either to a play of physiognomy or to the indicating of a signified” 
(OB 93/119). The process of relating to the other is, then, as I said in chapter 
5, a dizzying emptying-out process. I cannot help but represent, thematize, 
and signify the other, but the other eludes me, eludes every representation I 
make, every theme I propose, every signification for which I seek a fulfill-
ment. My aiming at the other through a theme and then bracketing that 
theme over and over again is, in fact, the infinition of the infinite, or glory. 
The other “obsesses the subject without staying in correlation with him, with-
out equaling me in a consciousness, ordering me before appearing, in the 
glorious increase of obligation” (OB 94/119). I direct myself again and again 
toward the other who, again and again, escapes the theme or sign by which 
I attempt to reach him or her. This process of direction and retraction is the 
infinition of the infinite or glory. “The infinite,” Levinas says in the passage 
where he first refers to glory, “is non-thematizable” and “gloriously exceeds 
every capacity” (OB 12/14). This is the type of presence we have of the other, 
in a trace that cannot be made into “the appearing of a phenomenon” (OB 
12/15). We cannot “bring it into immanence and essence” (OB 12/15). When 
we approach the other, there is a breakup of essence, a “breaking point where 
essence is exceeded by the infinite” (OB 12/15). The breakup, however, is also 
a “binding place” (OB 12/15). That is to say, there is a connection. There is 
glory. The binding or relation is called, by Levinas, illeity, coining a term from 
glory and shine 173
the French il (he) to indicate a way of relating to the other without thematiz-
ing the other. Illeity indicates “a way of concerning me without entering into 
conjunction with me” (OB 12/15).
Why, though, must my relation to the other without theme be preceded by 
relating to him or her by way of a theme? So far, the answer is not obvious. It 
becomes obvious when we take into consideration the next important point 
for Levinas about glory, namely, that it is found most of all in direct address, 
or what Levinas, in Otherwise Than Being, calls the saying (le dire). My rela-
tion to the other as other takes place most of all in the saying. But the saying 
always takes place in the said (le disant), that is to say, direct address always 
has some cognitive content. Hence the need for retraction, or what Levinas 
calls in an earlier section discussed in the preceding chapter, for reduction.
There are some forms of speech, however, that come close to having no 
content. These indicate to us what breakup of essence is like. Levinas is fasci-
nated by them. One, of course, is “Here I am.” What cognitive content does 
such a statement have, given that it is always true that I am here? What is the 
point of uttering it then? When I say, in response to direct address, “Here I 
am,” I am making myself available or, to be more precise, I am indicating that 
I am available or, to be even more precise, indicating that I am making myself 
available. “Not the communication of a said,” Levinas says, “which would im-
mediately cover over and extinguish or absorb the saying, but saying holding 
open its openness, without excuses, evasions or alibis, delivering itself without 
saying anything itself ” (OB 143/182). “Here I am” is as close as we come to 
a pure saying because it indicates no other content than the speaker’s own 
making him- or herself available: “Saying saying saying itself [Dire disant le 
dire même],” Levinas calls it. “Here I am” is the exposure of exposure, a sign of 
the giving of signs, rather than being the exposure of some content or a sign 
of a signified. On the one hand, then, it is responsibility (“ ‘Here I am’ means 
‘send me,’ ” Levinas says in a gloss on Isa. 6:8)12 while, on the other hand, 
it is sincerity: “Sincerity would then be saying without the said, apparently 
a ‘speaking so as to say nothing,’ a sign I make to another of this giving of 
signs, ‘as simple as hello’ (bonjour)” (OB 143/183), Levinas says, referring to 
another form of speech that comes close to having no content. Sincerity is, 
for Levinas, a directness in relation to another, a facing of an other without 
the armor of concepts or themes. Sometimes he calls it droiture, in French, or 
temimut, in Hebrew. What am I saying when I say “bonjour”? Am I really say-
ing that the day ( jour) is good (bon) or wishing you to have a good day? Not 
exactly. Instead, I am making myself available to you—or, even more, giving 
an indication that I am making myself available to you. “Hello” is, then, both 
sincerity and responsibility.
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Sincerity, then, “refer[s] to the glory of infinity” where glory is conjunc- 
tion without appearance (OB 144/183). And, to come to our last important 
point about glory, “Glory is but the other face of the passivity of the subject” 
(OB 144/184). The dizzying process through which I make myself available 
is the glory of the infinite. In this process, I have a connection to the other 
without the other becoming a phenomenon, without the other becoming 
something with which I can synchronize, without the other becoming some-
thing that I can recollect. This provides the best explanation of the term I 
mentioned at the beginning of this section, “immanent transcendence.” The 
term, rightly understood, does not indicate a transcendence that can be made 
immanent. Instead, for Levinas, transcendence is absolute and cannot be con-
verted into immanence. Instead, it indicates that for Levinas the far and near 
collapse into one. The near, that is, glory, is simply our awareness—in proxim-
ity, responsibility, sincerity, saying—of the far or transcendent.13 Just as the 
mishkan is holy because, through it, we make ourselves aware of God, so glory 
is the dizzying emptying-out process by which we are made aware of the 
infinity of the other.
Levinas, then, utilizes two key relational terms for fundamental metaphysics, 
the holy to designate transcendence and glory to represent immanence—that 
fleeting kind of immanence the other, whether God or another human being, 
has for us when we relate to him or her as absolutely other. Glory as im-
manence is accessible but also problematic. It is accessible because it is that 
little bit of presence of the wholly other that we in fact do, in some sense, 
get, and it is problematic due to the problem of epistemological idolatry that 
constrains us to treat that presence carefully and not make it too central.
But Socrates is not unaware of similar issues. More specifically, like Levi-
nas, Socrates is aware that the most accessible good can easily draw us away 
from the ethical. Beauty, which for Socrates is the most accessible good, can 
lead us to cover over or deny our vulnerability, lack, or neediness and, as a 
result, keep us from remedying it. For Socrates, awareness of our ignorance is 
what spurs us to inquire and come to know. And, since virtue is knowledge, 
admission of such lack is crucial to attaining virtue. Similarly, because of 
beauty’s fundamental connection to appearance, our love of beauty can lead 
us toward what seems good or to a surface good rather than what is good or 
to a deeper good. This is another way that beauty, the accessible good, can 
lead us away from the ethical. Because of these problems, Socrates, like Levi-
nas, often downplays the role of the accessible good—beauty—in our lives. In 
the Phaedrus, Socrates has to be forced to discuss it. The ecstatic palinode in 
which he describes our soul as a chariot pulled aloft to view a radiant vision 
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of the highest forms is a speech he resists giving. Phaedrus has to threaten 
him, playfully, with violence to keep him from going away instead. But, in 
that speech, and in some other places, like Levinas, Socrates actually gives the 
accessible good its due. In the end, for Socrates, the beautiful and the good 
are not in conflict. Desire, though associated with beauty, aims at what is best 
and, rightly informed and developed, helps us attain that aim. Desire is like 
reason, for Socrates, in aiming at what is best, and only needs appropriate 
rational development to attain it. According to Socrates, the beautiful, ap-
propriately understood, is the cause of the good.
4.
Beauty, as we said, shone bright among the other beings! And now 
that we have come down here, we grasp it, shining most clearly, 
through the clearest of our senses. For sight is the sharpest of our  
bodily senses, although it cannot see wisdom—how awesome would  
be our love if an image of wisdom came through sight as clearly as 
beauty does—nor can it see any of the other loved things. Beauty  
alone has this fate, to be what shines forth most and is most loved. 
(Phdr. 250c8–e1)
Beauty shines brightly. Any of us can see it. It is the most accessible of the 
highest forms. It not only shines, but shines forth most (ekphanestaton). 
Socrates is motivated by it when he is young, as we see from the fact that, as 
a young man in the Parmenides, he does not want to extend the application 
of his newly discovered idea of form to such entities as hair, mud, and dirt. 
Likely to test Socrates, Parmenides describes hair, mud, and dirt as ridiculous, 
least honorable, and most base. Socrates takes the bait and concurs—though 
he confesses that he sometimes has at least some inclination to grant that 
there is a form of them, but that when he does, he flees “for fear of falling ru-
ined into a pit of nonsense” (Prm. 130d6–7). Parmenides thinks Socrates has 
this reaction due to the fact that he cares how he appears. When he is older 
and more philosophic, Parmenides avers, Socrates will no longer dishonor 
such things:
“For you are still young, Socrates” Parmenides said, “and philosophy 
has not yet taken hold of you as hereafter it will take hold of you, 
in my opinion. Then you will dishonor none of these things. But 
now, due to your age, you are still concerned with how you seem to 
people (pros anthrōpōn doxas)” (Prm. 130e1–e4).
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Parmenides, of course, is right that when Socrates is older, he will come to 
care less about how he appears to people. We see this in numerous examples 
in the dialogues. For example, in the Gorgias, when Socrates and Callicles 
discuss justice, Callicles maintains that justice is nothing but the advantage 
of the strong or superior person, and Socrates uses as examples to think about 
Callicles’s claim a doctor, a weaver, a shoemaker, and a farmer. Callicles com-
plains to Socrates about the examples, saying, “By the gods, you simply never 
stop talking about cobblers, clothiers, cooks and doctors,” mechanical artisans 
Callicles would not even consider as examples of strength or superiority (Grg. 
491a1–3). By the time of the Gorgias, then, Socrates has changed. He is not 
embarrassed by homely examples.
Similarly, in the Symposium, Alicibiades points out that generally Socrates’s 
speeches appear ridiculous at first because the words and phrases in them 
are rough like a hybristic satyr’s hide (Sym. 221e1–4). Alcibiades complains 
about Socrates there that “he talks of packasses, blacksmiths, shoemakers and 
tanners” (Sym. 221e4–5). Again, Socrates is not wary of, but even known for, 
his homely examples.
We see the adequacy of Parmenides’s diagnosis of Socrates’s character 
even more in Socrates’s choice of a simple, earthenware pot as example of 
the beautiful in the Hippias Major. We have discussed the example previ-
ously, in chapter 3, section 3. The type of pot Socrates mentions, a chytra, 
is an ordinary cooking pot, a round earthen pot used for everyday cooking 
and serving.14 Hippias is contemptuous of such an example. He considers 
it base or vulgar and the person who uses it uneducated or a boor (Hipp. 
Maj. 288d1–3). Socrates responds that such a person—and we know he is 
referring to himself—is “not refined but trashy, caring for nothing but the 
truth” (Hipp. Maj. 288d4–5). By the time of the Hippias Major, as well, then, 
Socrates has changed. He is not embarrassed by but quite at home with—and 
even makes a point of—mundane or lowly examples.
If the interpretation I have given of the Hippias Major is right, though, 
in that dialogue, we see Socrates change again. Though he continues in the 
dialogue not to care how he seems—and even makes a point of being trashy—
nonetheless, he comes to see the importance of appearance. Beauty is ap-
pearance for Socrates, as I have argued. It is the appearance of form. It is 
the transcendent aspect of all being. As such, it is what makes all knowing 
and communicating possible—and, since virtue is knowledge, it is as such a 
source of the ethical.
At the same time, beauty leads us astray. It is a problem for us. Our love 
of beauty often leads us to cover over whatever is ugly. It especially leads us 
to cover over what is ugly or deficient about ourselves, an overestimation of 
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self that keeps us from pursuing wisdom. Such overestimation and lack of 
openness to the real is for Plato what epistemological idolatry is for Levinas: 
in each case, the accessible good leads us away from the ethical through the 
overestimation of self.
Beauty as a mere covering is a common theme in Plato’s dialogues. Cos-
metics is unflatteringly contrasted with gymnastics in the Gorgias, for ex-
ample. Cosmetics deals with bad or ugly aspects of the body by covering 
them, while gymnastics instead aims at bringing the body into good condi-
tion through exercise. Cosmetics is “malicious, deceitful, petty and servile” so 
that people “take on an alien beauty instead of their own beauty that comes 
through gymnastic exercise” (Grg. 465b5–6). Cosmetics covers lack rather 
than making us aware of it. As a result, we have no spur to overcome the lack, 
no spur to become better. The discussion sets up an analogy to the soul. Soph-
istry, on the analogy, is cosmetics of the soul: sophistry makes speeches look 
good without being good. Sophistry prettifies the soul, as well, without en-
gaging it in the kind of mental exercise that really would make the soul better.
Similarly, in the Hippias Major, after refuting Hippias’s definition of the 
beautiful as a beautiful maiden, Socrates restates the core of the issue about 
what the beautiful is as what is “that by which all other things are ordered 
[kosmeitai] and appear beautiful” (Hipp. Maj. 289d2–3). Hippias’s answer, as 
we saw previously, is gold. One might think he is not responsive to Socrates’s 
effort to move their discussion of what the beautiful is away from substances. 
Instead, I believe that what happens in the interchange is that Socrates and 
Hippias interpret the word kosmeitai differently. Related to cosmetics, kos-
meitai can be translated correctly either as “is ordered” or “is adorned.” Pre-
sumably, Socrates means to imply that things in good order are beautiful. 
Hippias, instead, takes Socrates to mean that things are beautiful when they 
are adorned in a certain way. Much of the drama and the teaching of the dia-
logue stem from this difference in approach, with Socrates connecting beauty 
with good order and Hippias connecting it to surface covering.
For another example, in the Symposium, Alcibiades performs the conflict 
between surface and intrinsic beauty when, having come to the drinking 
party to wreathe Agathon the wisest and most beautiful, he finds himself un-
knowingly seated between Agathon and Socrates: “Alcibiades sat down next 
to Agathon, in between Socrates and the latter, for Socrates had made room 
for Alcibiades when he saw him. On sitting down, Alcibiades embraced Ag-
athon and wreathed him” (Sym. 213a7–b3). After doing this, he sees Socrates. 
Having wreathed Agathon, he is loathe not to wreathe Socrates as well. 
“Otherwise,” he says, “he will reproach me because I wreathed you but not 
him although he conquers all human beings in speeches not only recently 
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as you did, but at all times” (213e2–5). Turning from Agathon to Socrates, 
Alcibiades cannot decide. Whom shall he love? Agathon’s speech is beauti-
ful on the surface: at one point, he extemporaneously breaks into verse—but 
empty of content—a vacuous listing of good human qualities. Socrates, to the 
contrary, is described by Alcibiades as like a satyr on the outside (215b3–4) 
but entirely beautiful within (pankala, 217a1). His speeches initially strike 
one as ridiculous according to Alcibiades, as we saw before, but by showing us 
our need, they show us the way to beauty. Alcibiades says that Socrates makes 
him realize he is in need of much and chastises him because he neglects 
himself (216a4–6). Only Socrates, he says, can make him feel shame (216b2). 
When drunken Alcibiades sits between Agathon and Socrates on the couch 
looking from one to the other, the choice is clearly delineated, between sur-
face beauty and beauty within.
5.
The dialogues on love belie the starkness of this contrast, however. For, in 
both the Phaedrus and the Symposium, beauty is portrayed as the highest 
form, and our love of the beautiful as a passion that can lead us to the highest 
things. Even more, love of the beautiful is portrayed in these dialogues as a 
passion that has no fundamental conflict with the highest things, as we have 
seen in chapter 1. Let us review.
Phaedrus is carrying a speech written by Lysias in praise of nonlovers. 
Socrates criticizes the speech and rewrites it to make its presuppositions 
clear. In this first Socratic speech, Socrates brings out Lysias’s presupposition 
that eros or love is a form of hybris. That, according to Socrates, is why Lysias 
can argue that a nonlover is preferable to a lover. The prior presupposition on 
which the claim that eros is a form of hybris rests, according to Socrates, is 
that there are two sole sources of human action (Phdr. 237d6–7), an innate 
desire for pleasures and acquired opinion that aims at what is best (237d9–
e1). On this account, sometimes desire and opinion have the same goal, but 
sometimes they do not since desire and rational opinion have no intimate 
connection. Desire is not shaped by reason but is irrational and has its own 
natural goal while opinion has no intimate connection with desire and, when 
rational, comprehends what is good or just. In cases in which desire and 
opinion do not have the same object, one can control or master the other, and 
then the one in control is the source of our action. Moderation (sōphrosynē) 
is one type of mastery or control, specifically, control by rational opinion that 
guides us toward what is best. Hybris is the other kind, rule by irrational de-
sire that drags us toward pleasures. Love, for Lysias according to Socrates, is a 
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specific case of such hybris in which the desire involved is eros or love, which 
has to do with the pleasures of beautiful bodies (Socrates’s euphemistic way 
of referring to sex). In love, Socrates says on Lysias’s behalf, the desire for sex 
masters opinion that has an impulse toward what is right (238b7–c4). Ac-
cording to Socrates, it is as a result of these presuppositions that Lysias can 
conclude it is better to have a relationship with a nonlover than a lover since 
the nonlover will control his desires and aim at what is good.
Socrates’s second speech on love, the one he resists giving, the palinode in 
which he takes back what Lysias said and instead expresses his own views, 
does not include the idea of human self-sufficiency or control on which 
Lysias’s conclusions rest. Instead, Socrates strikingly associates love with lack 
of control and being outside yourself. This is a crucial point for this book’s 
discussion of Plato as a philosopher of the other. For Plato’s Socrates, “the 
greatest good things come to us by the way of madness when, that is, it is 
given by the divine” (244a6–8), and love is one example of such divine mad-
ness. Socrates, in other words, thinks of us as fundamentally directed out-
side ourselves. He associates love with being moved (as Levinas thinks of the 
ethical as passivity), with being enthused, that is, with having a god within 
(as Levinas thinks of the ethical as having the absolute other within), with 
awe, with humility, and, generally, with madness (mania) or being out of your 
mind. The helmsman or governor of the soul, who is identified with reason 
(nous), falls on his back at the sight of the beloved and then loves him and 
serves him. He is knocked out and no longer in the things of himself (as 
Levinas thinks of our ethical state as denucleation) (250a6–7). For Socrates, 
then, eros is a divine madness that pulls you out of your self (ecstasy) and 
draws you up (transcendence). Moreover, though eros is madness, it is not 
irrational. Instead, in eros, two lovers together cognize beauty. They cognize 
what really is. As I have said before, in chapter 1, the ecstatic madness of eros 
leads the lover to the most important kind of rationality, a responsive ratio-
nality that is a simple beholding of what is.
In his image of this responsive rationality, the two winged horses repre-
sent spirited and erotic passions, and the winged charioteer represents reason 
(nous). When the lover sees a beautiful youth, there is a conflict between the 
erotic and spirited horses. The erotic horse pulls them all forward so he can 
have sex with the youth, but the spirited horse due to shame refrains from 
going forward and pulls them all back. They struggle again and again until 
the erotic horse wins out and leads them to the boyfriend whose face flashes 
like lightning. But that is not the end of the story of the struggle. If it were, 
a control model would in fact be Socrates’s model of the soul and of human 
action and virtue. If it were the end of the story, then Lysias in fact would be 
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justified in his rejection of eros, and Levinas would be right that, for Plato, 
knowledge and virtue are a return to the self. For eros then simply would be 
satisfaction of one’s own desires.
Instead, Socrates believes that when we see beauty in the world, sensual 
beauty, we discern its likeness to the eternal beauty we saw before we were 
born. We want to fly upward and see that beauty, the very form of beauty. 
When the horses have concluded their struggle with the victory of the erotic 
horse—with the erotic horse controlling and overcoming the spirited horse 
and leading them to the beautiful boyfriend—the charioteer sees the bright 
boy, remembers beauty itself, and in fear and awe, falls on his back (254b7–8). 
He is knocked out and no longer in the things of himself (250a6–7). He re-
strains the unruly horses until they cease to be unruly, and the erotic horse is 
humbled and follows the charioteer’s forethought (pronoia).
In other words, at this very point, Socrates makes it clear that a soul can 
surpass virtue as control and achieve virtue as knowledge. As the three-part 
soul of the Republic is not Socrates’s final account of the soul and the control 
model that accompanies it not the final model of virtue, so the image of 
virtue as control by the charioteer/reason over two unruly horses/passions is 
not Socrates’s final account of virtue in the Phaedrus. Instead, the final ac-
count, the account of virtue in its strongest sense, is the account according to 
which reason and passion go in the same direction. The erotic horse follows 
the charioteer’s forethought (pronoia), Socrates says. That is, eros ceases to 
be controlled by reason and, instead, simply follows it. And, even more, this 
state is not merely an erotic state or an erotic-cognitive state, but also an 
ethical state. For at this point the soul of the lover follows the beloved with 
shame and fear and serves the beloved’s needs. Eros, in other words, is not 
self-directed and brute. Instead, it is open to reason and to being and, as a 
result, it is ethical. The shared vision of beauty makes the soul good. Virtue, 
in other words, is knowledge.
What is implied here, as I argued in chapter 1, is that passions are cogni-
tively intentional. They may function as brute when they are underdeveloped 
or underinformed, as we see in the Phaedrus and in the Republic. There in 
fact is a stage in which passions function as if brute. In the Republic, it is the 
stage, described in book 4, in which the reason is calculative, not contempla-
tive, and the reason involved is convention-engendered opinion rather than 
knowledge. Such a situation is unstable. For, in it, reason is not secured. It is 
not, to use the image of the Meno, chained down. In other words, reason is 
unstable because its conclusions are not based on argument, on grasp (nous) 
of forms or first principles, or on the combination of the two, that is, on ar-
gument that originates in a grasp of forms or first principles. When it is not 
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chained down in that way, it is easily dislodged, as the decline of the regimes 
suggests. For example, a young man whose father did not increase his and his 
family’s substance because he refused to seek office or engage in bad activities 
in an unjust regime might easily be dissuaded by a beautiful or charismatic 
interlocutor. “Why be good?” such a person might ask. “Look where it got 
your father” (Rep. 8.549c2–550b7). What if such a person were Alcibiades? 
What if the issue were expansionist war? What if he filled his listeners’ eyes 
with visions of wealth and power? Views of justice accepted merely because 
they are conventional might easily disappear under such circumstances. Such, 
I maintain, is the longer account of what Socrates means when he argues that 
true opinion is not as good as knowledge for virtue. Only knowing for your-
self what is good will withstand such beautiful speeches. Conventional views 
are not strong and secure enough.
In addition, if virtue is not to be fundamentally unstable—and we know, 
of course, that thinkers such as Hobbes and Freud believe it is deeply un-
stable—its arguments must be based on first principles or forms. It is not 
enough even to have one’s own arguments if the arguments are not them-
selves secured. For Socrates, as for Aristotle after him, they are secured when 
they stem from first principles that cannot themselves be argued for but can 
only be grasped in contemplation. The term for the faculty that engages in 
such contemplation is nous. When we grasp the beautiful or the good, we 
love it. And, when we do, we simply are good. Our passion and our reason 
have the same object. We are, in a unified and secure way, virtuous. The chari-
oteer, Socrates says, seeing the bright boy, remembers beauty itself. In other 
words, the encounter with a particular youth who is beautiful gives us a grasp 
of the form of beauty. This grasp of the universal in the particular is recollec-
tion. The lover’s reason remembers beauty itself, Socrates says. That is to say, 
seeing the beautiful youth, the lover grasps and is informed by beauty and, 
as a result, becomes beautiful himself. In fear and awe before the form of the 
beautiful, the charioteer or nous falls on his back, Socrates says, giving us an 
unforgettable image of a type of reason that is not turned in on itself. As a 
result of this whole experience, the soul of the lover does not jump on the 
beloved but instead follows the beloved with shame and fear and serves the 
beloved’s needs.
Similarly, for Diotima in the Symposium, eros for the beautiful is not con-
trasted to passionate bodily eros. Instead, it begins with it. Correct erotic 
development, according to her, in fact begins with bodily love. “One who is to 
go about this matter correctly must begin while young to go to beautiful bod-
ies,” Diotima says (Sym. 210a4–6). He begins by loving one beautiful body. 
He moves from there to loving all beautiful bodies, seeing that the beauty of 
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all bodies is one and the same. Then he comes to love beautiful souls—decent 
souls—even more, then beautiful practices and laws, then beautiful knowl-
edge, and, finally, the beautiful itself (210a6–211d1).
It is important, of course, in each of these two descriptions, as well as in 
the discussion of the divided line and cave in the Republic, that not everyone 
gets to the absolutely highest visions. Not everyone ascends out of the cave. 
Not everyone sees the beautiful itself in the Symposium. And not everyone is 
a philosopher in the Phaedrus where some are described as being more divine 
than others. In order of descent the possibilities are a philosopher, lover of 
beauty, musician, or lover; a lawful king, warrior, or ruler; an athlete, trainer, 
or physician; a prophet or mystery priest; a poet or another of the imitative 
artists; an artisan or farmer; a sophist or demagogue; a tyrant (248d2–e3). 
Socrates is willing to countenance different abilities of ascent in different 
people.
But our point is a slightly different one in this section. Our question is 
about desire, and whether it leads away from or toward what is best. Socrates 
makes it clear in each of the three ascents—to the beautiful in the Phaedrus 
and Symposium and to the good in the Republic—that ascent is a process of 
pulling out what is implicit in the low. The high is implicit in the low, we 
could say on Plato’s behalf. What we see when we are lovers who see a beau-
tiful body in fact is the beautiful—but it is the beautiful as exemplified by or 
found in a particular bodily instance. As things are images of the forms in the 
Republic, so the form of beauty is implicit in a youth’s beautiful body. Bodily 
desire is not in fundamental conflict with desire for the beautiful because 
the beautiful is implicit in every beautiful body. It is because not everyone 
will move from beautiful bodies to the form of beauty implicit in them that 
Socrates is cautious about stressing beauty as much as the good. It is not 
because of a supposed fundamental conflict between desire and what is best 
for us. For Socrates, desire points us toward what is best for us, if only we will 
follow in the direction it points.
6.
We have seen that one problem with beauty is that it can lead us to care about 
surface beauty rather than deeper beauty. We have also discussed the fact that 
not everyone ascends from instances of bodily beauty to less bodily and more 
generalized or formal types of beauty. We have the resources now to see as 
well that, in fact, these two problems are the same! Beauty motivates all of us, 
but we do not all see it in its most stand-alone form. Alcibiades’s ambivalence 
about whom to wreathe as wisest and best is a paradigm of the issue. It is so 
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easy to love Agathon’s speech, beautiful in form, dramatic in its extempo-
raneous virtuosity, in its accomplishment of on-the-spot poetic form. It is 
harder to love what Socrates does. His examples are mundane. He requires 
us to rethink our most cherished opinions rather than simply utilizing them 
and starting from them in our speeches and our deeds. Socrates is an irritant, 
like a fly buzzing around and biting you when you try to swat it away. He is 
always buzzing around your most vulnerable places where you least want him 
to be. He will not be swatted away.
For there lies the more serious problem with beauty, that the transcen-
dent quality of beauty can lead us away from confronting our human condi-
tion. Eros, Diotima says, is the son of Poros and Penia (Resource and Need). 
Socrates, according to the oracle at Delphi as interpreted by Socrates, is 
aware of his ignorance. Human being is in between utter capacity and ut-
ter lack, variously described, as these passages suggest. Awareness of lack is 
uncomfortable. The beautiful can give us a respite from what makes us un-
comfortable. That is the grace and charm of beauty, that it raises us above the 
least pleasant aspects of our ordinary lives, from irritants like an insect bite, 
to deeper irritants such as our own human failings or, on the graver end of 
things, the inevitability of death.
For example, in the Hippias Major, as previously discussed, when Hip-
pias’s first two definitions of beauty—as a beautiful maiden and as gold—are 
refuted, he provides a definition referring to death as his third:
I say that always, for everyone, and everywhere it is most beautiful 
for a man who is wealthy, healthy and honored by the Greeks, 
having arrived at old age and having beautifully arranged the 
burial for his own parents when they have reached their end, to be 
beautifully and magnificently buried by his own offspring (Hipp. 
Maj. 291d9).
A beautiful funeral hides the inevitability, and possible nobility, of death. In 
fact, the very idea of a beautiful funeral is from a certain standpoint bizarre. 
Central to any funeral is a corpse, that is, a material entity, specifically, a body 
losing its form. What could be uglier? And, inevitably, we all at some point 
will be one, so to speak. A beautiful funeral, in one sense anyway, is a para-
digm of beauty as a covering over what is ugly and, even more, as an event 
that can take the bite or the sting out of our inevitable, human fate.
Moreover, as Socrates’s refutation of the definition shows, to see this as the 
paradigm or as the definition of beauty is to deny beauty to gods and heroes. 
For the gods do not die, and heroes, paradigmatically, risk early death for the 
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sake of important ends. In Greek one even says about them that they died for 
the sake of the beautiful. That is, one says that their dying before their par-
ents for something important is what makes them beautiful. Socrates men-
tions Achilles in his argument by counterexample (along with other heroes 
and gods)—Achilles who died to avenge his beloved friend, Patroclus. We 
can call to mind as well Socrates—who in the Apology compares himself to 
Achilles and who dies for his friend, wisdom—actually becoming a corpse 
in the Phaedo.
The reference to corpses and rot are made even clearer when Hippias re-
sponds to Socrates’s suggestion that gods and heroes might not be beautiful. 
In fact, Socrates is only saying that Hippias’s definition would make gods and 
heroes not be beautiful, but the allusion to the very idea that they might not 
be beautiful strongly bothers Hippias. “Go to blessedness!” he says euphe-
mistically (293a2). The phrase is a euphemism for “Go to the crows!”15 That 
phrase is similar to our “Go to the dogs!” or “food for crows” and is a reference 
to death and, even more, to the corruption of our bodies, since the idea is that 
the crows will eat you! What is this thing called a human being? It ranges 
from blessedness—being close to the gods—to being food for crows. Our 
lives range from blessedness or prosperity to being ground up in an animal’s 
mouth. We range from divinity to dirt. It is hard, in thinking of this euphe-
mism, not to think, as well, of the hierarchy discussed in the Parmenides, from 
forms such as the one, the beautiful, and the good all the way down to mud, 
dirt, and hair. The sweep is found in our human nature.
What, though, if beauty in general came out of what is ugly? A beautiful 
human body contains ugly guts and feces. Perhaps the body is the ultimate 
euphemism for us since it is, from one standpoint anyway, nothing but a 
beautiful covering over ugly guts and feces.16 But this idea, that the beautiful 
results from or supervenes on what is ugly or plain, is one Hippias just can-
not entertain, as we saw in chapter 3. After the third definition fails, Socrates 
wants the two of them, who lack knowledge, to inquire together in order to 
find it. Socrates exhorts Hippias to “look-for-it-with-me” (suzētei) (295b3). 
If they did inquire together, the beautiful, knowledge, would come out of the 
ugly, ignorance. If Hippias looked for it with Socrates and they then found 
it, that would be the most beautiful thing according to Socrates! The most 
beautiful thing is two together seeking and attaining wisdom (295b4). How-
ever, Hippias does not want to inquire together. He wants to say what he has 
already thought out and prepared when by himself. He says that if he were to 
go off and seek the beautiful himself, he would be able to say what it is pre-
cisely—more precisely even than any preciseness: “I know well that if I were 
to go into seclusion for a short time and investigate it by myself, I could tell 
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it to you more precisely than all precision” (295a4–6). Hippias is ashamed for 
his ignorance and ugliness to be manifest in public. But if the two ignorant 
ones pooled their resources together, knowledge might come out of it. For 
both together might be more than each separately. Hippias’s shame keeps 
him ignorant. It prevents him from becoming better.
This, then, is how beauty leads us away from what is best according to 
Socrates. It leads away from what is best if we cannot ever allow that we 
are besmirched by what is ugly. It leads away from what is best if we cannot 
admit our own lack, need, or vulnerability. Hippias, for example, cannot find 
beauty because he cannot admit that he is in part ugly. Socrates presents 
himself as the paradigm of how to find it through admission of not having it 
since he admits to or is aware of his own ignorance. If we let our ignorance be 
manifest, we have the resource to remedy it. If we let our ignorance be mani-
fest together with another, we have perhaps even more resources to remedy 
it, since both together are different than each separately.
Even worse is when we prey on others’ tendency to feel shame at their 
own lack. Socrates, the gadfly, does not do this, but Hippias, the sophist, 
does. He says what people want to hear not what benefits them. Near the 
beginning of the dialogue, he makes it clear that he thinks his wisdom is 
far above that of the ancients but that he does not say so “fearing the wrath 
of the dead” (282a7–8). In addition, since Spartans do not allow education 
that is contrary to established custom, Hippias does not teach them benefi-
cial new ideas that he has. Instead, he teaches them ancient history, reciting 
genealogies of heroes and people and the founding and settlement of cities, 
since this is what they want to hear. Socrates accuses him of simply telling 
pleasing tales, like an old woman entertaining children with stories they like 
to hear: “the Spartans use you the way children use old women, to tell stories 
pleasantly” (286a1–2). Hippias, then, both is uncomfortable allowing his own 
deficiencies to be manifest and also preys on the similar tendency in others by 
saying what they want to hear. They flock to him as a result, but on Socrates’s 
behalf we can ask whether they become better. Using Hippias’s relation to the 
Spartans as an example, we can say that they do not. He is so far from making 
them more fine that he cannot even say what the fine is, and he is unwilling 
to undertake the personal revelations he would have to undertake in order 
to find out. Hippias perhaps does not hear the irony in Socrates’s opening 
line greeting to him, “Hippias, the beautiful and wise” (281a1). Socrates, to 
the contrary, came in his life to the awareness of his own lack. According to 
himself, he learned it at least in one case from Diotima who taught him his 
human, all-to-human, state of being more like a daimon than like a god. She 
tells Socrates, you think Eros is the loved one rather than the lover. Instead, 
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Eros is the lover and love, because it is a kind of desire and desire is a kind 
of lack. Socrates, personified as Eros in the Symposium, progresses over time. 
He does not remain in a shame-governed state all his life. He learns to let his 
need be his resource, his awareness of ignorance be the spur to overcoming 
ignorance, and thus becomes Socrates, the paradigmatic philosopher we have 
come to know.
To summarize, beauty has the power to help us see and be motivated by 
the highest things while at the same time it is problematic in two important 
ways. Beauty’s power is the power to point us toward what is most important 
for us, namely, the beautiful and good. Beauty points us in the right direction 
and, if we go far enough in that direction, we will see the first principles or 
forms the awareness of which can suffuse our lives and motivate us always 
to do what is best. The beautiful, then, is not problematic due to a supposed 
natural or eternal conflict with desire. That, according to Socrates, is Lysias’s 
view of desire and beauty. Instead, beauty is problematic because, though we 
all see beauty, it being the most accessible of the evaluative forms, we do not 
all see it fully and so may prefer a surface beauty over a deeper one. Even 
more problematic is the fact that, under the spell of the beautiful, we may 
deny our human vulnerability. A beautiful funeral hides the inevitability, and 
possible nobility, of death. A beautiful tale can flatter the young by telling 
them what they want to hear rather than what they need. A beautiful politi-
cal speech given by a beautiful, compelling speaker can lead a city to disaster.
Plato, then, has drawn for us a Socrates who is aware of the same type of 
problem about the accessible good that Levinas is, namely, the problem of 
overestimation of the self that leads away from the ethical. The problem de-
lineated by Plato’s Socrates is not, of course, exactly the same problem Levi-
nas delineates. For Levinas, the issue is what I have called epistemological 
idolatry. The job of the philosopher is to loosen the grip of being, Levinas 
says, so that no one said, no one human perspective—especially not our own 
personal perspective—will become identified with the final or whole truth 
about things. To do so is to allow the hypostasis of an eon to become an idol, 
according to him. Even more, it is to see a perspective, our own perspective, 
and therefore ourselves, as being perfect, a form of idolatry, since idolatry is 
seeing what is not perfect as perfect. It is important for Levinas as a result 
that we accept that the other exceeds us and accept that we never quite get 
the other whole or pure. Put differently, it is important for Levinas as a re-
sult that we reinterpret glory not as immanence ordinarily understood but 
as just the other side of our responsiveness: “Glory is but the other face of 
the passivity of the subject,” Levinas says (OB 144/184). Glory is an attenu-
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ated immanence. It is our recognition of the distance between the other and 
ourselves.
Socrates, too, is concerned with his most accessible good not causing us to 
overestimate ourselves. He, of course, does not call doing so idolatry. None-
theless, much of his work is about the same general problem, the problem of 
not wanting to know our own limitations. Dialogues are full of examples 
of this. In the Meno, when Meno has been refuted time and again, his way 
of managing the pain of negative self-awareness is to attack Socrates. That is 
why he gives the image of Socrates as an ugly stingray fish, a fish that numbs 
those with whom it comes into contact (Meno 79e7–80b2). Meno, in other 
words, when faced with recognizing his own lack and seeing himself not as 
beautiful but as deficient and ugly, projects his own ugliness onto Socrates to 
relieve himself of the pain. Hippias, true perhaps to his nature as a diplomat, 
when in the same situation of having been soundly refuted, wants to run 
away and be by himself where he can devise a beautiful speech to give to 
Socrates—beautiful, but probably not true. For Socrates, this tendency we 
have to avoid recognizing our limitations, our lack, our vulnerability, leads 
away from the ethical. And most powerful among such motivations is the 
beautiful since it is the most powerful of all the evaluative forms. It is most 
accessible and can, as a result, either most powerfully lead us to the highest 
things or most powerfully lead us to cover over our needy human condition 
thereby denying us the resources we need to become good.
With this comparison, our discussion of similarities and differences be-




What does the presence of an other hold out for us? Whether it is Phaedrus, 
anxious about his lovers, or Sartre, ashamed before a keyhole, the stakes of 
this question are high. For Phaedrus, the question is whether to open him-
self to others or shut himself off in fear. For Sartre, the issue is whether the 
presence of an other is a risk to his very self, a self that is a self by making 
others objects. For us, the question poses a challenge to some of the dominant 
thought of the cultures that have shaped us. Levinas’s answer to the question 
is that fraternity is ipseity, that I am a self by being in relation to other—but 
that, adding his own proviso, I relate to others while remaining my self. In 
fact, the self is a self by relating to others while absolving itself from the 
relation and remaining itself. Striking about Levinas’s idea of the relation 
is, first, that it is a relation in which I bracket all my own interests, desires, 
and presuppositions in order to relate to the other as such—as the singular 
other before me, the person before me no matter what their properties may 
or may not be at any one time—and, second, that though I am constituted by 
the other, I retain myself in that constitution. Levinas is between Heidegger, 
for whom I am fundamentally in the world, and Descartes, for whom I am 
fundamentally turned in on my self. It is this that makes Levinas an im-
portant transitional figure between those who define us by inwardly turned 
subjectivity and those who make subjectivity fundamentally an artifact of 
something outside itself—or, to use a common set of terms, between mod-
erns and postmoderns.
Levinas, however, as I have shown, is not alone in critiquing the self- 
sufficient self and creating a philosophy of the other. Plato, his frequent 
contrast figure in Totality and Infinity for his own approach to the self, is a 
philosopher of the other. He describes and delineates a similarly fundamental 
and disruptive directedness of self to other. The similarities include the figu-
ratively violent nature of the relation of self to other, the freeing quality of 
being in a relation to an other, and the fundamental vulnerability we experi-
ence in being in such a relation. In addition, their philosophies of the other 
each include a movement from disruption to service, from simple to complex 
freedom, and from personal desire to the active promotion of the futures of 
others.
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With these similarities noted, the differences in each philosopher’s view of 
the nature of relations to others stand out. In fact, one of the goals of this book 
has been to make them stand out and, in so doing, to alter how we see Levi-
nas in the history of thought and how we understand what is most unique 
about him, and as well to open our minds to the idea that there is more than 
one fundamental way to be for or be affected by the other. Levinas is pre-
ceded by Plato, among others, in seeing self as fundamentally, metaphysically 
in relation to other. Levinas, then, is one of a number of twentieth-century 
philosophers to turn to premodern thought for a critique of the self-directed 
self found in Enlightenment thought, based in part on his acceptance of a 
fundamentally Enlightenment, as well as phenomenological, idea of the ac-
tive aspects of knowing. But the premodern sources to which Levinas turns 
lead him to a strikingly different understanding of being for the other, as 
different from Plato’s as the new is from the eternal, as glory is from beauty, 
and as relating to someone as singular is from the responsive beholding of 
that other’s qualities. Two very different kinds of response. Two very different 
kinds of philosophy of the other. Each with its own importance, and each 
with its own very specific, and lasting, appeal.
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n o t e s
Introduction
1. Translations of works by Plato and Aristotle are my own. Translations of all other 
texts are by the cited translator. Page references separated by a slash are first to the En-
glish, then to the French text. The Socrates referred to throughout is the Platonic Socrates 
of the dialogues not the historical Socrates. As a result, some views that originated with 
Plato will be referred to as Socrates’s views since they are views attributed to Socrates in 
the dialogues.
2. Compare Matthew Abbott, “Epistemological Humility: Knowledge After Levinas’s 
Radical Separation.”
3. For similar treatments of the history of Levinas’s references to Plato, see Adriaan 
Peperzak, “Platonism of Emmanuel Levinas,” and Naas, “Lending Assistance.”
4. For discussion of the summary, see Peperzak’s, “Platonism of Emmanuel Levinas.”
5. For external support for this interpretation, see Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1.6, 
where, after a short discussion of metaphysics—about the equivocity of the good— 
Aristotle similarly does not go to the most fundamental metaphysical level. He states 
that further precision on the topic belongs to another part of philosophy (1096b30–31). 
I argue the other part of philosophy is the discussion of being as potentiality and actuality 
in Metaphysics 9. Achtenberg, Cognition of Value, 44–49.
6. See Achtenberg, “Review of The Philosophical Sense of Transcendence.”
Chapter 1
1. I was fortunate to hear Stewart Umphrey discuss the Symposium in 1980 and was in-
fluenced by his approach and ideas. My approach to the Phaedrus shares a stress on human 
vulnerability with Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of them in The Fragility of Goodness.
2. That this vulnerability, figuratively understood as violence, is not violence in an ordi-
nary, concrete sense, is clarified by a comment Levinas makes to an audience member 
during an interchange at the University of Leyden in 1975: “By vulnerability, I am at-
tempting to describe the subject as passivity” (OG 133/83).
3. The view that Levinas thinks openness brings something good to the one who is 
open is counter to the more common assumption that, for Levinas, my responsible rela-
tion to the other fundamentally does violence to me. It is my view, counter to this, that 
for Levinas, though my relation to the other is all about the other, nonetheless it brings a 
good also for me. This view of his is more evident in Totality and Infinity, with terms like 
marvel, new dimension, and teaching, but also found in Otherwise Than Being, specifically 
in the concept of glory, despite the later work’s greater emphasis on responsibility and its 
backgrounding of desire, a term central to Totality and Infinity. The concept of glory, in 
a Hebraic register, denotes a type of immanent good. Why Levinas emphasizes respon-
sibility and backgrounds glory is one of the main topics of chapter 7, “Glory and Shine.” 
The chapter also discusses a parallel foregrounding and backgrounding found in Levinas’s 
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“Loving the Torah More Than God,” where acceptance of the withdrawn God is in the 
foreground but gives one the standing to ask for a little of God’s presence, and maintains 
that a similar pattern is found in one interpretive strain in Jewish thought, a strain in 
which the holy is emphasized and glory mentioned in hushed tones to de-emphasize it.
4. There are other frames. One of Derrida’s ways of expanding Levinas’s legacy is by 
utilizing many frames. I shall leave delineation of that extraordinary set of expansions to 
other discussions.
5. This chapter refers to Levinas’s treatment of ideas in Totality and Infinity, the earlier 
of his two major works.
6. Hybris has a variety of meanings all suggesting a disposition to overstep limits: wan-
tonness, arrogance, insolence, insult, violation, assault. The verbal form, hybrizein, can 
mean to rape someone.
7. At 246b1–2, Socrates refers to the charioteer as the ruler of the soul: “the ruler holds 
the reins of the pair [ho archōn synōridos hēniochei].” At 247c7–8, he calls nous the soul’s 
governor or helmsman: “really existing being, visible alone to reason, governor of the soul 
[psychēs kybernētēi monōi theatē nōi].”
8. Since I see Socrates making one-to-one comparisons—moderation and shame to 
hybris, genuine reputation to boasting, driven by commands and speech alone to deaf and 
barely yielding to whip and goads—I translate alēthinēs doxēs (253d7) as “of true reputa-
tion.” Love of honor (philotimia) is left out of the comparison due to the fact that Socrates 
is describing the virtue of the good and bad horses so that the sense is: though he is a lover 
of honor, nonetheless he has moderation and shame.
9. Though this comes from a slightly earlier part of his speech, in it, Socrates is talking 
about a lover (249e4).
10. Regarding the boy, Socrates refers to “the flow of beauty going back into the beauti-
ful one through the eyes” (255c4).
11. In chapter A.2, Lingis translates rupture as breach (TI 35/5) while in the second 
reference given here, he translates it as rupture (TI 278/255).
12. See also TI 197/171.
13. As noted before, Levinasian absolute transcendence is distinct from Plato’s tran-
scendence of a whole over its parts.
14. The French “le creuse” could have a stronger meaning than “deepens it” such as “hol-
lows it out” or “excavates it.”
15. This calls to mind the other who threatens my integrity in Sartre’s Being and Noth-
ingness and in the lordship and bondage section of Hegel’s Phenomenology.
16. Fecundity can be read as Levinas’s response to Heidegger’s being toward death and 
can instructively be read together with natality in Hannah Arendt’s The Human Condition 
as another such response and with Derrida’s survival (survivre) or legacy.
17. For ecstasy, see also TI 48/18 where Levinas states that metaphysics “excludes the 
implantation of the knowing being in the known being, the entering into the Beyond by 
ecstasy.” In a similar vein, Levinas rejects apostasy of the self: “But faced with this alterity 
the I is the same, merges with itself, is incapable of apostasy with regard to this surprising 
‘self ’ ” (TI 36/6).
18. The contrast is with Hegel’s universal identity that negates the heterogeneous. Levi-
nas quotes Hegel: “but this which is distinguished, which is set up as unlike me, is im-
mediately on its being distinguished no distinction for me” (TI 36–37/6–7). In “Love and 
Filiation,” Levinas says that in contrast to “knowledge which is suppression of alterity and 
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which, in the ‘absolute knowledge’ of Hegel, celebrates ‘the identity of the identical and 
the non-identical,’ alterity and duality do not disappear in the loving relationship” (LF 66).
19. As we will see in chapter 6, in Otherwise Than Being, Levinas refers to a “good vio-
lence” (OB 43/56).
20. As Sartre would maintain who, according to Levinas in his interview with Richard 
Kearney, interprets the other fundamentally as a threat. Levinas, “Ethics of the Infinite,” 
182.
21. In Otherwise Than Being, being is adverbial.
22. Thanks to Antonio Calcagno for helpful comments on a previous version of this 
chapter.
Chapter 2
1. Gorgias states that rhetoric is the greatest good for human beings because it brings 
freedom and the power to rule over others in one’s own city (Grg. 452d5–8).
2. When Socrates directs the slave to draw an additional figure inside the original one, 
all the slave has to do to solve the geometrical problem of finding the double square is 
see that the new figure drawn is, in fact, the double square. Seeing that could, however, be 
understood to be an example of recollection as described in the Phaedrus where, as we have 
seen, it is defined as understanding what is said according to form, moving from multiple 
perceptions to what is gathered into one by reasoning (logismōi) (Phdr. 249b6–c4). Recol-
lection, in other words, is, roughly, movement from perception to the conception or idea 
that is implicit in it. That is all the slave needs to do, make explicit what is implicit in what 
he sees.
3. When the topic of the sophists comes up, Meno begins to express some personal 
questions about which he would like to inquire: he admires Gorgias for not claiming to 
teach virtue but simply to make people clever speakers; he cannot tell whether the soph-
ists are true teachers; and he wonders how good men ever come to be and whether there 
really are any. Meno’s genuine questioning about what really matters to him—how to get 
virtue—enables Socrates to argue that knowledge, since it is more lasting, is superior to 
true opinion (97c11–98a4). The discussion then devolves into a mush of statements, some 
of which contradict claims they have made before that pass Meno by without notice, for 
example, the claim that if virtue is wisdom, then it can be taught (98d10), and the claim 
that since virtue cannot be taught, it is not knowledge (99a7–8), when they had agreed 
that knowledge was achieved through recollection. Just about nothing of the argument 
has stayed, in a lasting form, in Meno’s mind. Meno remains the same. So the dialogue 
ends with the conclusion that virtue is true opinion and must come by divine allotment 
or fate, since it cannot come by knowledge. This parallels what Socrates probably thinks at 
the end of the dialogue about Meno himself, that if he is to achieve virtue, he would get it 
as a kind of divine gift and not through achieving knowledge, since he remains averse to 
or by disposition incapable of thinking for himself, that is, of recollecting.
4. Plato, like Homer, is fond of puns and wordplay. In the Meno, he plays on the similar-
ity between the sound of Meno’s name and the word for remembering (mnēmōn, Menōn) 
to make fun of the fact that Meno is someone who remembers what he has heard rather 
than thinking. The title of the Meno means remaining, which is what Meno does—remain 
the same, not change at all in his tendency to say what he has heard rather than thinking 
for himself—as pointed out by Jacob Klein, A Commentary, 44, 186. The title of the dia-
logue on friendship, a kind of relationship, is “breaking up” or “dissolution” (Lysis).
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5. More specifically, one would suppose, the form of the good, since if virtue is know-
ledge of forms, it would have to be knowledge of evaluative forms not just of any kind of 
form since Socrates makes it clear at 88a–b that he distinguishes the type of knowledge 
that virtue is, wisdom (phronēsis), from intelligence or quick thought (eumathia). Virtue, 
for Socrates then, is wisdom not mere intelligence or intellectual ability.
6. The claim that virtue is the ability to get good things is refuted by the claim that it 
would only be the ability to get good things justly, moderately, or piously. But Socrates 
says to Meno about the definition, “perhaps you speak well” (78c3–4), suggesting the 
definition is correct. What ability would be the ability to get good things? The answer 
would be knowledge or wisdom. The passage, thus, indicates Socrates’s own answer to the 
question, what is virtue.
7. “What is the subject most argued about by Chrysippus himself and Antipater in their 
disputes with the Academics? The doctrine that without assent there is neither action nor 
impulse, and that they are talking nonsense and empty assumptions who claim that, when 
an appropriate appearance occurs, impulse ensues at once without people first having 
yielded or given their assent.” Plutarch, Self-Contradictions 1057A, in Long and Sedley, 
Hellenistic Philosophers, 317.
8. In Otherwise Than Being, I become a hostage to the other (6/6), substitute myself for 
the other (6/6), am wounded by the other (15/18), am penetrated by the other (49/64), etc.
9. Translation amended.
10. More literally, no longer inside the things of himself.
11. See chapter 1, note 7 in this volume.
12. Socrates does say that all nature is akin (Meno 81c9–d1).
13. Rousseau, “Sciences and Arts,” 6.
14. Emerson, “Self-Reliance,” 28.
15. He goes on in the passage to say that freedom is courage—a difference from Socra-
tes according to whom it more centrally is wisdom.
16. Socrates’s point is similar to the views of Anglo-American philosophers who as-
sociate freedom not simply with the ability to act on our desires or evaluations but on 
our decisive commitments (Frankfurt) or strong evaluations (Taylor). See Stalley, “Plato’s 
Doctrine,” 149–51.




1. See also TI 292/268; GP 67–68/112; EI 188.
2. Another answer, not discussed in this chapter, is found in Levinas’s critique of what 
he takes to be Plato’s understanding of need as mere lack.
3. The idea of creation is discussed also in Otherwise Than Being where it is connected 
to a variety of central concepts taken up and developed in that book such as absolute 
passivity. In that work, Levinas draws a contrast between the Aristotelian idea of prime 
matter as pure potentiality and Levinas’s idea of absolute passivity that, according to him, 
is related to the idea of creation (OB 110/140). This contrast between prime matter and 
absolute passivity is relevantly similar to the one stressed in this chapter between the 
eternal and the new.
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4. In Totality and Infinity, Levinas speaks of openness—for example, of transcendence 
as “openness par excellence” (TI 193/167, my translation)—while in Otherwise Than Being 
he speaks of anarchy. The resonances of openness that are missing in anarchy (a term with 
its own resonances that openness lacks) are a good example of the benefits of not passing 
too quickly beyond Totality and Infinity in discussions of central Levinasian ideas.
5. For pregnancy, see Halperin, “Diotima a Woman,” 117, 137–42.
6. In the Phaedo, Apollodorus’s weeping at Socrates’s death causes everyone present but 
Socrates to break down (117d3–5).
7. Cantarella, Bisexuality, 17–27; Davidson, Courtesans and Fishcakes, 167–82 (contra 
Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 100–109, and Halperin, “Diotima a Woman,” 124).
8. Dover, Greek Homosexuality, 124–28.
9. Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 24.
10. With Kirk, reading palintonos in Fragment 51. Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philoso-
phers, 193.
11. A similar distinction is made by Renaissance Jewish philosopher Leone Ebreo ( Ju-
dah Abravanel), who in his Dialogues on Love has Philo argue that truer and more un-
alloyed desire and love does not involve lack and gives as among his examples God’s love 
for his creatures and a father’s love for his child. Ebreo, Philosophy of Love, 180, 250–52. 
See also the new translation by Rossella Pescatori, forthcoming.
12. The interpretation I give of the good beyond being is my own. It is influenced by 
Klein’s discussion of the divided line (A Commentary) and by Seth Benardete’s discussion 
of the beautiful (“Introduction”).
13. To associate form only with eidos, the fourth level of the divided line, though use-
ful for making verbal distinctions in this essay, is somewhat misleading since the math-
ematicals (third level), the eidē or forms (fourth level), and the idea of the good (beyond 
the line) are all broadly speaking formal for Plato.
14. Achtenberg, “What Is Goodness,” 148.
15. Achtenberg, “What Is Goodness,” 149.
16. The interpretation of the Hippias Major that I give here is my own and has not been 
published elsewhere. Some other important recent interpretations are Paul Woodruff ’s in 
his translation and commentary, Plato: Hippias Major (1982); David Sweet’s “Introduction 
to the Greater Hippias” (1987); Drew Hyland’s “The Question of Beauty in the Hippias 
Major” (2008); and Seth Benardete’s interpretation in the introduction to his book The 
Being of the Beautiful (1984). I read a version of Benardete’s interpretation before the book 
was published and am influenced by Benardete’s interpretation. I believe my interpreta-
tion is compatible with his though it develops most of the key ideas differently than he 
does. Woodruff ’s and Sweet’s interpretations contain important ideas from which I have 
benefited, though my particular discussion of the dialogue’s drama is not found in their 
work. My interpretation importantly differs from Hyland’s about the role of definition in 
the dialogue. I see the dialogue as having an answer to the question, what is the beautiful. 
Hyland, to the contrary, doubts that Socrates “has as his serious goal in these dialogues to 
succeed in discovering an unimpeachable definition” (7–8) and thinks the Hippias Major, 
Symposium, and Phaedrus “give us good reasons to conclude that there cannot be an ad-
equate articulation of the ‘essence’ of beauty itself ” (17). Where Hyland maintains that 
there are difficulties in finding a comprehensive definition of beauty and so Socrates does 
not define it, I would say that Socrates has a definition that includes the central difficulty 
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about beauty—the central aporia—within it. There is something fundamentally puzzling 
about Platonic transcategorials, but the aporia does not make giving a definition impos-
sible. Hyland also says that Plato’s topics are occasioned by an existential situation. I agree, 
but I think that is compatible with giving actual definitions. As stated in the introduction 
to this book, I take the dialogues to be combinations of logos and ergon—argument and 
action—and see no reason why drama precludes successful definition. That is not to say, 
of course, that every dialogue that attempts to give definitions is successful, but I do think 
that some of them are, for example, the Meno on virtue, the Phaedrus on eros, and the 
Republic on justice.
17. Sweet, “Introduction,” 350.
18. Benardete, “Introduction,” xxxiv, Sweet, “Introduction,” 350.
19. Daniel Gebhardt suggested this idea to me.
20. The doubling here is important and gives the reader an indication of what makes the 
form of beauty different than some other forms. Hippias cannot simply say “a maiden is 
beautiful” because some maidens are not. Nor can he simply say that something beautiful 
is beautiful without a mere redundancy. The forced doubling implies that beauty is not 
identical to the properties of a maiden nor are those properties wholly irrelevant to beauty 
in this case. The beauty of a maiden is in and through the maiden’s properties, but it is not 
simply identical to those properties or reducible to them. Beauty is in and through those 
properties but surpasses them, we could say, foreshadowing a point Socrates will hint at 
later in the dialogue.
21. For Hippias, according to Sweet, “Beauty is any beautiful thing.” “Introduction,” 345.
22. This is exaggeration since a good cosmetician will bring out what is already there not 
just hide some of what is there, but I am following Socrates’s understanding of cosmetics 
in the Gorgias.
23. Thanks to Silvia Benso and James D. Hatley for reading and critiquing a draft of an 
earlier version of this chapter.
Chapter 4
1. See Kirk and Raven, Presocratic Philosophers, 269, for this translation of fragment 3.
2. Translation emended.
Chapter 5
1. Derrida famously writes difference with an a: différance.
2. For “epiphany of the face,” see TI 22/51, 48/75, 145/171.
3. See, for example, 1081a14, a23, b21, etc. For discussion of the indeterminate dyad, see 
Benardete, Encounters and Reflections, chapter 7; Klein, Greek Mathematics, 80–83.
4. Benardete used to say the most important word in Aristotle’s Metaphysics was pōs 
(somehow).
5. I discuss this passage further in Achtenberg, “What Is Goodness,” 116–18.
6. I discuss this passage further in Achtenberg, “What Is Goodness,” 129.
7. Uniqueness, as a translation of unicité, is meant to convey singularity not possession 
of a set of properties possessed by nothing else.
8. For dénucléation, see OB 64/81, 141/180, 181/228.
9. See, for example, TI 43/13–14, “to receive nothing of the other but what is in me” 
(regarding Socrates); 43/13–14, “to receive nothing, or to be free” (regarding Socrates); 
51/22, “to receive from the other beyond the capacity of the I.”
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10. Translation emended.
11. For similar comments, see Lingis, introduction to Otherwise Than Being, xxxii.
12. Translation emended (substituting Lord for Eternal ).
13. Translation emended.
14. This remark presages Levinas’s extended discussion of the glory of the infinite in 
chapter 5.
15. See, for contrast, Husserl on retention and protention in internal time-consciousness.
Chapter 6
1. For the proportion, see Klein, A Commentary, 118–19.
2. Chaining true opinions down by “reasoning about why they are true” is one way of 
interpreting “aitias logismōi” (Meno 98a3–4).
3. Klein, A Commentary, 36–38.
4. Aristotle’s use of phronēsis to mean practical wisdom is a later development, though it 
is foreshadowed by the use of it in the Republic to mean knowledge of the good.
5. Or, at least, as an Athens is to a Jerusalem, as I indicate in what follows.
Chapter 7
1. Translation emended.
2. Translation emended to follow the note and Holy Scriptures.
3. Steve Reich’s translation in “Tehillim, Three Movements” (liner notes).
4. Robert Alter, Book of Psalms.
5. Translation emended.
6. Translation emended.
7. Chananya ben Teradyon, second century c.e., was head of Sichnin yeshiva in the 
Galilee.
8. Rabbi Shimon bar Yochai, a student of Rabbi Akiva, lived in the second century c.e.
9. Translation and spelling emended. Proof texts rescinded.
10. Malbim, Remazei Hamishkan, in Plaut, The Torah: A Modern Commentary, 614. 
Rabbi Meir Leib ben Yechiel Michael Weiser, called Malbim, was a nineteenth-century 
Volhynian rabbi.
11. For discussion of the Isaiah references, see Eisenstadt, Driven Back, chapter 2.
12. OB 199/186n11.
13. Hence Levinas, in Otherwise Than Being, can refer to the other interchangeably as 
near or far, hither or beyond. As mentioned in chapter 6, if to relate to the other as other 
is to relate to him or her without a mediating term, relating to the other as other is relat-
ing to an other who is far, because not connected to us by any term, and near, because not 
separated from us by any term.
14. Woodruff, Plato’s Hippias Major, 53n73.
15. Benardete, “Introduction,” xxxiv.
16. Thanks to Christopher Anderson for discussion of the idea of the body as a covering.
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